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CHAPTER I
THE REICH CONCORDAT AND CO-ORDINATION 0? CATHOLIC
ORGANIZATIONS
In 1933? the emerging Third Reieh encountered a
political-spiritual rivalry with the smallest sovereign
state in the world.

Foundations for the Reich-Vatiean

conflict during World War II began with Bismarck and the
unification of Germany under Prussian leadership *

In

1870, Vatican Council I declared the dogma of papal
infallibility which Bismarck regarded as an arrogation
of state rights.

He felt that it detracted from the

supreme authority that the King and Chancellor should
exert over the new German Empire,,

Bismarck*s desire to

appoint ecclesiastics and control education resulted in
the Kulturkampft a contest between the leaders of Germany
and the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church which
led to the expulsion of the Jesuits from Germany and the
"May Laws” aimed at state control of the clergy.

Bismarck

also abolished the salaries and religious orders of recu
sants to bring the clergy under state control.
By 1878, despite persecution of the Church that
accompanied the Kulturkampf, State and Church reached an
understanding which made co-existence possible.

This

was largely due* to the rise of the unique Catholic
Center Party which had a solid Catholic membership drawn
from such disparate elements as to be capable of entering
into either a conservative or liberal coalition.

The

Centers, holding the balance of power between the Social
1

2
Democrats and the National Liberals* brought about
Church-State co-operation by siding with Bismarck against
the other two parties in support of a weakened version
of Bismarck’s isolationist tariff bill,,

Bismarck saw

the need for co-operation with the Center Party not only
to influence the one-third Catholic German population
but as a political force.

Stilly no final settlement

of the respective rights of Church and State resulted.
World War I provided circumstances* when the
United States entered the war and internal German events
brought about a situation seemingly conducive to peace*
in which the Center Party could exert its political
influence.

I-n July of 1917p the Center Party’s con

servative majority supported the annexationists in their
attempt to bring Belgian* French* and Russian terri
tories into Germany’s domain.

The liberal minority*

convinced that Germany could not win the war* proposed
a Peace Resolution with no annexation and no indemnity.
Social Democrats and Progressives joined the newly
oriented Center in favor of the resolution.
were unreeeptive to the new proposal.

The Allies

The Vatican*

too* maneuvered diplomatically in support of restoration
of Belgium under the conditions of the Peace Resolution
in an effort to encourage a compromise peace.

Allied

failure to take advantage ©f the peace proposal curbed
Center Party activity during the First World War and
caused Pope Benedict XV t© cease diplomatic initiatives

3
and t© return t© appeals for peace on humanitarian grounds.
Between 1©70* when the Vatican lost the last trace
of its temporal army as Rome became the capital of a new
Italian Kingdom* and 1919* the Vatican experienced a
transformation in its manner of handling international
problems„

In World War I* it became obvious that Vatican

representation of all Catholics* irrespective of nation
ality* combined with its humanitarian goal on earth to
demand that the Holy See pursue a course of the strictest
neutrality,,

To do otherwise indicated its partiality to

one country* resulting in a decreased ability to promote
its objectives in the neglected country.,
-

The problem became more acute when one of the

factions at war found it expedient to hinder Vatican
policy toward that country*s Catholic population.,

The

Vatican had to remain neutral despite secular pressure
applied to national Catholics in order to forego their
increased persecution in the offending country,

Vatican

policy tried to avoid this dilemma by making non-political
peace proposals based on an appeal to all humanity* re
gardless of the political persuasion of the individual
belligerents,

Benedict XV's adherence to this policy

caused the Central Powers to regard the Vatican as
pro-Ally* and the Allies t© regard it as pro-German,
The Vatican learned that its new wartime policy— a
strange blend of national politics* international di
plomacy* and neutrality— was unwieldy.*

k
Vatican international policy was hampered hy a
similar situation on the State level because the Church
had to refrain from engaging in national polities,

With

■the loss of Vatican temporal power, the philosophy of
separating Church and State became particularly appli
cable! the church being supreme in spiritual matters
and the state foremost in political affairs.

Theo

retically, the Church gave up its right to engage in
politics on any level in order to assure peaceful
existence within the nation and stringent international
neutrality,
Qn the other hand, since the Church recognized
State secular supremacy, it had to advocate that its
members give allegiance to the legally constituted
authority.

Within this framework, the Vatican strove

to fulfill its basic function of obtaining the best
possible conditions for Catholics within the State,
This situation leads to political conflict
that may result in a concordat, an agreement between
the pope and a government for the regulation of ecclesi
astical matters,

A concordat is devised to delineate

a "way of living1' by which the State yields its right
to interfere in most spiritual affairs while the Church
agrees to become non-political.

By this method the

philosophy of separation of Church and State becomes a
reality founded upon the words of a treaty.

The Vatican

negotiates away its right to treat politically with the

5
State -either through itself or the Catholic Church ©f the
nation,,

Nevertheless* when its national programs are

threatened* the Vatican mast resort to national politics
and international diplomacy to protect Catholic interests*
This abrogates the rights assured to it under either the
philosophy ©f separation of Church and State or a con
cordat „■
v0n July 31? 1919* the newly adopted constitution
of the Weimar Republic upheld the undisturbed exercise
of freedom of religion under State protection and did
not impose a State Church*1

During the inter-war period

the Vatican*s superior doctrinal development and organi
zational capacity helped it gather strength in the wake
of weak and unstable lay governments*
By-1933»- the Roman Catholic Church had evolved
into a supra-national entity with persuasive influence
over the moral* ideological* and political actions of
more than 35® million persons in Europe*

Income and

budgetary figures are not published* but the Vatican*s
immense global holdings in finance* property-* and
membership caused the secular powers of the world to
regard the Vatican as an institution capable ©f influ
encing the thought ©f entire countries*

Diplomatic

..jB’oS* 'War Department* Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression"'(Washington„" 19&6)* IV* 6dB* Hereafter cited
i s T l f l This ’is" the Constitution of the German Reich*
TharTGhaptir* Article 135-137» The Vatican generally fears a State Church because it detracts from the inter
national power of the Holy See*

6
relations with thirty-seven nations, exclusive of apos
tolic delegates, and one of the best informed intelligence
services in the world

2

added to this prestige.

The pope,

as visible head of the Church, commanded only a 000 man
temporal militia and an 108 area, but in fact, led an
"empire" camparable in wealth and power to many lay
governments,
This supra-national entity is directed by a highly
centralized organization, having functions comparable to
the foreign services of secular countries, directly re
sponsible to the pope,^

p

The Vatican uses these agencies

............................

Camille M, Cianfarra, The Vatican and the War
(New York, 19l|^), 66-67. Hereafter cited as cianfarra.
The Vatican had more than thirteen hundred bishops
throughout the world who sent periodical reports to the
Holy See. In addition, the numerous Nuncios and apostolic
delegates, having access to the same information as lay
ambassadors, sent both political and ecclesiastical news
to the Papal Secretary of State,
The Roman Catholic Church functions through a
strict hierarchy. The pope is the supreme authority who
delegates much of his power to twelve collegiate bodies
called congregations, three tribunals, and four offices.
These assemblies form the Curia, or Church Government.
The Congregations are comparable to the departments of
state of lay governments. The cardinals, most of whom
reside in Rome although a few are heads of dioceses,
constitute the Vatican Senate, Apostolic delegates have
only a religious mission to lay governments but may act
as intermediaries with the lay authority in practice.
They have access to the same sources of information as
nuncios, who ar© charged with "a diplomatic mission.
This same political mission extends to internuncios.
The papal envoys ©f ambassadorial rank are nuncios while
an internuncio is comparable to an envoy extraordinary
dr minister plenipotentiary. The function of both is
to foster good relations between the Vatican and the lay
state while attending t© the state of the^ Church in their
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to disseminate information and protect its international
flock by formulating policy, programs, and directives
intended to stabilise adverse pressures applied by lay
governments#
On January 30, 1933i> Adolf Hitler, a Catholic,
became German Chancellor and proceeded t© amass sweeping
totalitarian powers under the aegis of the National
Socialist German Workers5 Party (NSDAP)#

The Vatiean*s

inability to reconcile its ultramontanism with the
National Socialist belief in Party supremacy in all
aspects of life gave rise to immediate moral and ideo
logical opposition.

Hitler and the Nasi hierarchy

clearly saw the delicate problem of superimposing
National Socialism upon religion.

They undertook the

political manipulation of the German Catholic Church and
the Vatican so as not to become liable to their suasive
moral and political power#
Conflict first occurred on the political level
within Germany#

Paul von Hindenburg, President of the

Weimar Republic, appointed Hitler t© head a cabinet
based on a parlimentary majority of the Reichstag.

The

iTssigned'territory. Bishops have authority to govern
the Church outside of Rome in conformity with canon law
and papal directives. "'They are the link between the
Holy See and the parish priest# All ranks are directly
responsible through the hierarchy to the pope# For
further information sees Cianfarra, 63=67| Robert A.
Graham,*) Vatican Diplomacy? A Study of Church and State
on the ln¥ernallbbal."Flan^TPr Inc eton, New Jersey, 1939),
23 "and'" 1 2 6
Her'e'slttercited as Graham.

8
Nazi Party*, supported by the conservative Nationalists,
held only 2I4.7 of the $ 8 3 seats and lacked the necessary
votes.

The Center Party, the party of the golden mean

that normally elected betxjeen sixty to seventy members
to the Reichstag, held the balance of pox^er between the
Right and the opposition Left,

Hitler began negotiations

with Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, leader of the Catholic Center,
to secure an electoral majority.

The Chancellor said that

if negotiations failed he would dissolve the Reichstag
and hold new elections.
Kaas submitted questions and suggested guarantees
designed to protect the Center Party.

Hitler immediately

repudiated these- provisions, intended only for discussion,
as excluding a basis for agreement and called for new
elections.^- Kaas protested to Hindenburg too late.
Hitler had already obtained a decree from the President
setting the date of March
election.

1933, as the time for a new

On February 17, the Prussian Minister of the

Interior, Hermann Goering, ordered his police to open
fire on members of parties hostile to the government.
Thus a terrorist campaign began which, although directed
at Communists and Socialists, counted many Catholics among

^"Allan Bullock, Hitlers A Study in Tyranny (New
York, 1962), 255«58o Hereafter cited as Bullock. Bullock
and other competent historians believe that Hitler preraedit&tedly used the submitted provisions as an excuse to
call for new elections.

9
its victims.
The Nazi's intensified election campaign gained
impetus when an alleged Communist revolution and the
burning of the Reichstag building gave Hitler an oppor
tunity to decree the revocation of individual liberties
guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution.

The decree of

February 28 contained many other provisions that allowed
the NSDAP to assume vast powers and culminated, on
March 5* in a Nazi-Nationalist coalition with a bare
majority in the Reichstag.
The Nazis now began a drive for passage of an
Enabling Act to allow the government to deviate from the
Constitution, conclude treaties with foreign powers, and
enact laws drafted by the Chancellor without the co-oper
ation of the Reichstag.

They needed a two-thirds majority

to pass the Act as a constitutional amendment.

The ne

cessity for such a large number of votes again plaeed
Hitler in contention with the Center Party.

It had

actually increased its proportional representation in the
Reichstag during the election.
Hitler*s March 23 Reichstag speech masterfully
convinced the opposition parties that it was to their
advantage to vote for the Enabling Act.

Its appeal to

the Catholic Church Was singularly successful.
<

Promising

........

George Seldes, The ¥aticans Yesterday— Today
"Tomorrow (New York, 193i0» 336» Hereafter cited as Seldes.
GoerTng^planned to eliminate all opposition. Influential
Catholics were included intentionally, not accidentally.

10
peace and Christianity as the foundation of Germany’s life,
Hitler declared that the "Government ^rill devote its care
to the sincere living together of Church and State."

6

The speech evoked an official memorandum from the Fulda
Bishops’ Conference.

It stated that, although the German

bishops had adopted a decidedly oppositional attitude
toward National Socialism, subsequent official German
statements convinced them that their earlier prohibitions
7
and warnings must now be disregarded.1 The historically
opportunistic Center Party, believing the speech to be
a guarantee of Church rights in Germany, voted with the
two-third majority for passage of the act.
Meanwhile the NSDAP began to extinguish the
"Catholic political movement" throughout Germany.

It

brutally attacked Catholic associations such as the
National Convention of Roman Catholic Journeymen and the
Catholic Benevolent Association.

8

Leading bishops com

plained to the Chancellor about the methods employed.
Hitler sympathetically assured them that such.incidents
were undesirable, were not directed specifically against
Catholics, and that Catholic associations would not be

6NCA, VI, 10k.
7

Ibid,, 105. The Pulda Bishops’ Conference began
as an advTsory Assembly of Prussian and Upper Rhenish
bishops. After 1933? It included all twenty-five German
bishops. They directed German Catholic opinion. Quite
often it did not reflect Vatican policy.
O
Seldes, 337-38.

disturbed by the new regime if they entertained no tendencies hostile to the government.

9

The State1s demand that influential Catholics and
their organizations stay strictly out of polities began
to solidify as Hitler molded Germany into a totalitarian
nation.

On April 28* the Chancellor clearly outlined this

necessity to the bishops of Germany,

They had presented

grievances to him concerning deprivation of the freedom
of the Catholic Church* schools* associations, and the
dismissal of Catholic officials purely because of their
ideology,

While forcefully rejecting the idea of any

renewal of the Kulturkampf and speaking of the Church
with great regard* Hitler insisted that it simply fulfill
its spiritual mission and keep its organizations aloof
from party politics,
Gn June 2k» the Reich followed up this warning
by -assimilating the Christian (Catholic) Trade Unions
into the German Labor Front,

The Catholic Unions -had

escaped the general State take»over of unions a month
earlier purely as a concession to their Christian nature.
But they continued to use their special position to
remain undisturbed by National Socialism while promoting

12
politieal Catholicism,,
The replacement of Catholic union leaders with
National Socialists corresponded with conflict in the
areas of education*, youth organizations*, and press
facilities.

Reich-Church tension became so hostile

in fields where both powers claimed jurisdiction that
the necessity arose to draw clear lines of authority
within which Church and State could contain themselves.
The Vatican could no longer divorce itself from the
relations between the Reich and the German Catholics
and*,- searching for a way to protect its German member
ship*, resorted to national political activity designed
to negotiate a concordat similar to those with the
German States of Bavaria*, Prussia*, and Baden.
Germany took the initiative in instigating a
concordat by sending a devout Catholict Franz von
Papen#

12

to Rome to see the Italian Head of State and

NCA*, III*, 383«81|... The spirit of the German
attitude' is captured by the Director of the Office of
the Organization of the German Labor Front in'NCA*, IV*,
i©J?5>s Mlt is "above all “the Catholic party leaders whom
the Trade Unions have taken over who should be removed
from the associations, those men who . . . are main
taining their connections with politieal Catholicism
just as they always have.”
12Fra~nz von Papen (1879*=,1959) i member of Catholic
Center Party| Vice-Chancellor under Hitler*,"January 3©*,
1933«^August*, 193ijL; Special Plenipotentiary for'the Saar*,
November i933csJian©' 193^1 negotiator of’”the Concordat#"
Ambassador to Austria# July 193hraFebruary 193®l Plenipo
tentiary Minister Extraordinary on special mission to
Austria*, July 1936j Ambassador to Turkey*, April 1939August 19l|4»

13
placate the Vatican*

Papen hoped to use the concordat

not only to ease tension with the Vatican but to pacify
the Cabinet Conservatives1 demand that basic Christian
principles be incorporated into the government’s
1^
statements of policy* J
later* Benito Mussolini pointed out to Papen the
momentous effect that a successful agreement with the
Vatican would have on world opinion toward Germany*

He

noted that such an act would establish the new regime’s
prestige abroad for the first time*

He told the German

Embassy in Italy that by enticing the Vatican to conclude
a concordat* Germany could relieve its isolated position*
win a moral victory* and gather favorable Catholic opinion
throughout- the world*

This would place Germany on a

better footing for diplomacy with the lay nations,1^"
The German Ambassador to the Holy See passed this
information on to the Foreign Ministry.

He stressed that

the possibility of a concordat proved important enough
to upset enemy powers who were ”using all their influence
in order to dissuade the Vatican from concluding a treaty
15
with Germany,” ^ Despite foreign opposition, preliminary

“^Franz von Papen* Memoirs (New York, 1953)s> 2?8.
Hereafter cited as Papen.
^fypGFP* C fl I, 636. These thoughts occurred to
leaders of“ the He ich, but Mussolini’s beliefs added
impetus to concordat negotiations*
15
Ibid.* 610-11.
-

lfc
discussions with the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal
Eugenio Pacelli,

16 cordially progressed to a discussion

of the final draft*
German policy toward the Vatican during negoti
ations, indeed throughout the war years, centered around
the two explicit demands that Catholic influence he 1)
absolutely and finally removed from political matters,
and 2) relegated to a purely Christian role as determined
by the State*

The Vatican, which never openly endorsed

national Catholic political parties, bargained away the
Center Party in an effort to conclude the concordat.
The Social Democrats, Communists, and Nationalists
were already defunct when, on July $ 9 the Center declared
itself dissolved in accordance with Hitler*s wishes.
However, sporadic anti-Catholie outbreaks hindered con
clusion of the concordat.

Hitler displayed his genuine

concern by issuing orders to rescind former measures
against Catholics in order to appease the Vatican and
17
promote conditions conducive to signing of the concordat. ’
His desire to bring internal peace succeeded and, on July

' ‘
l6Eugenio Pacelli (1876-1958): Ordained 1899?
promoted to Secretary of the Sacred Congregation“for
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, .191i|.| consecrated
Archbishop of Sardes, 1917? Papal Nuncio to Bavaria,
1917? Papal Nuncio to Berlin, 1925“29? made a cardinal
and Secretary of State,“1929? traveled extensively in
both Americas and Europe? made Camerlengo in 1935?
elected as Pope Pius XII and reigned from March 2, 1939
to 1958.
1TPapen, 281.

15
20* 1933s Papen and Pacelli ratified the first important
foreign treaty entered into by the Third Reich*— the
German-Vatican Concordat,,
,The Concordat theoretically delineated the entire
gamut of legal relationships between Church and State*
but the heart of the document* the provision without
which the Reich would not sign* was the regulation of
"politieal Catholicism" contained in Articles 31 and
18
32o
Political Catholicism* originating as a reproach
against the Roman Papacy during the Kulturkampf* became
the vortex of National Socialist agitation toward the
Catholics.

Article 31 guaranteed protection to purely

religious organizations and their respective Christian**
oriented affiliates„

Organizations extending beyond

these limits to add social or professional interests
were similarly protected provided that they remained
absolutely non-politiealo
The State also guaranteed the right of regular
worship, to members of sport and youth organizations
falling under State control,,

Members of these organ

izations received the right of exemption from partici
pation in activities not in harmony with their religious
beliefs„

Although the one-party state had become a

reality by the time Papen and Pacelli signed the document*
10
See Appendix A* 18?° 91 for
from the Concordat,,

selected articles

16
Article 32 removed the last possible opposition by flatly
excluding the clergy from political parties (except the
NSDAP) and activities on their behalf.
The majority of the articles proved unsatisfactory.
Article I contained the usual clause pledging freedom of
religion.

Articles 5 through 10 described the legal

status of the clergy, and 11 through 13 diocesan boundaries
and juridical religious bodies.

All Articles depended on

favorable interpretation and, in some cases, the status
of German civil law.

Under Article lip the pope appointed

the bishops who assumed office only in the absence of
political objections by the government.

The selected

bishops then, by Article 16, swore a loyalty oath to the
Reich.
The Vatican obtained its major victory in Articles
19 through 25 which guaranteed the Catholic educational
system by providing a basis by which Nazi inroads in this
area could be combatted.

Most of the remaining articles,

between 25 and 31? regulated marriage, prisons and other
institutions, and the language to be used in church
services. 19
; Problems of practical application of the Con=
cordat8s terms became the subject of numerous crises even
before the final ratification.
19

Misinterpretation, or.

See Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi
Germany (New York, 1961$.), 79=66 for a superb explanation
of the Concordat terms. Hereafter cited as Lewy,

17
narrow interpretation* precipitated most crises* but -the
true reason was more fundamental*

The Church grossly

misunderstood the lengths to which National Socialism
would go to uphold its totalitarian ideas, and the Reich
failed to realize how steadfastly the Church would cling
to its basic doctrines*

The document offered various

opportunities whereby divergent views could be reconciled
by "joint agreement,” but neither camp foresaw its beliefs
as totally exclusive of the other’s.
The NSDAP«s method, and that of Hitler, was to
"jointly agree" only when a number of solutions acceptable
to the Reich were proposed and the Vatican accepted one
of them*

This worked well for Article 27 whereby the

Reich nominated a number of Army Bishops, and the Holy
See appointed one "so that no one can be appointed by
„ 20

the Vatican to whom the Reich Government does not agree."
However, this method did not succeed in areas where Ca
tholicism was more firmly entrenched.
Article 31 provisions for regulating Catholic
politieal activities were a constant source of irri
tation, but the first clashes occurred in the field of
youth education which seemed to be stabilized by Article
21.

This article provided that religious instruction be

taught in accordance with Catholic principles as an

20DGFP, C , I, 622.

Letter from Papen to Hitler.

18
integral part of secondary* senior* and vocational school
currieulums#

Nevertheless* National Socialist requirements

that teachers join the NSDAP* teach in an atmosphere of
anti-Semitism* and remove crucifixes from the classrooms
became irreconcilable with Catholic beliefs in humanitarianism and the display of the visible Church#
Another acute problem arose concerning German
assimilation of Catholic youth into organizations directed
by the State#

Section ij.* Article 31 pre-supposed differ

ence of opinion in this respect and specified that members
of these bodies need only participate as far as their
religious conviction would allow#

Here again, as National

Socialism gradually inculcated its beliefs into the organ
izations* the Church found its principles in opposition#
The satisfactory solution of resulting disa
greements never occurred under the Nazis and, as Germany
expanded to Western and Eastern Europe, new differences
emerged when the Concordat did not sufficiently cover
situations arising in newly incorporated and occupied
territories.

Finally* the statement of Article 33,

Section 2* that? "Should differences of opinion arise
regarding the interpretation or execution of any of the
articles of this Concordat* the Holy See and the German
Reich will reach a friendly solution by mutual agreement
. o o ■#"

21

21

became untenable#

See Appendix A* 190#

19

Still9 in July 1933# the Concordat initially satisfied both the Vatican and Germany,,

Eminent Catholics now

considered the Reich as a bulwark against eastern communlsms
and Cardinal Pacelli assured the German Catholics that their
position in the nation was secure*
vantages for the Third Reich.

Hitler saw many ad

Considering the Vatican1s

stand against national Socialist doctrine the mere act of
negotiation pleased him.

More notably, the accomplished

fact caused Catholic withdrawal from most political ac
tivity,

Also, proper manipulation of the Concordat terms

would allow him to prevent the Vatican from concluding
further treaties with the individual German states*

This

measure, to stop Vatican exploitation of German political
divison by forming separate concordats, greatly influenced
22
German desire for the Concordat.
Most importantly, he
realized that the conciliation, seemingly impossible a few
months before, earned him support from all over the country
as Man unreserved recognition of the present regime! • *
« o»23
r

"

Anti-Catholic measures increased in Germany im
mediately after ratification of the Concordat*

On July

25, the government promulgated a sterilization law of

-2 %onradHeiden, Per Fuehrer; Hitler*s Rise to
Power (Boston, 19^4), 63I4JT -Hereafter cited as Heiden,
Der-'Fuehrer „
23DGFP, C, I, 653I Papen, 280*

20
untold repugnance to the Church.

The "Law for the Pre

vention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring" had been
approved on July 1^ but was put off until the 25th so as
not to jeopardize conclusion of the Concordat.

From this

time forward the Reich carried out a conscientious policy
Of "co-ordinating" the German Catholics.

Co-ordination

meant to construct a quasi-national Germanic Church which
would pursue interests parallel to the National Socialist
principles of the State. Attempts to achieve this result caused Germany
to over-step guarantees decreed in the Concordat,

In

October, the Vatican presented the Foreign Minister with
a list of specific .points of discord arising from German
violations of the document.

The Vatican expressed the

opinion that the situation differed "from the tragic
experiences of the Kulturkampf of the past only by its
greater harshness and depotism."

2k-

Yet Germany showed

little inclination to negotiate about these differences
until the middle of December.

At that time Hitler

approved the sending of a special representative to
communicate directly with the Vatican rather than through
Diego von B e r g e n , t h e Ambassador—to the Holy See.

The

Reich took this action only after Ambassador Bergen
2k-

DGFP „ C . II, 25.

25lbld.. 9 . Diego von Bergen; German Ambassador
to the Holy See, April 1920-Apri-l 19^3.

21
repeatedly stated that the Holy See displayed a profound
distaste for German failure to discuss the Concordat
breeches,

BergenJs warning that the Vatican was beginning

to advocate an outright schism with the Reich resulted in
a direct and open display of Germany's willingness to
consider the breeches,,

This proved to be a highly suc

cessful maneuver,
Pope Pius XI

Of\

had already written a Christmas

speech denouncing Germany in the bitterest terms for
violating the Concordat in regard to the education of
youth and persistent ill-treatment of Catholics all over
Germany,,

"All the world was expecting a very sharp pro

nouncement against us by the Pope*, , , ." Bergen wrote
to the Foreign Minister,

11and

we succeeded only by dint

of the greatest effort, and by use of all the diplomatic
means at our disposal, in eliminating bit by bit the harsh
ideas already set down in writing,"

27

Pius XI rewrote the

speech and attacked only the sterilization law while delet
ing all other anti^German passages.

The special repre

sentative's presence successfully stopped the Christmas
denunciation and caused further action concerning the list

^Ambrosi© p'ajnlen Achille Ratti,(1857-1939)° Apostblic Visitor to Poland, the Baltic States, ^and. Russia,
1918? Papal Nuncio to Boland, 1918-1921f made a cardinal,
1921| elevated to Archbishop of Milan, 1921 j elected Pope
Pirns XI on February 6 , 1922 and served to March 1939?
greatest political achievement was the Lateran Treaty with
Italy, 1929,
2 7 DGFP^
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of breeches to lapse into oblivion simply because of
oR
calculated inaction by the Reich.
Co-ordination of the German Catholic political
apparatus continued in 1934

manifested by State

take-over of the great array of daily nex^spapers,
weeklies, and periodicals of the Catholic Press.

In

February, the Reich Director of the Press subordinated
Catholic publications to the NSDAP.

The following year

Germany pointed out that the Church no longer needed a
press as the Concordat provided for government pro
tection of the Church.

Finally, with the outbreak of

war the press remaining in existence complied with
demands of the NSDAP to join their propaganda campaign.
However, reduction of the press to a shadow of its former
power negated the great benefit that this may have had
for Germany,

29

The appointment of Alfred Rosenberg,

30

author of

the pagan and racist The Myth-of the 20th Century, as

28

The special representative, Rudolph Buttmann,
periodically appeared at and disappeared from the Vatican
throughout 1933 and 1934* Buttmann made prolonged excuses
for his absence only to return xdien the Vatican applied
great pressure.
Subsequently, he would refuse to converse
and leave again.
See; DGFP, C , II, 25* 172-73* 240, 247.
29Lewy, 143-148.

30
Alfred Rosenberg (1893~1946)“ early associate
of the Nazi movement! head of the Nazi Party Office for
Foreign Policy' and Ideology, 19331 Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, 194-11 official Nazi phi
losopher and author of many' other treatises on Nazi doctrine
besides The Myth. Inclusion of The Myth on the Catholic
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director of ideological training for the NSDAP hindered
further negotiations concerning practical application of
the Concordat.

The Vatican looked upon his appointment

as a confirmation of German plans to exterminate Christianity and to replace it with a united Germanic Church
under the leadership of National Socialism*

The Reich

merely explained that the Vatican need not worry since
no one was obliged to read the book.

During the summer

of 193ij- the Nazi !,Roehm Purge" of military elements in
opposition to basic Reich policy, including many Catho
lics, and an abortive Nazi putsch in Austria over
shadowed direct concern about this appointment.
In May, a month after Rosenberg’s appointment,
Ambassador Bergen became quite anxious about the de
terioration of Reich-Vatican relations and sent a long
communique to the Foreign Minister to that effect.
Bergen pointed out that a clash with the Vatican was
inevitable because German maneuvers to frustrate imple
mentation of articles of the Concordat not favorable t§
the Reich had become less effective.

The Concordat was

a major treaty with a foreign power which led Bergen to
conclude that if an actual discharge of obligations was

Index over-joyed Rosenberg who believed this contributed
greatly to its circulation. The work evoked many violent
attacks from the bishops which might otherwise have been
avoided. Many circles maintain that Hitler’s failure to
read and censure the book was a blunder on his part.

2k

not carried out the Vatican would discredit German fi
delity.

Bergen knew this would encourage other foreign

powers to cast "doubt on the credibility of all the
political agreements and commitments proposed by us
31
[Germany]."
Such an action would also have an
unwanted reaction in the highly Catholic countries and
hinder German plans to re-occupy the Saar.
The Reich accepted Bergen's advice and intensi
fied relations with the Vatican aimed mainly at reaching
some agreement over the Concordat that would satisfy the
Holy See.

Negotiations, although rather unproductive,

proved successful enough to pacify the Vatican for the
moment.

By August 5,- Minister of the Interior Goering

felt that problems arising from Nazi interference in
Church matters had dissipated enough to order all State
and Party authorities "to refrain from making any kind
of disparaging remarks either about the Church's re
ligious and moral doctrines or about ecclesiastical
32
institutions and persons."
Thereafter, when Hitler
became Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor as well as Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces upon Hindenburg’s death,
Reich-Vatican relations returned to more normal channels.
Throughout 1935 and early 1936 conditions remained

3 1 DGFP,
3 2 Ibid.,

C , II,

8I
4.I-I4.2 .

Ill, 291-92.
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much the same.

Germany continued to impose National

Socialist principles and totalitarian ideals upon the
Church* but open friction became less obvious.

Dis-

cussions of Article 31 virtually disappeared as the
Foreign Ministry continued to promise settlement of
outstanding questions* and the Vatican steadfastly
demanded practical proof of the German intention.

The

situation matured into a German-Vatican rapprochement
because the Vatican feared that Communist-supported
Popular Front governments in Spain and France would
allow atheistic communism to sweep into Europe.

By

January 28* 1936* Germany pursued the eradication of
political Catholicism and co-ordination of the Church
only to a degree that would not develop into open
conflict with the Vatican.33
Yet* pressures to incorporate Catholic organi
zations into the State and to replace Christian beliefs
with those of the &SDAP continued.

Article 33- neither

satisfactorily defined what associations could remain
active nor to what degree the youth movements could
retain religious instruction outside of the standard
State supported program.
As the years passed and the totalitarian State
became more cohesive* the Keich more and more believed

33DGFP, C » IV* 1010.
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that Catholic youth associations over-stepped their vaguely
described bounds into the realm of political action.
they clashed with the Hitler Youth.

Here

Minor prohibitions

placed on the Church organizations, without interference
by the German Bishops or the Vatican, accumulated until
complete abolition of the Catholic youth caused grave
concern at the Holy See.
On December 1 , 1936* Hitler outlawed the Catholic
Youth Association and named Baldur von Schlrach as "Youth
Leader of the German Belch.H

The Nuncio to Berlin, Mon-

signor Cesare O r s e n i g o r e f l e c t e d Vatican opinion by
strongly protesting against what amounted to compulsory
enrollment of the entire German youth into the Hitler
Youth. "Indeed, the 108,000 Hitler Youth of 1932 swelled
to 5»400;00'by the end of 1936 and to 7 ,700,000 in
1939*35

Catholic rights to religious instruction in

schools and to maintenance of theological schools and
seminaries as stipulated in Articles 20, 21, and 23 of
the Concidrda;t steadily'lost ground and protesting Catho
lics were confined to concentration camps.

These and

other pressures culminated in 1937 when.the Reich-Vatican
conflict reached a peak.
34

Cesare Orsenigo (1873-1946)i Apostolic Nuncio
to Hungary and Poland, 1929; Papal Nuncio to Berlin,
1930-1945; influential in negotiation of the GermanVatican Concordat.
3 5 NCA, V ,
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The more courageous leaders of the episcopate sent
a delegation to pressure Pope Pius XI into taking a stand
on German suppression of Catholics,

The Pope needed no

urging because the Reich repeatedly failed to respond to
his communications and had now all but terminated negotiations over the Concordat,

Pius XI penned an encyclical

concerning the condition of the Church in Germany entitled
Mit Brennender Sorge ("With Burning Anxiety”).

The Vatican

instructed that the document be smuggled into Germany, to
prevent a ban on its being read.

Copies were made and

sent to all the parish priests and bishops to be read from
the pulpits.
The specific and explosive character of the antiGerman pronouncements caught the Reich by surprise.

The

encyclical of March lij.* 1937s went directly to the heart
of German fears that lack of agreement over*.and breeches,^
of, the Concordat would be placed before the world as an
unfulfilled treaty,

Pius XI devoted lengthy passages to

the Reich!s "unwritten law" of arbitrary misinterpretation,
evasion, and open violation of conditions agreed upon by
the two powers.
Governments are rarely named in encyclicals
regardless of what offenses they have inflicted upon the

J U.S., Department ©f State, Documents on German
Foreign .Policy, 1918-1911.5, Series D, (1937*
‘(Washington: 195b“l96ij.), I, 93b, Hereafter cited as
DGFP o
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Church.

In this way the Vatican can maintain a neutral

position by making humanitarian appeals to the world at
large.

But “Anxiety11 minced no words and the Government

of the Reich saw its title in print.

Clearly, the Vatican

had no intention of compromising with a state that sowed
the seeds of hatred and hostility while persecuting the
Church with “machinations that from the beginning had no
other aim than a war of extermination."
The Reich8s reaction would determine the fate of
the Catholic, population in Germany.

Various authorities

suggested diverse methods of coping with this delicate
problem.

Ambassador Bergen informed the Foreign Ministry

that the' encyclical must be ignored, and the unfavorable
effects neutralized by timely factual replies in the hope
that the storm would pass over.^

The Foreign Ministry,

rejecting this view, regarded "Anxiety" as a call to
battle but reserved its. official opinion until a later
39
kO
date.
Hans Kerri,^ responded by accusing clerics of
hostile acts against National Socialism that had jeopardized any possible agreement in the preceding years.

The

3^For the complete text of "With Burning Anxiety"
sees Harry C. Koenig (ed.)„ Principles for Peace; Selections from-Papal-Documents„ Leo XIII to Pius XII ’
{Washington, 19k3)5
Hereafter cited as Koenig,
38DGFP» I , 934-35.
39Ibid.„ 938.
^0The post of Reichsbischof originated in 1933
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official response followed none of these lines.
Action taken at the top of the Reich hierarchy
cane directly from leaders of the Nazi Party,

The men

who reflected the ■ultimate hostility toward the Church
had now gained control of all aspects of German life
and government.

The official line accused the bishops

and archbishops of violating Article 16* the compulsory
loyalty oath stating that they must strive for the
interests of the Reich while endeavoring to avoid acts
detrimental to it,

Reich leaders failed to halt the

reading of "Anxiety” from the pulpits but* using the
"breeches” of Article 16 as their justification* abso
lutely forbade any reproduction or dissemination of
the encyclical.^
To neutralize its effectiveness Joseph Goebbels*
the Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment*
launched a campaign of accusation against occupants of
the monasteries.

Two old charges left dormant since the

Concordat negotiations of July 1933 were now reopened.

with Pastor Ludwig Mueller in that position, Gn September
28, 1935s Hans Kerri was mad© Minister for Church Affairs
and* displacing the Protestant Mueller* began a program
to incorporate all German churches into a Nazi National
Church with a' Christian basis. The divergent views of
Hitler* Ribbentrop, Hinaaler* and Bormann, sabotaged his
every effort, Kerri was also Minister of Space Planning
which resulted in his dubious unofficial title of "Minis
ter of"Space and Eternity.” Kerri died in 19ij.l and the
post remained vacant.
^DGFP* I* 935»
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The Reich again claimed that the clergymen committed
treason by illegally exporting money from Germany and
resumed the so-called "immorality t r i a l s . F e w
currency violation cases came to court but the immorality trials appeared by the hundreds»

Nazi controlled

daily newspapers ground out sordid details of alleged
illicit relations between priests and nuns and charges
of homosexuality among the clergy*

Restrictions on the

mass media greatly hindered Catholic refutation of these
charges*

The campaign effectively caused a large segment

of the German population to regard the clergy as sex
criminals*
Nevertheless, in May of 1937* the means of diplo
matic couanunieation remained open in an effort to find
some basis for an agreement that would relieve the great
tension that had built up*

On May 29® even this last

hope of achieving a reconciliation was extinguished*
George Cardinal Mundeleins Archbishop of Chicago de
livered a speech charging the "paper-hanging” Fuehrer
and "crooked Propaganda Minister” with engineering
atrocious propaganda methods concerning the morality
trials,A3

^ D G F P 9 I, ,9l|.5i'HGerhard “Ritter, The -German
Resistance;-Carl GoerdeIer*s -Struggle Against Tyranny
(!N@w 1‘orky l95’6 ) 9 ' 54* Hereafter cited as Hitter*
^ 3BGFP5 I, 968I Cianfarra, 101-102*
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Enraged at this personal attack* Hitler prompted
a declaration stating that " *the conditions necessary for
a normal state of relations between the Reich Government
and the Holy See® no longer e x i s t e d . B e r g e n tried to
persuade the Vatican to reprimand Cardinal Mundelein.
The Vatican answered that it was powerless because of
the irrefutable facts* and that though he was a Catholic
Cardinal he was not an official of the Roman Curia,
Hitler then ordered the suspension of the immorality
trials until further notice, but the damage was done.
In his Christmas speech of 1937 the Pope forcefully de
nounced the brutal, violent, and deceitful religious
persecution throughout Germany,
Throughout 1938 and early 19399 Germany embarked
on a consistently negative course to consolidate its
position against the German Catholic Church.

The Reich

closed down the remaining Catholic schools, forbade
publication and circulation of papal messages, and re
lentlessly denounced alleged Vatican violation of rights
defined by the Concordat.

Martin Bormann,^ Deputy of

W pGFP„ I, 993*
)i Head of the Party
^ M a r t i n Bormann (1900-'
Chancery| Secretary of the’Fuehrer (succeeding Rudolph
Hess in 19ij.l) I Reich Leader and Reich Minister? member of
the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich?
General in the Secret State "Police (S.S.)j appointed
Party Chancellor in Hitler*s"political testament of April
29, 19V5l missing and rumored killed in an attempt to
escape from Berlin on May 2, 19^5*
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the Fuehrers issued a regulation banning members of the
clergy from the NSDAP on the grounds that conflicts of
an ecclesiastical-political nature must be avoided*

He

later amended the decree to include all Germans wh© were
even ’’closely connected” with the Church.^

This sig

nificant step affected a very'large part of the German
population*

Soon the Catholic students* associations

throughout Germany folded* the national Young Men*s
Association collapsed* and the last distinct traces of
the German Catholic political apparatus passed into
obscurity*
It is significant that the German Catholics so
easily accepted repression of the Church in Germany*
Acquiescence existed because of the not uncommon belief
that a new and greatly improved era was coming into
existence*

All of Germany felt the impact of revo

lutionary years that produced hope* self-confidence*
pride* and the establishment of a new military might
that had been lost in the frustrating wake of the Peace
of Versailles after World War I*

Much of this hope

was fulfilled between 1933 and 1939.

New jobs were

created and prosperity returned while Germany moved
from one triumph to another under its new foreign policy.
Most people realized thht sacrifices had to be made in

Ill* 606*
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other areas if the dream were to come true.

One of those

areas was the German Catholic Church,
In retrospect, it appears that reduction of Catholic influence in Germany was a gradual and methodical deChristianization of Germany at the order of Hitler,

More

truthfully, this reduction occurred as National Socialism
gradually matured within a totalitarian state, which, by
its very nature, had to subvert the Church to the State,
This is nothing unique in history.

Totalitarianism

cannot condone the existence of another strong and hier
archical organization— the Catholic Church had become
a state within a state— inside its borders.
By 1938, the Nazi Party controlled all aspects
of German activity.

One of the few remaining avenues of

opposition revolved around traditional aspects of Christi
anity such as individual beliefs, family life, and the
Church itself,^
this treat.

In 1939, the Party effectively removed

Strong.Nazis like Bormann apd Rosenberg

now even rejected the Idea of a State Church,

They argued

that no close relationship of any kind could exist between
a National Socialist State and the Catholic Church,
Furthermore, they believed that the Church hierarchy
rejected National Socialism and would not'help the State
Zf-7
Ernst Welzsaecker, Memoirs of Ernst von Weizs^cker (Chicago, 1951) » 169.. Hereafter cited as Welz
saecker,
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m time of crisis.
Hitler believed the same thing but had a much
different attitude about how the Vatican should be
handled,

Whereas Bormann, Rosenberg, and their followers

truly wanted to uproot the Church and its members, Hitler
knew that this would cause it to pull together.

He also

knew that it was greatly to his advantage to keep the
Vatican from taking a public stand against Germany.

He

solved the problem of eradicating the Catholic Church
without alienating the Vatican by tactfully manipulating
'
li.9
negotiations concerning implementation of the •Concordat,
By opportunistically opening, intensifying, and suspend
ing negotiations it was possible for the Reich to suppress
political Catholicism.
Hitler also had the insight to refrain from direct
attacks on the international Church.

Rather than entirely

severing communications xtfith the Vatican and brutally
closing down Church activity altogether, he used indirect
methods,

50

Reich take-over of Catholic youth and schools

on the grounds that it was necessary to further the Hitler
Youth and NSDAP doctrine is one example.

By cautiously

^ 8NCA, III, 167“69.
Ii9
Waldemar Gurian, "Hitler's Undeclared War on the
Catholic Church," Foreign Affairs, XVI, 270. Hereafter
cited as Gurian.
^°Ibid.
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infringing-on traditional Church rights and justifying
the infringements by narrowly interpreting the Concordat9
Hitler reduced the Church to submission.

CHAPTER I I

GERMANY USES CATHOLIC SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION
To understand fully the mood of "new era” confi
dence that helped the National Socialists co-ordinate
the German Catholics, one must examine the simultaneous
triumphs of Hitler’s territorial expansion.

Less than

a month after the signing of the Concordat, Hitler
announced that "because of the denial of moral and
material equal rights to Germany he was withdrawing
from the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations.

On the same day, October 1^, 1933* the Fuehrer

announced that Germany would hold a plebiscite on
November 12 to allow the German people to voice their
opinion of this action.

There was no doubt that the

people, remembering the loss of the First World War and
1
the humiliating Treaty of Versailles, would react favor
ably in this Instance and that an adverse stand by the
German episcopate would have no decisive effect on the
outcome.

Nevertheless, the new government took measures

to assure that the bishops would conform.
The principle method used to bring the bishops
into line was to extol the virtues of German nationalism
while indirectly repressing any opposition.

Vice-

Chancellor Papen, the Catholic protagonist of the Con
cordat, accompanied Hitler to a mass meeting in Essen
and urgently requested his ’’Catholic fellow-cltizens” to

37
reward the new Chancellor’s recognition of Germany’s
Christian basis with their vote of confidence in the
upcoming plebiscite,JMost bishops believed that the regime’s foreign
policy merely expressed the German nationalism of which
they themselves were an intricate part and needed no
convincing.

Yet, the few prominent clergymen who could

not forget Nazi ill-treatment of their brethren and. the
difficulties arising under the Concordat demanded that
concessions be made for their support.

These sparse

demands immediately met with National Socialist reprisals
in the from of prohibitions ontheir press outlets
restrictions on the context of their sermons.

and

On

November 12, 1933, the overwhelming majority of the
bishops, reflecting public opinion of the German people,
followed their nationalistic instincts and supported
Hitler, the Nazi Party, and rearmament by voting their
approval in the plebiscite,
German ambition to re-occupy the Saar, a mining
area placed under control of the League of Nations after
World War I, caused a more difficult problem.

Initially,

the Saar, with its nationalistic German population, could
have easily been incorporated into the Reich with no

1NCA. Y I , 102-03.
2Lewy, 181,
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objections from the Vatican,,

The area was seventy per

cent Catholic and strongly predisposed to Germany because
its Catholic population looked to the bishoprics of Trier
and Speyer^ for leaderships

Ambassador Bergen, aware.of

the tendency of these people to follow the German bishops
and the pope, requested that the Holy See refrain frbm
signs of partiality toward France because it would turn
the people of the Saar against Germany.
Pacelll, the Vatican Secretary of State, laid
bare the problem by informing the Ambassador that Pius
XI and the Saar clergy no longer welcomed German advances
In that area.

This attitude arose because of delays in
2i
carrying out the Concordat*s provisions in Germany.
On
December 8 , 1933. Bergen informed Pacelli that the govern
ment Intended to conciliate questions arising from the
Concordat as quickly as possible and to consider the
Vatican's Ideological objections to the sterilization
law.^

Further efforts to influence the Vatican Included

The bishoprics of Trier and Speyer were within
the Reich proper. These bishops followed the typical
policy of the German bishops which was to support the
state to which they owed allegiance. See; Appendix B,
192-93
locations of German diocesan boundaries.
fypGFP. C, II, 167-70.
5Ibid.. II, 196. This Is the July 25, 1933. "Law
for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring.1*
Germany had proclamated the law despite strong Vatican
opposition.
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the special appointment of Papen to rally support in the
Saar.

By the year*s end, conditions stabilized to such

a degree that the Vice-Chancellor sent a highly optimistic
message to the Foreign Ministry.

He reported that the

Vatican*s representative to the Saar viewed the territory
as a German country which should be returned to the Reich.^
Events during the first half of 193^ caused the
accommodating Catholic outlook to decline rapidly.

Con

tinued deliberation over implementation of the Concordat*
the ”Roehm Purge” that.took Catholic lives, and the as
sassination of Austria*s Catholic Chancellor caused the
Vatican to disregard German attempts to secure its support
in the Saar.

German foreign poliey now became more inter

twined with Vatican reaction to the condition of the German
Catholic Church.

Successful reoccupation of the Saar with

a minimum of hostility from the population was desirable.
This necessitated a relaxation of conflict in the Reich
in order to secure Vatican approval which would, in turn,
insure a favorable plebiscite from the Catholic population.
Itfith this in mind, the government again swayed the
Vatican by undertaking intensified negotiations toward
settlement of Concordat disputes and relaxing pressure on
7
the Church in Germany.
Again, the bishops thought of

6DGFP0 C 9 II, 195=96.
7L@wy, 127.
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their patriotic duty to the country to which they ©wed
allegiance and, influenced by the intense pro-German
feeling within the Saar* gave their support to Hitler*
Gn January 13, 1935* the Saar plebiscite indicated a
resounding approval of the new expansionistic foreign
policy by producing a ninety per cent vote for the
Saarss return to Germany*
The final phase of Hitler8s reclamation of land
lost in Western Europe under the treaty of Versailles
succeeded without opposition from the Vatican.

By this

time, Germany had achieved a general rapprochement with
the Vatican and the German Catholics.

8

Hitler replied

to a Franco-Soviet treaty of February 2?, 1936, by in
vading the demilitarized Rhineland and denouncing the
Locarno Pact as incompatible with the treaty.

The

Rhineland bishops joined the crowds that enthusiastically
9
greeted the troops as they crossed the Rhine bridges.
By July 18, Reich-Vatican relations remained
relatively good as another totalitarian-minded leader
destined to play an ambiguous role in the fate of
Hitler®s Germany marched his Nationalist' troops against
the Loyalists of Republicah Spain.

Generalissimo

Francisco Franc©10 recognized the importance of having

®DGFPo C B IV, 1010. Also sees Chapter I, 25.
9
Lewy, 201.
10
Francisco Franeo (1892) i made a General,
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the Spanish Catholic’s support for his

plans while, at

the same time, creating a commonly acceptable ideology
among the various fighters for liberation that he had
assembledo
At the outset, the Vatican supported Franco
because of persecution the Republican government had
earlier directed against Catholicism,,

The Vatican’s

support was reinforced by the fact that Franco fought
against a government that was backed by Russia,

Russian

projection of atheistic communism into any area of
Europe alarmed the Vatican,

In 1936. the Holy See Up-

held the Rome-Berlin Axis for the very reason that it
too appeared to be a bulwark against communism.

But,

since Germany granted aid to Franco’s Nationalists
during the Spanish Civil War, and Spain had a predomi
nately Catholic population, problems Inevitably resulted
because of the Reich’s treatment of its Catholics,
The Vatican’s mood of benevolence toward Franco
paralleled developments in the Reich and could not help
but change as Germany more clearly supported the Nation
alists while increasing suppression of German Catholics,

1926? returned to Spain from Morocco as a Rightist War
Minister, 1934; exciled to the Canaries by Leftist forces,
1936; became head of the revolutionary forces, June 1936;
defeated the Loyalists in August 1939; despite his claim
of neutrality in September 1939s he remained close to the
Axis; given life tenure In Spain and can elect his own
successor by a law of July 6 , 194?«

Thus* the Vatican*s natural tendency t© ally with Germany
in the mutual fight against Russian ideology and the
Spanish government became untenable because of conditions
in the Reich*
In December* it became clear that even though
Germany participated in the British sponsored neutrality
agreement t© keep the Spanish Civil War locals it con
tinued to supply Franco with military aide

The Vatican*s

attitude toward the Nationalist cause waned because ©f
Germanyss obvious intent to remain involved in the war

11

and the conditions in Germany that gave rise to the
encyclical !,With Burning Anxiety®11 Franco adopted the
German view that the Vatican must not be allowed to
interfere with governmental operations and banned the
12
document from Spain*
The Holy Seess hostile policy
perplexed both Germany and Italy*

They could not

understand how the Vatican justified such a position
while they carried on a fight against communism*

11

What promised to become an open Reieh-Vaticam
break with dire consequences for Franco was smoothed
over by further diplomatic maneuvering by the Reich®
After September 13* 1937*. Hitler repeatedly referred to

“^^Hugh Thoma'So The "Spanish Civil -War (New York
1-961), 358«> Hereafter cited as Thomas. '
12

■ . .

DGFPn III* 293-9j?*
13Ibid09 26?*

k3

National Socialism as the ideology that would cause the
destruction of eommmnism and Spanish soil as the
battlefield upon which this war would be waged*

Also*

German suppression of the Pope’s encyclical* resumption
of the immorality trials* and demands upon the Vatican
concerning Cardinal Mundelein resulted in a Vatican
policy of reserve designed to promote a compromise over
Ik

the internal German situation* ^
On August 28* the Holy See committed itself to
15
the support of the Nationalists*
The Spanish Catholic
hierarchy* exclusive of the Loyalist Basques* never
wavered from this stand*

However* the copnitmeht did

not relieve Germany from frustrating experiences induced
by Vatican actions*

In December of 1937? Lope Pius XI

again denounced the persecution of Catholics ih"1the
Reich*
Throughout 1938* the German Ambassador in Spain
sent reports to the Foreign Ministry advising that the
Church’s influence on Franco greatly added to Germany’s
difficulty in bringing him directly and concretely into
the Reich’s orbit*

Germany’s main efforts.to advance

totalitarian aims in Spain revolved around the Falange®

'^For events taking place in the Reich sees
Chapter I* 27=30* The reserved Vatican policy did not
result in better relations* In 1938-39* conditions in
the Reich became worse*
15
DGFP* III* i+82; Thomas* 1+50=51.

Franc,© wholeheartedly supported this organization but
refused to implement its principles in a rapid and
explicit manner as'desired by Germany because of obT£
Sections from the Vatican,
Furthermore, tfye Ambassador
reported, the Vatican swayed the Generalissimo’s
brother-in-law and Minister of the Interior, Serrano
Suner, so profoundly that he allowed the State to be
subjugated to the Church

7

Germany believed its co-ordination of the German
Catholic Church to be more important than trying to
appease the Holy See in an effort to take Church
pressure off the liberation movement.

In 1937-38,

while the Vatican did its utmost to exert pressure on
!

Franco and his followers, the Reich reached the peak of
its suppression of the Church,

During this time, the

i

Reich made no conciliatory moves toward the Holy See as
a direct result of hindrance of its policies in the
Spanish Civil War,
The only Impediment Germany used to stem Vatican
interference In Spain was the constant reference to a
united front against Russian communism.

Even this call

arose as a common idea in Europe rather than being
directed exclusively toward Rome,
16
DGFP. Ill, 660,
17Ibid., 8^8,

On March 27, 1939,

it looked as if this would he enough to cement GermanItalian relations with Spain without causing either a
German or Spanish break with the Vatican.
Disregarding Vatican pleas for a truce* Franco
launched a campaign* long desired by Germany* in
Catalonia.

In early March* the Nationalists secured

their objective and on March 27 Spain joined Germany*
Italy* and Japan in their pact against communism.

The

Spanish Civil War brought these nations much closer
together ideologically.

The Vatican indirectly lauded

Germany by profusely congratulating Frane© and the forces
that supported him.

X8

Franco turned his attention to achieving harmony
within Catholic Spain after his victory.

It could not

be assumed, that the Nationalists would continue to over
look the ill-treatment of Catholics in Germany once their
position was consolidated* when the Vatican remained an
19
integral part of their life and culture.
In relation
to events in Spain* the German-Russian Non-Aggression
Pact of August 23 was a blunder.

The German movement

toward Russia-decreased the Spanish desire-to continue
to-seek German aid.

The German invasion of Poland and

suppression of its Catholics later in 1939 did not help

19 Allison

X9M»* 36

E. Peers* The Spanish Dilemma (London*
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the German cause either.

On September I4., 1939® Spain

declared strict neutrality.

Pranco!s New Year’s Eve

speech implicitly confirmed Spain, Italy, and the Catho
lic Church as the defenders against the common enemy,
Russia.

It made no mention of Germany.
Prom 1939 to 1943® Hitler unsuccessfully tried to

bring Spain into the war on the side of Germany.

Spain’s

adherence to the Axis in '■19^1 would have .greatly enhanced
German possibilities in North Africa.

Hitler, not

wishing to risk an invasion of Spain, could not .get
Franco’s voluntary help.

This is partly attributable

to the refusal of Serrano Suner to forget his reser
vations toward the Third Reich as a result of its perse
cution of German Catholics.20

In 19^1® Hitler confided

to Mussolini that this man, and the improved position
the Church had gained in Spain after Franco’s vietory,
frustrated his-preparations to occupy Gibraltar.

21

Hitler did not blame Franco for not allying with Germany,
but "the systematic sabotage perpetrated by his Jesuit
22
brother-in-law. . . . " Serrano Suner.
In 191+-2, Goebbels * placed the blame for Spain’s
p n . . .

DGFP9 X, 97-8.
21

Gale&zzo Gian©, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London,
19^8), lj.19. Hereafter oiled as Ciano^s Papers.
2?
Adolf Hitler, The Testament of Adolf Hitlers The
Hitler-Bo-rmann Documents, February-April 1943 (London
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refusal to aid Germany squarely on Franco and the Vatican„ J
It is clear that Hitler's failure to ease conditions in
Germany for the Catholics and to pacify the Vatican was
an integral aspect of his inability to bring Spain into
the war0

In spite of this, Hitler's neglect did not alter

the total picture -that evolved since the beginning of the
Spanish Civil War.
Germany and the Vatican were more gravely con
cerned with events that developed in another area.
Germany's need to absorb Catholic countries, and the
Vatican's desire to forego any repetition of conditions
now present in the Reich collided.

On March 12, 1938,

Germany's annexation of Austria caused the first instance
of grave hostility on an International scale.
Vatican officials looked upon Austria as a Catho
lic stronghold against communism as well as socialism.
They directly supported its independence„

In 193^» the

Nazi regime began to supplant this defense against
communism with anti-Christian ideologies and lay grounds
for a struggle that would last into the latter years of
the war.

Throughout May and June of that year, Austrian

Nazi's bombed vicarages and the residences of archbishops.
The Nazis later found the Catholic Church to be one of

^Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries 19^2-19^3
(New York, 19^8), 63, 119. 166. Hereafter cited as
Goebbels.

^8
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th© strongest organizations opposing them,^The May.=June bombings subsided at the insistence
of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss* staunch advocates
Benito Mussolini,

Mussolini found Hitler in a concili

atory mood because of his involvement in the June 30
”Roehm Purge” and the question of succession to Hindenburg.

The Fuehrer needed a period ©f tranquillity t©

consolidate his position.

The February declaration of

France and Britain to support Italy in an attempt to
uphold Austrian independence also influenced the decision
to stop the bombing.

But ©verzealous Austrian Nazis

failed to heed the Reich8s policy and undertook a putseh.
On July 2j??, the putsch abruptly failed but the Nazis,
murdered Dollfuss,
The Reich found itself in aggravated..-tension with
the Vatican.and facing the. loss of Mussolini*s backing,
Germany immediately took..successful steps.t$ correct,
this turn ©f ©vents, ;While the Reich appeased both
opponents by reducing anti-Catholie decrees in the
Reich*

th© crowning touch was the dispatch ©f Papen

as Minister-Extraordinary to Austria,

The mere presence

of Papen^former Center Party member* non-Nazi* devout
Catholic* and instigator of th© Goncordat— sufficiently

^NSA* iv* 310,
2$

For the status of ©vents in th© Reich during
this period sees Chapter I* 2^,
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comforted both factions in Rome to bring about a quiet
ending to the year,,
From 1934 to 1935s Papen, feeling that he appeared
like a M 'Catholic in wolf's clothing*8”
for the German annexation of Austria.

worked diligently

Despite constant

frustration by the Vatican's most vociferous Austrian
representative* Theodor Cardinal Innitzer,

27

Papen ex

ploited not only his own reputation as torch-bearer of
28
the Catholic cause but that of his wife.
During July
of 1938* Papen instituted many political manipulations
to-promote a peaceful annexation of Austria,

On July

11, an Austro-German agreement stated Hitler's recognition
of Austrian sovereignty while Kurt von Sehusehnigg,

^Papen,

29

351®

Theodor Innitzer (1875-1955)s Cardinal* 1933?
Archbishop'of Vienna, 1938? censured by Pope Pius XI for
his political recommendation of Austrian union with
Germany, 1938? threatened by German occupying forces,
1939®
OP\
In his memoirs, Papen unswervingly claims that
he remained in power and carried out his duties only in
order t© deter Nazi brutality toward th© Catholics and to
secure the best interests of the German people. A few
scattered sources substantiate this idea. The majority
of sources maintain that Papen, although somewhat of a
dullard, consciously and voluntarily worked directly for
the best interests of the Third Reich and all its ramifi
cations. For the latter vieTw see: NOA , VII, 105 and NCA,.
Supplement B, 1149=50.' One of the main affidavits filed
against Papen at Nuremberg was submitted by the American
Minister in Vienna, Mr. George Messersmith (NCA, IV, 319).
Hitler awarded'Papen the “Golden Party Badge“ and made
him a Nazi member for his fine collaboration in Austria.
^ K u r t von Schuschnigg (1897)s Minister for
Justice in the Dollfuss Cabinet, 1932? Chancellor of
Austria, 1934~1938| imprisoned by the Nazis, 1938=1945®
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Dollfuss* successor, declared Austria a state dedicated
te formulating policies in line with those of Germany.
This, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War a few
days later, brought the Vatican and Mussolini mueh nearer
30
to recognizing German policy in Austria.
Other attempts met with failure.

Papen suggested

that Nazi attacks on the Church be stopped to assure a
peaceful Anschluss.

Although Hitler accepted this idea,
31
Goebbels and Martin Bormann later negated it.
On
another occasion Bormann suppressed Papen*s plea to
allow an article,

32

written by a prominent Catholic and

depicting a conciliation of National Socialism and the
Christian viewpoint, to be distributed in Austria.
Papen viewed the use ©f the article as "a political
33

necessity of the first order. . .

The Vatican was

hostile to this work, and Germany missed a chance to
enhance itself in the eyes of Austrian Catholics in
regard to annexation.
The most important event of this period was a
reorganization of the German Foreign Office which began
\

as a purge of !lund© sir able” elements in the army.

By

3°Papen, 369=71.
31Ibid.fl 357.
32b i'shop Alois Hudal, then residing in Home,
wrote the .article ”The 11th of July from the Catholic
Point of View.-11
33
NCA, Supplement Ag %66.
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February 4 p 193©? the office of Foreign Minister passed
t© Joachim von Ribbentrop*^ while Ernst vnn Weizsaecker^
later became State Secretary of that office,

Simultane

ously* the Eeich recalled three key ambassadors! Herbert
von M r k s e n arrived from Tokyo* Ulrich von Hassell^^—»
replaced by Hans von Maekensen^1— -from Italy* and Papen
from Vienna,

Th© purg© allowed Hitler to gain supreme

command of the army and to place the Foreign Office under
control of men who would d© only as told.

Hassell had

seldom agreed to opinions of the Reich when they became
more noticeably under the influence of the MSDAP,

Papen

experienced the same thoughts and his astonishment at
the recall gave way to thoughts ©f being replaced by
more active members ©f the Party,

^Joachim von Hibbentrop (1893-1946)° Hitler ls
advisor on''foreign policy* 1933# Ambassador at Large*
1935# German Ambassador 'to London* 1936-1938? Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs* 1930^1945 (succeeding
Imerath).
^Ernst von Weizsaeeker (1882-1951)? Head of the
Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry*
1936-1938? Siate Secretary* April 1* 1938-April 19431
German Ambassador t© the Holy See* April 1943-1945®
bassador
visor to
2G* 1944
executed

Ulrich von Hassell (1881-1944)? German Am
to Italy* 1932-1937? became diplomatic ad
anti-Hazi underground| took part in the July
plot to assassinate Hitler? tried and condemned*
in 1944°

■^Hans von Maekensen. (1883-1947)? son of Field
Marshal von Maekensen? German Minister in'Hungary* 19331938? State Secretary t© the Foreign Ministry* 19371938? Ambassador in Italy* 1938-1943#
38
Papen* 406~©7o
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Just as th© government used this period t© eonsolidat© its totalitarian position within the Reich
proper* so did it strive to transmit this principle into
th© out=lying* contiguous traditional German states. ■ In
1937? Chancellor Schusehnigg realized the impossibility
of maintaining a dictatorial one-party government that
excluded Nazis from the Cabinet.

Nazi demonstrations

continued to break out in Austria against both the
Chancellor and th© Church.

Hitler met Schusehnigg at

Berchtesgaden and demanded that he grant an amnesty to
Austrian Nazi political prisoners and* more importantly*
39'
include the pro-Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart^ in the
cabinet as Minister of the Interior.

Schusehnigg had

no alternative.
Germany feared no resistance from the Vatican as
political reports disclosed that the Catholics also
pressed for the resignation of the Austrian Chancellor
in favor of their'own candidate*, Provincial Governor
Franz Gleissner.^-0 Although the Church aided the Nazi
oriented change* it was not prepared for th© appointment

-^Arthur Seyss-Inquart (1892=1946)s Councillor of
State* 19371.appointed Minister of Interior and Security*
1938? p bs t=Anschiuss Chancellor* March 11-15* 1938* Heich
Governor of Austria (Ostmark)* March 1938=May 1939I Deputy
Governor General of Poland* 1939=194.0# Beieh Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands* May 194©“1945f".appointed
Foreign Minister in Hitler's political•testament* April
!945o
^°NGA* VI* 271 0
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of-Seyss-Inquart*

This caused grave apprehension at the

Vatican,,
Sehusehnigg’s continued insistence on the inde
pendence of Austria finally resulted in the mobilization
of German troops on Austriads border,,

Increased pressure

from Germany forced the resignation of the Chancellor
and th© Austrian president*
Inquart to Chancellor*

The Mazis elevated Seyss-

Within two days*, March 12-13?

1938? Germany completed the Anschluss and declared
Austria a province of the German Reich*
Th© 100 per cent Catholic nation lost its inde
pendence*

The Vatican became pessimistic because of

fear of German intransigence against the Austrian Catho
lics*

The appointment of Seyss-Inquart*, rather than

Gleissner*, as Chancellor of Austria furthered this
frame of mind*

So did thoughts of National Socialism ;

as the predominant ideological force behind German foreign
policy*

These circumstances could only result in the .

same sort of Catholic suppression that now prevailed in.
Germany*

Yet, as Hitler stated*, th© Anschluss was merely'

the application of the World War I Wilsonian principle
of self-determination*
Papen declared that the inclusion ©f/.sueh' a great
number of Catholics in Greater Germany would strengthen
its Christian front*

He.said that a strong Christian

front*would benefit both the Church and Germany by

5^
creating a stronger buffer against communistic infiltration of Europe*

In truth* Hitler had made up his

mind on this question more than a decade earlier.

In

Hein Kampf he noted that the Hapsburg monarchy used
religion as a purely political idea to oppose Orthodox
Russia which* from the German viewpoint* was !,a cata1l2
strophic idea0,,H"

The Fuehrer carried out.the thoughts

in Mein Kampf rather than the verbal statements made by
himself and Papen.
From the first day of the Anschluss until the
end of t h e ‘war* Germany followed the same" policy toward
the Church in Austria as it did in the Reich.

Catholic

youth organizations fell under German control* schools
were closed* and the Nazis took over th© Catholic press.
Germany experienced the same difficulties with the Holy
See in Austria as it did in the Reich* and Hitler called
for the always successful plebiscite to be held in
Austria on April 10.

Bergen informed th© Foreign Office

that the Austrian Foreign Minister's placing of his
entourage under the jurisdiction of the German Legation
caused nothing more than official recognition at the
Vatican,

He also reported that the Holy See would not

^Tapen* 3^8°
""^Adolf Hitler* Hein Kampf (Boston* 19i}3)* 93»
Hereafter cited as Hitler* ~Hein Kampf. Hitler' is here
discrediting the idea of "political Catholicism."
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take an official stand on Reich action in Austria until
after the plebiscite
Hitler wasted no time in gathering support from
the Austrian episcopate for the upcoming plebiscite.

He

sent Papen back to Vienna (with no explanation)* where
he arranged a meeting between the Fuehrer' and Cardinal
Innitzer.

The Fuehrer surprised everyone by reversing

his policy of invariably avoiding any conversation with
high Church dignitaries^" and accepted this meeting.
Innitzer, urged on by thoughts of German patriotism and
Hitlerian expressions of the right of self-determination*
promised the. undivided loyalty of the Austrian Catholics
in return for the extension of Concordat guarantees to
Austria.^

The terms included; freedom of religion*

youth membership in Catholic organizations* and Catholic
rights in youth education.

Hitler* encouraged by the

support of such a prominent Vatican representative*

DGFP* I* 1026-27.
HGA* Supplement A* 5>01.
In June of 1933 Austria concluded a Concordat
with the Vatican. Innitzer correctly assumed that
Germany would not honor this treaty when Austria was
incorporated into th© Reich and attempted to have the
German Concordat extended to Austria. Germany did not
want this because it would further the Vatican's power
in German territory. In"the final analysis the Reich
did not extend its Concordat to Austria. Furthermore*
it rescinded’the Austrian treaty. Various German
authorities found-diverse legal methods to achieve this
end and the intra-departmental eocrnxunications for this
period are qui-te interesting. See; BGFP* I* 603-Oij.j
NCA* ill* 1+83-95.
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astonishingly agreed to every provision.^*
In regard to the forthcoming plebiscite* the Reich
won a huge success at the conference,,

In March* the

Austrian episcopate issued a declaration urging support
for union with Germany.

Innitzer8s authorization moder-

ated the indignation of United State's Catholics eoneerning German policy.

ii7

On April 10* Austrians polled

a vote of nearly 100 per cent in favor of incorporation
of their country with the Reich,

Bishop Johannes Sproll

was the only prominent Prelate to oppose the incorporation
by failing to vote at all.
The Vatican1s decision to await the plebiscite
before taking a stand on Germany's entrance into Austria
gave Hitler an opportunity to sway the episcopate.

The

Vatican tardily took steps to correct the impression that
it* through the Austrian hierarchy* condoned Germany's
aggressive tendency toward the Austrian Catholics.

The

Vatican summoned Innitzer to Rome where his reception*
first by Secretary of State Cardinal Paeelli and later
by the Pope himself* was anything but cordial,, Recalling
the Cardinal's earlier anti-Nazi posture and opposition
to Papen* Pius XI asked for an explanation ©f his sudden
political somersault.

Innitzer related the promises

^ N C A * Supplement A* 501f Papen ijlj.2-ij.3c
^7BGFP* I* 619o

made to him by the Fuehrer*
On April 6, Bergen reported to Berlin that
Innitzer was virtually forced to retract his support of
the annexation of Austria because of the Pope's "morbid
irritation” with policies of the Reich*^

The Vatican

said that the Austrian bishops had acted without the
knowledge of the Holy See and that Innitzer, acting as
head of the Austrian Church, now rescinded his en~
couragement of the Anschluss,

From this time forth,

no changes regarding concordat negotiations in Austria
could be undertaken by the local bishops without the
h.9
agreement of the Vatican,^
Further Vatican attempts to regain control ©f
the situation in Austria came too late as the all~
persuasive March episcopal declaration gave Germany a
political victory from which th© Holy Bee could not
'j ■
recover* Germany viewed the Anschluss as a resounding
vietory in which the Austrian Catholic Church fully
participated*

Any other efforts by the Vatican to

interject stronger authority over these Catholics would
seem offensive to German rights*

As the weeks passed,

and Pope Pius XI became convinced that he could negotiate

' ^ DGFP*"I, 1031'%' Cianfarfa, 116-18,' There are
many accounts describing .to just what extent Innitzer had
to be "forced” to retract* It'is'quite evident that he
still believed in Hitler's assurances at this time*
^Cianfarra, 118*
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n© concrete guarantees for the Austrian clergy* his
statements turned more anti°German«
On May 3* 1938? the Pope hoped that a visit by
Hitler to Mussolini would he extended t® the Vatican so
that new negotiations might be opened,

However* Hitler

decided to punish the Pope for his belated pressure in
Austria and turned down th© opportunity to see him.
As the Fuehrer quieted Mussolini»s fear of the new
German conquest* the Pope ostentatiously retreated
from Rome,

He closed the Vatican galleries and museum*

which Hitler planned to visit* and commented that the
prominently displayed swastika was not the cross of
Christ,
Amid the Hazi=Fascist display of light* music*
and color* the darkness of the papal state across the
Tiber stood out as a vivid reminder of the acute Reich~
Vatican tension now prevailing.

Reports from the

Ambassador to the Holy See confirmed the German hope
that this maneuver* directed at impressing the Pope

I

with German power in Italy* proved successful,
Bergen aptly expressed the attitude of the Reiehs "In
view of the present German-Vatican tension and th©
repeated brusque statements of the Pope* omiting the
visit appeared to me appropriate and the only dignified

^°DGFP, I* 1036-37.

cou3?se„,,y
Adhering to this attitude, the Foreign Office
directed Bergen to demand that the Vatican recall Bishop
Sproll, the only Bishop not voting in the April plebi
scite 0T Paeelli received Bergen coldly before refusing
th© request on the grounds that, although Sproll8s action
may h ave been inept, participation had been voluntary so
there could have been no violation of a legal obligation,,
In early July, .the Gestapo led Nazi Party members in
Co
demonstrations against the bishop*s residence*
Nuncio Orsenigo complained to the Reich govern
ment only to be answered with grossly false charges that
the demonstrations merely exemplified how low the bishop5s
position had sunk in relation to the people he supposably
served.

On th© 23rd, the Party imported a crowd of over

two thousand to march on th© residence, but the action
got completely out of hand.

Th© violence and destruction

alienated the Rottenburg non-Nazi populace and greatly
embarrassed the Gestapo.
The Vatican continuously refused to recall Sproll.
Pending negotiations between the Reich and the episcopate
encouraged Bergen to request that the recall be forgotten

^1DGFPa I, 1036-37o

^ 2Ibid., 1038-39o
53^™
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In an effort to decrease the resistance of the Holy See.
By taking his advice the Reich could have continued to
consolidate its position in Austria without great animosity
from the Vatican.

But the. Party obviously considered the

situation well enough in hand to make an example of the
bishop.

The Political Department of the Foreign Ministry

overruled Bergen and decided to remove Sproll forcibly
from his residence in Rottenburg.

Goebbels received

instructions to enlighten the public about Sproll's gross
violations of civic duty as the Gestapo executed the
removal.55
The negative attitude Germany adopted toward the
Vatican when Hitler refused to visit the Pope In May of
1938 continued throughout the summer in the same pattern
as that manifested toward Bishop Sproll.

This policy

placed great pressure on the Holy See to maintain some
semblance of diplomatic contact with the Reich in order
to protect German and Austrian Catholics.
Having placed the Vatican on the defensive.
Hitler's jnovements in Czechoslovakia proceeded with no
notable interference from the Holy See.

Germany now

controlled Austrian economic resources and Catholics,
while being in a position to outflank Czechoslovakia on
three sides.

As In the Saar, the Rhineland, and Austria,

6T
the Sudetenland population was overwhelmingly German
Catholic.

Bergen had earlier reported that Pius XI

refused to heed Prance's request that he protest against
German activity in the Sudetenland ©n the grounds that
it was a process of self-determination in which the
Church could have no political interest.
The secular nation's attempt to appease Germany*
as exemplified by the Munich Agreement* hinged on the
same consideration.

Gn October i* 1 9 3 Germany exer

cised her rights under the Agreement and* t© the
applause of the Fulda Bishops5 Conference* increased
th© Catholic population of Greater Germany by ten per
cent.

$7

Th© Sudetenland cam® under German control.
In March of the following year* Hitler upset the

diplomatic equilibrium by occupying the rest ©f CzechoSlovakia which had been guaranteed protection by France
and Britain.

For the first time th© Reich extended its

rule to a non-German population.

It was a ’momentous

demonstration of Hitler's readiness to extend Germany's
need for ”living space” beyond racial boundaries.
Ironically,, the only major concession went to a Catholic
priest* Monsignor Joseph Tiso* Premier of Slovakia.

He

gained autonomy for his state while the rest of Czech©~
Slovakia became a German protectorate.
56DGFP» VI* 7k°
^7L®wy* 218-19.

Germany had now
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established a large, consolidated land mass in Central
Europe that gave it a strategic position t© threaten
the- entire continent.
Directly after Hitler!s failure to visit the Pope
©n May 3» 1938, the Ambassador t© the Holy See began t©
take an entirely different attitude concerning Reich
policy than did th© Reich authorities working with the
Vatican,,

By May 2$9 Bergen came to the conclusion that

the Pop© had been sufficiently put in his place and that
th© time had com© for Germany t© develop a positive atti=
tude toward the Holy See#

He emphatically believed that

Germany should not incur the wrath of this great spiritual power, but should make the influence of the Church
serve th© interests of th© Reich»s foreign policy•
Bergen also wanted to keep the clergymen in the German
camp in order to "utilize them for our
national aims.”

Germany8s

Surely this policy had been most

effective in negotiations ranging from implementation of
the Concordat all th© way t© the plebiscite in Austria#
Reich authorities, under th© hold of a now mature
National Socialism, insisted upon following a negative,
policy throughout the year#

The Ministry for Ecclesi

astical Affairs adopted the view that th© international
Church was detrimental to National Socialism and,
therefore, took little account of proposals from the

^8DGFP,
MlllI“ I,
^ 101*2.
“

63

Vatiean Embassy while not answering communications from
the Holy S@© at all,

The few exceptions were iiasuf=

ficient and biased,
Th® Foreign Ministry followed the same eours© as
the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs,

Ribbentrop

made it clear t© Oraenigo that some day the problems
with th© Church would be solvedp but that the time for
such a settlement had not yet corned®

Weizsaeeker, the

new State Secretary^ informed Bergen that in th© ©yes
of Berlin a positive attitude was being pursued andp
in regard t© th© German clergyp the fight with the•
Church was not a frontal attack but was restricted to
separating "the sheep from the goats,"

6l

Germany!s victory in securing near complete
dominance ©ver the German Catholics as well as those in
the annexed territories was n©w obvious.

In sh©rtp

Germany inflicted a political defeat upon the Vatican
by subjecting its faithful t© th© will of National
Socialism without precipitating a R@ieh~Vatiean split,
A rupture in relations would very probably have resulted
in a Vatiean appeal t© the Catholics of the world t©
share in its enmity toward Germany,

Mow Germany was in

a position t© consolidate its new position in relation

•^9BGFP, Ip 101*1 •
60Ibid,P 101*5.
6lIbid,p 101*6,

to the Vatican just as it had don© in th© R®ieh proper*

CHAPTER I I I

GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VATICAN DURING
THE POLISH CRISIS
March-Qctober 1939
Prom 1933 to 1939p German leadership laid the
ground-work that provided a lever for negotiations with
the Vatican during th© Polish Crisis®

The Reich8s

authority now extended over the Saarp the Rhin@landp
Austriap and Czechoslovakia®

Germany had consolidated

a formidahl© land mass in Central Europe«

Th© Reich

itself was a highly totalitarian state directly r@»
sponsive to th© principles of National Socialism®

The

Concordat proved t© be th© vehicl® by which the Nazis
dictated their wishes t© th© German Catholic Church®
Quit® ©ftenp th© Vatican objected to harsh
measures used by th© Nazis and t© their overriding
authority in areasp particularly Catholic education^
that traditionally belonged to th© Church®

Howeverp

Vatican desire to co-exist with Nazi Germany remained
param©untP and the position of th© Catholic Ghureh in
all1 the Reich territories was gradually subordinated- t©
German domination®

By March 1939? th® Catholic Church

struggled for survival in the Reich8s sphere of influ®enee,

Germany had maneuvered th® Vatican into a dilemma®

If .the Holy See took an anti-Nazi standp th© Reich could
easily nationalize th® German Catholic Church®
Germany8s advantageous political position was
65
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compromised by th© personality ©f Pope Pins XI,

The

Pope desired'good relations with Germany but had vi©«
i

lently opposed Nazi co-ordination of th® German Gatholio
Church*

While facing th© difficulties of implementing

th®’Concordatg Pius XI often pushed his demands t© the
point ©f nearly causing a severance ©f Reieh^Vatican
diplomatic relations«

Secretary ©f State Pacelli always

cam® t© th© rescue and tried to smooth over th© ©rises,
Nazi intervention in Catholic education intensely
angered Pius XI9 and the repeated failure ©f Germany t©
answer his communications prompted the Pope to issue a
politically oriented encyclical accusing Germany ©f
fostering ware1

Thus9 th© Vatican*, although it did not

contest the annexation ©f the Sud@tenlandp could not be
relied upon to refrain from siding with the Western
Powers if Germany made further advances in th© East*
On February 10*, 1939*, Pius X I 8s death gave Germany
an opportunity t© better its political position in i>e= ■
lation to the Vatican*

Ideological conflict divided

Emrop© into opposite camp s—* totalitarian and democratic*®*,
each ©f which wanted th® Pop®8© moral authority on its
side if a crisis occurred*

February was a time ©f

feverish diplomatic activity in Rem® because b©th. factions
tried t© influence th© ehoie® ©f a pop© politically

'X'MGA* V* 1079* This is th© encyclical “With
Burning Anxiety,” The.Reich regarded it as a call t©
battle * Also see? DGFP*, I*, 93®*
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predisposed to their activities.

Diego von Bergen urged

the Sacred College of Cardinals to select a pope sympa
thetic to Hitler's plan for expansion in the East.

He

asserted that Germany wanted, to assist 11in elaboration
of a new world which wants to raise itself upon the ruins
of a-past, which, „ 0 o has:-no longer any reason to exist,”2
The Sacred College of Cardinals would make the
final decision and their deliberations took Cardinal
Eugenio Pacelli into consideration,

Pacelli/ a former

Papal Nuncio to Berlin, was Germany's favored candidate. ^
On March 2, 1939 s, the Sacred College elected Cardinal
Pacelli, who became Pope Pius XII, as their Supreme
Pontiff,

Vatican officials rejoiced, and Mussolini,

whom Pius XI tormented because of his close relatlonsliip
with Germany, ’’promised to send the Pope some advice on
how he can usefully govern the Church.”4
The German
Plus 2s

outlook towardPius XII was optimistic.

diplomatic experience and his knowledge of inter

national political affairs indicated that he understood

^Quoted in Cianfarra, 23. By November 5, 1937s
Germany had begun to develop Its plans for ’’living space”
in the East, See; G.M. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dic
tatorship; Based on an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi
Germany (Nfew"York, 1950), 100, Hereafter cited as Gilbert.
‘
’
S
oo
.
-'Saul Frledlander, Plus XII and the Third Reich;'
A Documentation (New York, 1966),: 8. Hereafter cited as
Friedlaender.
4
Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-19^-3; The
Complete Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano.
Ttallan"“Mlnister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943 (New York
1946), 36. Hereafter cited as Ciano, Dldrles.
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the causes of war.

Furthermore, the Pope had. signed, the

Concordat when he was Secretary of State and grasped
German political conditions as a result of his nunciature
in Germany,,

The Reich hoped that he would use his inter-

national acumen and understanding of German conditions to
appreciate its need for expansion in the East.

Leaders

of the Third Reich regarded Pius XII as very ”Germanophile.
Succeeding events justified German optimism.
Pius XI had often shown that his moral duty, rather than
political expediency, dictated his actions.

On March

6, the new pope reversed this tendency by writing to
Hitler and expressing his desire to come to terms over
problems in Germany.

6

He also ordered the Vatican press

to temper its anti-German position.
Further negotiations involved the appointment
of a Secretary of State, the Vatiean Foreign Minister.
Pius XII had the authority to make the appointment, and
the Axis launched a drive to secure a sympathetic man
in this capacity.

Ultimately, Pius appointed the former
7

Nuncio to Paris, Luigi Cardinal Maglione,

to this

^Ciano, Diaries. 5. Of., Clanfarra,
and
Oscar Halecki, Eugenio Pacelli: Pope of Peace (New York
1951)* 138,
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6dgfp, VI, 601.
7
'Luigi Maglione (l877”19ijl|.): Representative of
the Holy See in Switzerland, 1918-1920} Titular Archbishop
in Palestine, 1920} Nuncio Apostolic to Switzerland, 19201926} Nun,ei© Apostolic to France, 1926-1936} Cardinal,
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position*

Press reports released by the -Wes-term Powers

claimed a victory, asserting that Maglione was pro-Freneh
and prone to favor the West*
Ambassador Bergen told a different story to Berlin,,
He explained to the Foreign Ministry that Maglione had
always maintained good relations with the Embassy at the
Vatican and that he held a friendly attitn.de toward
Geiraany*

The Ambassador, aware that Maglione »s sentiment

must be fostered, recommended that the German press be
8
restrained in its assessment of him*
The NSDAP controlled
the press and, because of doctrinal conflict with the
Ghurch, editorialized hostility toward high-ranking Gath©lie leaders*

Germany carried out this request during

the next few days*

By March 13, 1939, the German Foreign

Ministry believed its relations with the Vatican to be
the best since 1933«
On March 15, Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia
in Czechoslovakia*

Pius XII and Maglione were visibly

dismayed as this action not only hindered Pius XII's
conciliatory policy toward Germany but subjected another
six million Catholics to Nazism*

More importantly, this

deterioration in the European situation ominously foreshadowed the crisis now developing in Poland.

The Polish

1935? Perfect of the Sacred Congregation, 1936-1939?
Secretary of State, 1939-19l|4«>
D
DGPP, VI, 29o

population was seventy-five per cent Roman Catholic* and
various estimates placed the number of Poles residing
through out Europe between fifteen and twenty millions.
Poland8s predominant Catholicism was one of the reasons
Q
for the country8s traditional anti-German sentiment.'
For -Germany to advance further in this direction
without becoming subject to the Vatican8s power* it had
to be conciliatory enough to appease the Holy See.
German-inspired Hincidents” occurred in many Polish
cities* adding.to the Vatican8s dejection.
Bergen., cabled the Foreign Ministry.

On March 17?

He disclosed that

recent developments threatened to cause an undesirable
change, in the attitude of the Holy See.

Bergen also

stated th-at the Vatican press had stopped attacks against
the Reich and that “there was no question that the German
press must continue a restrained objectivity towards
Vatican a f f a i r s . A g a i n *

the National Socialists in

charge of the press complied and immediately put the
recommendation into effect.
appeased the Vatican.

This effort temporarily

These events* although only a

portion,of the total picture that aided in formulation
of Germany8s strategic plans* were considered in the
deliberations for Hitler8s next move.

^Ciano* Diaries* 33°
10
DGFP* V I *

29.

-?1
On March 21, Hitler demanded the return of Danzig
and extra-territorial rights in the Polish Corridor,

The

Non-Aggression Pact signed by Germany and Poland in 193i|
was endangered, and a subsequent Anglo-Polish Agreement
to defend Poland brought the situation to near crisis
proportions.

However, Germany had now established cordial

relations with the Holy See and a new Vatican policy arose.
The Pope abstained from intervention in German affairs on
the political level and avoided the more personal in
fighting that Pius XI had engaged in,

Vatican criticism

of German treatment of Catholics became doctrinal,^*'1'
In April, Germany and the Vatican established
better relations, more as a result ©f American policy
than of German instigation.

President Franklin D,

Roosevelt had asked Germany and Italy to abstain from
aggression against thirty states for ten years.

The

proposal was public, addressed t© th© two specific heads
of government, and asked for a guaranteed time limit
before any country took further action.

The time limit

would allow America to strengthen her armaments if so
inclined,
11

Bergen telegraphed Berlin to inform the

Cianfarra, llf9o Pius XII always tried to dis
regard purely temporal problems in favor of protecting
the Vatican’s neutrality by not naming names and staying
on the world-wide humanitarian level. Sees DGFP, IV,
598 (telegram from Bergen to Berlin) and Lewy, 200,
Bergen regarded Pius XI as inflexible and unpredictable.
See: DGFP, G, II, 3» Weizsaecker believed that if Pius
XI hacPTTved any longer relations between the Reich and
the Church would have failed completely. See: Weizsaecker,

,

282

72
government that the Vatican severely criticized this
proposal because it viewed all three points as being
conducive to hostilities
On April 25 s> the Foreign Ministry again received
an indication that the Vatican would remain inactive
concerning the Polish question,,

Pius XII received a

group of German travelers in audience on that date and
Bergen reported the Pope’s statements "We rejoice at
the -greatness of Germany,, at her resurgence and her
prosperity, and it would be false to maintain'that We
do not desire a flourishing, great, and strong
Germany,

3

A great Germany was precisely what Hitler had
in mind.

Three days later, the Fuehrer delivered a

blistering speech to the Reichstag denouncing Roosevelt,
repudiating the. Anglo=>German Naval Agreement of 1935„
and declaring the German-Polish Non~Agression Pact of
193U- void.

Secretary of State Weizsaecker, the person

in the Foreign Ministry most intimately involved with
Reich”Vatican relations, was alarmed at this development.
It was unreasonable, he thought, to proclaim the Polish
Pact void publicly when it had already been rescinded
in fact,1^

But Reich strategists considered developments

12
DGFP, VI, 300o
^Quoted in Friedlaender, l60
izsaecker, 1810

73 in Poland more important than the rapprochement with the
Vatican,,
Hitler8s Reichstag speech, as surely must have
been expected, caused new problems with the Vatican,

The

Holy See moved toward purely political pronouncements by
asking Berlin, Warsaw, Paris, London, and Rome to abstain
from rash decisions that might lead to war.

All the

nations agreed, and the seemingly innocuous request
became the first step in up-grading Pius's attempts at
peace from a specific concern with Germany to inter
national importance.

The Vatican now embarked on an

effort to secure world peace rather than peace between
Germany and Poland specifically..

This left the Reich

to wonder whether or not it would be included in further
negotiations„
On May ty, the Fuehrer received Cesare Orsenigo,
the Papal Nuncio to Berlin, who had been detailed by the
Pope to present a plan for a conference of five Great
Powers of Europe,

The conference would include Germany,

Italy, France, Britain, and Poland-but not Russia,
Hitler realized' his distressing position and spoke to
Orsenigo with unusual charm.

He expressed "his real

gratitude to the Holy See" and promised that he would
get in touch with Mussolini at once to discuss the
problem,^

•^DGFP„ VI, ^26-27.

The only other occasion on

?4
Hitler, sent. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the. Foreign
Minister.,. on a personal mission to Italy,

Ribbentrop.

told- the. Italian Foreign Minister that the conference
could not be. accepted because it would place Germany
and. Italy, in a numerically inferior position to an
English^-French-Polish block which would inevitably,
follow.

When Ribbentrop instructed his State Secre

tary to convey the news to Orsenigo many changes were
made so as not to offend the Vatican,' Welzsaecker
delivered the message in unfathomable terms.

The

’’points of dlssentlon" of the German-Polish dispute had
not yet been ’’properly ascertained;, „ , „ the present
atmosphere also did not seem to be sufficiently favour
able," and finally, the conference ’’must unfortunately
from the -beginning be considered as not too promising,.’'^"7
Orsenigo anticipated such an answer and chided
Weizsaecker with remarks pertaining to the Vatican’s
recent stoppage of press attacks against Germany, and the
very grave points of friction that still existed in
"| O

German relations with Austrian Catholics,

Now, on

May 23, it was apparent that German refusal of the

which Adolf Hitler personally met with a high. Church
dignitary was in Austria, There he conferred with Cardi
nal Innitzer to secure his support for the Anschluss,
•^Clano’s —c
Papers,
tgmari»iir
i.. u 283,
17DGFP. VI, 481-82,
•^Ibid,„ 519o Germany now used the treatment of
Austrian Catholics as a bargaining point just as it did
with the German Catholics,
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Vatican's peace proposal had alienated the Holy See,
However, this tense mood could not last long.
On May 22, Germany had signed a treaty of military
alliance with Italy, and the Rome-Berlin Axis reached its
peak of solidarity,,
much closero

German-Italian relations became

The Reich could now gain by maintaining

good relations with Italy and with powers that could
influence or be influenced by Italy,

The Vatican's in

separable entanglement with the city of Rome and Italy's
-overwhelmingly Catholic population caused the Reich to
reassess its policy,

Another source of pressure on the

Reich to resume friendly negotiations, with the Vatican
arose from the desire to bring Spain solidly Into the
Axis sphere.

Any friendship between Germany and the

Holy See would make the preponderantly Catholic Spanish
people more disposed toward Germany,
Bergen realized as early as, May 16 that the Holy
See must be placated and- told the Foreign Ministry his
views in no uncertain terms.

He sent a memorandum

reviewing- the fact that since the accession of Pius XII
many quarters steadfastly hoped for a lasting friendship
between the Reich.and the Catholic hierarchy.

To this,

he added that the Italian people desired a normalization
of German-Vatican relations because the new tension caused
great anxiety among these people and the Papacy,

The

most unsettling disclosure of the message pointed out

76
that Italy blamed Getnfany for causing the Vatican to turn
toward France*

This put "a heavy strain bn the

A x i s , "-1-9

Because of this situation, Bergen deemed a settlement with the Curia as "desirable and expedient on grounds
of foreign policy" and suggested^a plan of action.

He

wanted to clear the air of all existing mistrust and
displeasure by proclaiming a press truce'.

The National

Socialist press had only haphazardly applied the previously
ordered restraints.

Then it would be possible to under

take a solution of individual problems arising under the
Concordat when Germany annexed Austria,^®

Bergen believed

that these measures would lead to a solution of all
problems with the Vatican.
The Foreign Ministry was extremely slow in analyz
ing the memorandum, but by June 8 Bergen had the authority
to seek a settlement of problems outstanding with the
Vatican,

Ribbentrop even supplied him with the contents

of the proposals he should communicate.

The Pope admitted

Bergen to a private, prolonged audience wherein he re
ceived Bergen with great delight after the Ambassador
made it clear that he was seeking friendly relations.
The Reich had taken note of the gestures of good will
expressed by the Vatican, stated Bergen, and the Foreign

19DGFP. VI, 516-17.
20Ibid.. 518,
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Minister had decided that "a new epoch had dawned for
21
German-Vatican relations,”
The Pope replied that he
desired friendly relations with Germany although he wanted
Nazi measures in Austria curtailed.

The Pope did not

speak of the Polish problem in detail which indicated
that he would earnestly accept Bergen’s offer.

The

meeting resulted in a benevolent understanding that con
ditions would improve.
In reality German feelings toward a settlement
was divided,

Heinrich, Himmler,^ Reichsfuehrer-SS,

indicated that the circle of men around him at this time
favored an understanding with the Vatican and believed
that Church and State could dwell peacefully together,^3
Ribbentrop, Weizsaecker, and Bergen were all members of
the Foreign Ministry involved in the initiation of the
June 8 settlement.

It must be assumed that Hitler

supported the actions of that agency because Ribbentrop
seldom undertook anything on his own.

21DGFP. VI, 690,
22Heinrich Himmler (1900-19^5): took a leadipg
part in the ’’Roehm Purge” , 193^; Chief of the German
Police; Reich Minister of the Interior, 19-^3; Reich
Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Folkdom;
Chief of the Waffen SS; made unsuccessful peace overtures
to the Allies, 19^5; expelled from the Party, dismissed
from ^.11 offices, and ordered arrested for treason by
Hitler in 19^5; committed suicide after capture by
British troops, May 19^5.
^ c i a n o , Diaries . 86.
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On the other hand, secrecy shrouded the settle
ment as If it might be considered a step backward by
certain Nazis in the Belch,

Ribbentrop instructed Bergen

to inform the Pope that discretion was absolutely neces
sary to carry out the agreement successfully.

Bergen's

report to Ribbentrop after the audience carefully noted
that the Pope promised strict prudence from the Vatican,
Opposition centering around Hermann Goering, Joseph
Goebbels, and Alfred Rosenberg did e x i s t . H o s t i l e
anti-Vatican feeling centered around the inner members
of the NSDAP which could not reconcile itself to Vatican
demands in Germany and Austria.

All three were closely

connected with the National Socialist Party and executed
orders emitting from the Party Chancellery.
By June 10, the Polish situation again flared up
as a result of various accusations made by the pro-Nazi
Danzig Senate and the denial of such by the Polish govern
ment.

The German Foreign Ministry's attempts to pacify

the Pope were not completely effective, and Pius dis
regarded all other problems to concentrate exclusively
on initiating diplomatic activity designed to promote

DGFP. VI, 690; Friedlaender, 22-24. All three
men held various offices at this time. Most importantly,
Goering was Trustee for the Four Year Plan and number two
official in the Nazi regime, Goebbels held his usual title
of Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, and
Rosenberg remained head of the Nazi Party Office for
Foreign Policy and Ideology.
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peace.
His Holiness declared himself available to act as
an intermediary between Poland and Germany.

Yet, the Foreign

Ministry's anticipation of Vatican hostility resulted In a
beneficial effect in another area.

Weizsaecker met with

the Nuncio to Berlin and commented on the anti-German attitude
of the West Poland clergy.

On July 6, the Nuncio returned

the visit and informed Weizsaecker that the matter was being
corrected by higher authorities,2-5 This achievement eased
religious tension further and corresponded to the general
improvement of German-Polish relations between early July
and mid-August.
Before mid-August, Germany could combat Vatican
activities against it when the Holy See expounded moral
appeals to the world.

At that time Germany did not want

the Vatican involved in political affairs of the Reich.
When the Polish Crisis deepened, the government changed
its policy.

At this point, Britain became intensely in

volved in the negotiations and developments leading direc
tly to the outbreak of hostilities.

The Vatican now

achieved a new respectibility in international affairs as
the Western Powers began to gather strength from all
quarters.

It became the spiritual leader of efforts to

maintain peace, and diplomatic activity between the Vatican

2% x F P , VI, 865-66.
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and the major powers of the world Increased tremendously,
Germany now recognized the Holy See’s humanitarian attempts
to keep the peace on a world-wide, doctrinal level as a
definite threat.

The Reich now wanted to draw the Vatican

into the political affairs of Germany so that concessions
could be made which would keep the Holy See from declaring
an anti-German stand to the world.
The Foreign Ministry, on August 17, received infor
mation that the Vatican had consulted with the Polish
Ambassador to the Holy See, and it looked as if the
Pope might intervene for Poland.

Bergen reported that

the Polish Ambassador was convinced that a territorial
change in the Free City of Danzig would be answered by
military occupation by Poland, and that Britain and France
would come to Poland’s aid.
Following events surprised both the Foreign
Minister and Bergen.

The Vatican restrained its policy

of seeking peace through international moral pronounce/

ments and negotiated directly with Germany and Poland
in the Danzig affair.

The British Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs became aware of the situation when
.
/
he received a communication from the British Ambassador
to Italy,

The Italian Ambassador to the Holy See informed

the British Ambassador that the Vatican intended to nego2 6 DGFP, V I I ,

104.

81
tiate with Poland because a successful mediation of the
Polish question would make Germany prone to discussions
about the condition of Catholics within the Reich0

The

Vatican apparently asked Poland to let Danzig revert to
27
Germany.
This Information unsettled the British Foreign
Ministry because it indicated that the Vatican now
supported German policy in Poland.

Britain dispatched

its Ambassador to the Vatican to ascertain if the plan
existed.

The Holy See categorically denied it.

The

Papal Secretary of State contradicted this denial by
telling the same British Ambassador that he had sent a
telegram, to the Nuncio In Warsaw.

The telegram in

structed the Nuncio to tell the President of Poland
that If he returned Danzig to the Reich, Hitler would
negotiate on questions of the Corridor and minority
pO
problems.
The Vatican had reverted to intervention
in the political affairs of the Reich so that It could
maintain its protection of Catholics in Germany, Austria,
and Czechoslovakia.
On August 30, the German State Secretary for
27
'Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign
Policy, 1919-1939 (London, 19^9-1955 )V VI, 293-9^.■ Here
after cited as DBFP. The Vatican will not release its
documents for this period so it is not absolutely certain
that.it wanted Danzig to return to Germany; Nevertheless,
the British believed that the Vatican offered this solution.
28DBFP. VII, 4.03.

82

Foreign Affairs was still analyzing his information and
considering the possibility of negotiations with the Holy
See as the i n t e r m e d i a r y W e i z s a e c k e r must have been
befuddled by Orsenigo's visit and his request that the
State Secretary remind the proper authorities that certain
Catholic clergy and students were exempt from military
service in case of mobilization.

30

Orsenigo's actions

reflected the Vatican's feeling that war could not be
avoided.

The Vatican had returned to intervention by

moral appeals to the world powers.
Weizsaecker did not know th,at the Holy See had
curtailed its political involvement with Germany a few
days before.

During this period, the British Foreign

Ministry had more information about German diplomacy
with the Vatican than did the German Ministry.

The

latter had also been by-passed when Germany m,ade the
decision that caused the Vatican to resort to inter
national moral appeals.
Hitler» the German High Command, and upper echelon
Nazi leaders had undertaken a pro-Eusslan campaign without
regard te the foreign Ministry's opinion of the Vatican's
reaction.

The threat of atheistic communism infiltrat- ■

ing Western Europe was the most dreaded of Vatican

^Frledlaender, '31.
•^DGFP.. VII, 426. A secret agreement to the..
Concordat of which Weizsaecker had never been informed
stipulated this exemption.
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dreams, and with the possibility of this becoming a
reality the Holy See stopped negotiating with the Foreign
Ministry about internal German political affairs.
On August 23, Germany and Russia signed a ten
year Non-Aggression Pact which high-lighted German dis
regard for the Vatican's desires in this area.
Pact was signed because of political expediency.

The
The

desirability of a friendly Russia on the eastern border
was more advantageous to the Reich than trying to stop
Vatican moral appeals.

Moreover, the Foreign Ministry

could be relied upon to attempt to pacify the Vatican,
Pius XII fully understood the consequences of the
Pact.

The next day he broadcast an appeal to all govern

ments and mankind to refrain from a bloody conflict and
31
return to conscientious understanding.-'
The British
government reacted favorably to the appeal, but Hitler
and Mussolini completely ignored it.^2

It was clear,

for the time being, that the strategists who directed
the German government had slight regard for any pressure
the Vatican might apply.
31

While the Foreign Ministry

Great Britain, Documents Concerning GermanPollsh Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities
Between Great Britain and Germany on September 3 , 1939
(New York, 1939)'» 139• Pius XII took this step only
after his personal appeals to the German and Polish
governments failed. See; Cianfarra, l$2-83„
32Clanfarra, 185»

84evaluated, its Information about Polish negotiators and
Papal mediation, the Reich made the decision to attack
Poland1,33
On August 31s Pope Plus XII made a final prewar appeal.

Again, he directed, it at Germany and Poland,

but this time designated each by name, ^

All prior

appeals had been worded in general terms and theoreti
cally directed to all mankind, but now Germany's attitude
forced the Pope to the extreme position of chastizing
individual governments, . Copies were sent to the major
powers of Europe, and the British continued their advo
cacy of the Vatican's effort.

But the Pope appealed

too late, and the Party leader's belief in conquest
overshadowed all problems that the Vatican's power might
cause.

Hitler overruled his professional soldiers and

on September 1 invaded Poland without a declaration of
war.
Germany did not disregard the possibility of the
Holy See’s Indignation entirely.

On August 22, the

Reich had made plans for pacification of the Vatican
after the attack on Poland,

An official proclamation

by the' Fuehrer would be issued, when time allowed, to
guide such activities.

The Reich proposed to develop

33DGFP, VII,
-^fyprlnclples. 586.
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basic principles as guidelines to be followed until the
Fuehrer., could act.

The government would issue a statement

to the Vatican couched in friendly terms emphasizing
assurances, that there would be no more expropriation of
Church property in Austria..
Germany also planned to tell the Holy See that
the Reich wished to settle many other minor problems
immediately.

The Papacy considered one such problem as

particularly important.

It concerned Bishop Rusch, the

Vatican appointee as Apostolic Administrator for Innsbruek-Feldklreh. who had been appointed without the
consent of the German government.

Innsbruck-Feldkirch

was not in Germany, and the Vatican continuously struggled
to salvage its rights to appoint administrators in these
outside territories.

Germany maintained that the Con~

cordat. which supposedly guaranteed the Church's right
to make these appointments, did not extend to these
areas.

Thus, Germany had the sole right of approval.

If Bishop Rusch remained, it would be a Catholic victory
and a precedent that would be difficult for Germany to
overcome.
35DGFP,.VII-, 196-97.. This conflict of views
arises from Article I k of the Concordat and Article I k ,
Paragraph 2 of the Supplementary Protocol. See: Appendix
A. 188, 191o This. Article maintains that the Vatican can
make the appointment only if there is no objection "of
a general political nature" by the government. Confusion
arose when it could not be decided if t|ie Concordat
extended to certain areas outside the Rjgich.
?
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The proposal further suggested, that, with the
Fuehrer’s approval, details of the plan should be sent
to the Reich Minister for Church Affairs and the Reichsfuehrer-SS for implementation,,

Viewed in its entirety,

the proposal proved to be the most far-reaching and
impressive consideration ever undertaken by any agency
of the

R e i c h ,

36

Hitler and his subordinates knew that

the Vatican would be agitated and unpredictable when
Germany occupied Poland and that steps would have to be
taken to placate the Holy See before it reciprocated
with rash actions.
By September 6, Pius had neither appealed for
world peace nor bemoaned the fact that another Catholic
country had fallen to German advances.

Two idealistic

considerations influenced the Vatican in this respect.
First, a period of little international activity might
help to urge Germany to make peace with Poland and,
t

'

secondly, Germany might set up a buffer zone in Poland
against Soviet Russia,

The Director of the Political

Department, within the Foreign Ministry, took a more
practical stand in his communication to Bergen,

The

Director informed the Ambassador that France and England
36

DGFP„ VII, 196-9?« The plan to pacify the
Vatican was one part of a general outline describing
how the various European countries should.be handled
after the invasion of Poland, Unfortunately, it is
unsigned so that the issuing agency cannot be deter
mined.

8?
had asked the Vatican to declare Germany the aggressor in
the conflict, but that the Pope refused to do so.

The

reason was that he did not wish to jeopardize the Catholies already under German authority, ^
Germany’s hold on its Catholic population placed
the Papacy in an embarrassing position.
ism influenced all Germans.

National Social

The bishops within the Reich

and the annexed territories were Germans who adhered to
German policy.

These persons sympathized with Reich
j.

policy toward Poland and publicly declared their position,
i

•

•

The German Army Bishops caused even more embarrassment to
the Vatican.

They boosted the soldier’s morale by being

readily available to administer Extreme Unction.

They,

too, were German by nationality and did not hesitate to
urge the soldiers on to a swift and total victory.

Vati

can doctrine condones ’’just” wars only, and the bishops
assured their flock that a ”just" war existed in Poland.
Germany’s co-ordination of the German Catholic
Church and imposition of authority on Catholics in the
outside territories without causing a split with the
Vatican now paid off.
37

If Pius XII took a stand against

Friedlaender„ 33® These facts come from the
text of a telegram from the Director of the Political
Department to Bergen6 It is a manuscript from the
relatively unpublished Bonn archives. These are not
documents captured after World War II, but papers that
often, relate specifically to government relations with
bishops and the Vatican,
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German aggression, he would, alienate the National Social
ist Catholics and risk increased suppression of those
who resisted the regime, ^
Anti-Catholic suppression increased after the
invasion of Poland, and Nazi authorities improvised
rather unique methods to subordinate the Church within
the Reich to a greater degree.

They closed down churches

with the excuse that they were too far from air raid
shelters and that the occupants would be injured in an
attempt to reach Safety.

Germany reduced the number of

previously muzzled Catholic reviews and journals because
it needed paper for the war effort.^9
The Fuehrer introduced more extreme measures in
Poland when he decided that the clergy, along with various
other groups, must be exterminated in an effort to induce
unconditional s u r r e n d e r B y September 18, the Pope
could no longer remain silent.

He addressed a pilgrimage

in Rome with a didactic speech against the totalitarian
state and the men who lead it.

The address definitely

referred to Germany and Italy.

But Germany had now

entered a new phase of activity which nullified any plans
Pius may have entertained.

-^Friedlaender, 35.
-^^Cianfarra, 190.
MCA, VIII, 590. From an affidavit by Erwin
Lahousen, Chief of Abwehr Section 2,, relating the events
of a conference in the Fuehrer’s train.
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The Reich and Russia launched a "peace-offensive"
designed to place responsibility for continuation of the
war on the Western P o w e r s O n

September 19, 19391

Vatican circles took a particular Interest when Hitler
said that the West did not have to fear- world conquest
by Germany»

The German Ambassador to Italy instructed

Mussolini to make open statements that conditions in
t. L

Poland would not lead to war.

•»

As a result Italo-Vatican

relations became much better.
The Vatican, in effect, supported the Axis by
urging England and France to accept a settlement.^2
Although the Vatican's motive may-have been the desire
to end the war and save the Polish Catholic population,
the result was support of the Axis' need for a breathing
spell under the banner of a compromise peace.

However,

Germany could not take full advantage of the Vatican's
wavering attitude because itsmajor concern changed from
Poland to Russia.
On. September 29, the Reich and Russia partitioned
Poland.

The partition subjected Polish Catholics to a

state that decried religion in any form and threatened
the West with communism.

The Vatican faced the most

^Bullock, 573o
IxO
Cianfarra, 192. The Vatican newspaper repro
duced portions of Mussolini's statements.
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serious dilemma of the Polish Crisis,

Mussolini hnd

his Foreign Minister also abhorred the turn of events,
but German evaluation of the political scene placed the
need for Russian participation above the combined impor
tance of Italy and the Vatican,,

Yet, the Vatican only
jr.

mildly denounced the partition.
The Pope merely observed that;

"Despite unjust

persecution, the Polish Catholics-must persevere in prayer,,
ixk

and in the practice of good works."

The Vatican’s placid

reaction may be partly attributed to Mussolini’s-great
expectations for a favorable solution of the problem of
Russia’s westward advances,

He based his hopes on a

speech Hitler planned to deliver on October 6 „ ^

Neither

Mussolini'nor the Vatican knew that the speech was a
facade, and that Hitler, having secured his eastern border
with Russia, was making plans for the invasion of the West.
Germany’s grandiose plans for Eastern "living space”
j

relegated consideration of the Vatican to insignificance.
The day following his speech, Hitler took the step that
precipitated an Irreparable schism between Church and
^Clahfarra, 190-01, Mussolini and his Foreign
Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, were just-as taken back as the
Vatican, As leaders of a Catholic country they could not
condone communism. Sees Ciano, Diaries, 152=53«
i

.

.

.

^Bullock, 55^“55« The dates of the "peaceoffensive” are September 19-£3, 1939.. Hitler was still
committed to a speech on October 6 as ^ result of com
mitments made during this period.
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State by appointing Heinrich Himmler Reich Commissioner for
the Strengthening of German Folkdom in the annexed portion
of Poland.

Himmler's belief that National Socialism

must destroy Christianity at all costs
for his duty„

made him suitable

He intended to eliminate the Polish in

telligentsia,, the Jewish population, and the clergy,
with the ultimate goal of implanting National Socialism
as the supreme ideology.

A week later, Germany organized

the Government General to maintain public order and life
amid the confusion.
Hitler decided upon retributive justice for the
Catholic Church in recompense for the Vatican peace pro
posals of August and the role the Church played in under47
mining German culture and tradition in Poland.
Through
out Poland, the Reich closed down many Catholic institutions,
including monasteries, schools, and charities, in an effort
to simulate procedures that had already taken place in
kR
Germany.
It made Poland the prototype of a "New Order"
that was to prevail, in all Eastern territories under the
Reich’s authority by initiating a policy to subjugate
"inferior races," neutralize or exterminate the clergy,
and use forced labor to exploit natural resources.
Weizsaecker, 281.
4.7
Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations.
19^1^19^ (New York, 1953)9 381. Hereafter cited as Hitler,
Conversations.
*%CA. Supplement B, 1391.-.,
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The Fuehrer took little or no precaution to ease
the reception of this radical action at the Vatican,
Political strategists at the Holy See pondered different
methods of approach to the situation until Pius resolved
to abandon the tradition that a new pope's first encycli
cal explain the program to be followed under hisguidance.
By October 20, his staff had drafted an encyclical to
suit the state of affairs, but His Holiness rewrote it
many times.

On October 2?, Pope Pius XII delivered the

most politically oriented speech to be released from the
Vatican during his reign.
His first encyclical castigated the totalitarian
state and the state that rescinded treaties unilaterally.
He then turned to an indictment of conditions, implying
National Socialism and communism, that directed youth
toward a goal that would turn them from Christ,

The Pope

extended sympathy to countries that might be placed under
such circumstances without any mandate.

Finally, the

Pope condemned conditions that raised "a piteous dirge
ito

over a nation such as Our dear Poland,” '
Explicit extension of- sympathy to a country desig
nated by name moved the encyclical to the political sphere.
His implicit censure of Germany and Russia was too obvious
for even a political dullard to misconstrue.
k9
Summl Pontlficatus,

, 592-615,

The world

This is the encyclical
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knew that the Vatican had declared that It neither gave
up the struggle for world peace on the doctrinal level
nor the rights of individual Catholics on the politicalplane,,

All the' ill-will, suspicion, and mistrust that

was latent hetween Germany and the Vatican now came into
the open.

This caused many quarters to be apprehensive

of the German reaction.
The Reich government quickly understood the
significance of the document and took immediate steps
to suppress the undesirable influence it would have pn
Catholics in'Germany and the annexed territories.

Nazi

publications printed a distortion of the text in an effort
to lessen its effect. ^

Reinhard Heydrich,-^ Chief of

the Security Police and Himmler's assistant, reported his
precautions and views to the Reich Chancellery.

Heydrich

showed how well Germany summed up the situation by ob
serving that;
The encyclical is directed exclusively against
Germany, both in ideology and in regard to the
German-Polish dispute. How dangerous it is as
regards our foreign relations as well^as our
domestic affairs is beyond discussion.^5°Cianfarra, 200.
-^Reinhard Heydrich (190*1— 19^2); Chief of the
Security Police; head of the Reich Security Main Office;
Himmler's assistant until 19**2; Reich Protector for
Bohemia and Moravia, 19^-1; in revenge for his assassina
tion in Prague in 19^2 the Czech village of Lidice was
obliterated.
^Quoted in Friedlaender, -37o' This is a letter
from Heydrich to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Hans
Lammers.

9^
On November 5« the reading of the Pope ’s words from
the pulpits caught Heydrich off guard,,

His report stated

that only scattered readings occurred on that day because
the lesser Catholic hierarchy were informed too late to
disseminate the message,

He now proceeded to take pre

ventive measures, under directives already established
for such occasions, and issued orders to hinder all churches
from having the encyclical read.
of communication entirely,,

He stopped all other forms

The Reich Ministry for Propa

ganda and Public Enlightenment took appropriate steps to
prohibit discussion of the Pope's words by the press.^
Nevertheless/ Reich leaders did not want to cause a direct
break in relations with the Vatican,

Prevention of dis

semination of the encyclical was carried, out in a legalistic and relatively mild manner.
Throughout this period Germany viewed the Vatican
as a supra-national state with the power to influence
international decisions and intervene in local political
affairs at will if not checked by a secular power.

The

Vatican proved its ability to do this time and again
during the Polish Crisis,

Finally, the Reich concluded

that the Holy See was a de facto secular state and must

■^^Friedlaender , 37.
5^F0r confirmation of this view see; Friedlaender,
38, He concluded "that the Nazi leaders wished to avoid,
for the duration of the w^r, an open and irremediable
rupture with the Holy See, with all the consequences that
this would involve,"
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be treated, as such in order to gain concessions on a
quid -pro quo basis.
By November 1939» German political l e a d e r s f o r 
tified by National Socialism,, had greatly strengthened
their hold on Germany and its. territories.

They could

effectively combat even the most extreme Vatican attempts
at political maneuvers to ease the Catholic burden.
Economically and militarily, Germany had become so power
ful that the Vatican’s peace proposals were drowned in
the clamor of secular natlops to assert their material
istic diplomatic strength.

Ctf
-'-'Germany1s treatment of the Vatican as a secular
power is quite apparent in a March 11, 19^0, meeting be
tween Ribbentrop and the Pope. See: DGFP, VII, 896-97.
,

CHAPTER I V

GERMANY ENCOUNTERS MINIMAL VATICAN OPPOSITION
IN THE WEST
For Germany to continue its aggression, or even
to consolidate its newly gained position, without Vatican
interference, the Reich would have to again placate the
Holy See,

Germany had seriously offended the Vatican

because of its co-operation with communist Russia.

The

Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939s and the partition
of Poland between the two stunned the world.

This policy

continued in February of -1-940, when Germany entered into
new economic agreements with Russia.

The Soviet Union's

advances into Finland added to the defection of -all con
cerned Catholics.

In February

-and March, the Vatican

launched a propaganda campaignagainst Germany via its
i
radio station and Instructions to the clergy.
On March 11, 19^0, Hitler sent Joachim von Rib
bentrop to attend an audience with Pope Pius XII in 4n
effort to smooth over the discord arising from recent
events.

The Fuehrer told Ribbentrop fthat coprse td take
2
and what ideas to present.
At the outset, Ribbentrop
expressed concern for the fundamental relationship between
1
- Cianfarra, 208. The Vatican supports its own radio
station in Rome. Confidential instructions are Issued from
the Holy'See'to the clergy of all countries. In this manner,
policy decided upon at the top of the Catholic hierarchy can
be spread throughout the clergy,1
2 DGFP, V I I ,

896,
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National Socialism and Catholicism.

He related that the

Fuehrer believed a basic settlement to be possible, but
that any such agreement must be comprehensive and lasting,
not transitory as the Reich Concordat had proved to be. h
However, two obstacles stood in the way of a lasting
agreement at this time.

One was the predominant view of

the Catholic clergy in Germany that they should engage
in political activity.

The other, that Germany-was how

involved in a struggle that demanded all Its efforts and
which did not permit Hitler to be interested in any other
problems at this time.
What the Fuehrer did want, Ribbentrop explained,
was a continuation of the present truce with the Vatican.^
Ribbentrop stated that the Fuehrer had made the preliminary
concessions of paying one billion reichsmarks to the Church
and stopping 7000 indictments of Catholic clergymen in
Germany.

He did this because he wanted to expand the truce.

Ribbentrop ended the conversation by pointing out
what Germany had done for the Catholic Church.

He noted

that never in history -had such a radical revolution done
so little Injury to the Church than did the Nazi take-over
of Germany.

In fact, he said, it was only due to National

Socialism that communism did not destroy church life in
3"Truce!f was a strange word for Ribbentrop to use,
The Re ieh-Vatican conflict In the East had become very bad
by this time. Obviously, the Foreign Minister wanted to
convey feelings of optimism.
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Europe altogether.

Nevertheless,r the Foreign Minister

admitted that Germany and Russia had established a lasting
relationship.

He said that this -wAs possible because

National Socialism had become so strong that it made the
h
German people immune to communism,
Pius XII tried to question Ribbentrop about protP?
lems in Poland, Germany, and other territories, but did
not insist on this discussion because the Foreign Minister
repeatedly emphasised the possibility of a fundamental
understanding at-a later time,

Ribbentrop declared that

he and the Pope had had a cordial talk in which Plus

1

agreed to all that he said,

6

^DGFP, VII, 897-98, This information comes from
an unsigned memorandum found in the German Foreign Minis
try archives. It is generally believed that Ribbentrop
wrote it himself. In 1966, the Pope's secretary-and
personal confidant, Father Robert Leiber, stated tha,t
this document-was unknown to him. He 'believes that
Ribbentrop had it '’fabricated by someone in the Foreign.
Office," For the complete report of Leiber*s comments
on-this meeting--see:
"Pius XII -and the Third Reich,"
Look (May 17, 1966), 3^-50. Leiber is here commenting
on excerpts-frem Freidlaender’s Plus, XII and the Third
Reich. Cianfarra also presents -ah' entirely different
view than does-this document. See: Cianfarra, 209-10,
^DGFP, VII, 897, Leiber -said that the Pope also
raised specific questions -about the controversy between
Catholicism and National Socialism, To these inquiries,
Leiber reported, Ribbentrop answered that since thelGerman
effort was concentrated on-war, he could not -answer them at
the present. See:
"Pius XII and the Third Reich," Look
(May 17, 196.
6 ), 37,
^The former Ambassador to Italy, Ulrich von Hassell,
says the meeting was entirely fruitless, Ulrich von
Hassell, The von Hassell Diaries:
1938-19^ (New York, 19^7)*
131o Hereafter•cited as Hassell,
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Later that day, the Foreign Minister met with
Mussolini to promote a meeting between Axis dictators.
The two men discussed the audience with the Pope and the
contents of a letter sent to Mussolini from Hitler,
Ribbentrop dispelled Mussolini’s fears of the German ..
friendship, with Russia and discontent with the Vatican
in the same manner as he did the Pope’s,

He told the

Duce that a lasting solution between Church and State
would come when the Church solved the problem of politi
cal Catholicism,

The Foreign Minister explained that he

would deal, further.with the matter through the Nuncio to
Berlin, but that religious peace had meanwhile been
7
arranged,.'
Hitler had written to Mussolini about another reason
why the Vatican should be grateful to Germany,

He conten

ded that if Germany had not retained control in the Govern
ment General of Poland, the Church could not carry out Its
basic function because of the hostility of the local
populace there.

Then the Fuehrer calmed Mussolini's dread

of communism by stating that it was becoming a national,as opposed, to international* ideology which implied that
O
it did not endanger the rest of Europe, Mussolini believed
7
Clano’s. Papers, 358-59» Mussolini detested the Pope
Mid the influence the Vatican had in Italy, Yet, when com
munism threatened, he sided with the Holy See in order
to keep the favor of the Italian Catholic population,
8 DGFP, V I I ,

876, 78,
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the Fuehrer and decided that Germany and Italy had a common
destiny.
\
The

Ribbentrop*s journey to Rome i*asa -success,

Vatican and Mussolini bellaved Hitler's statements about
the weakness of eomm-unis®.

They-also found comfort In the

idea -that Germany -wanted to continue the religious -stale-?
i

mate rather than to oppose the Roly See*

On March 12.,-

the Russo-Flnnis-h- -Armistice added to the pacification of
Vatican anxiety about German-Russ-ian aggression.

By

March 15 9 Europeans -generally thought -that.the Armls tlce,
Ribbentrop-’©meeting- with Mussolini,-apd his audience -with
Pius indicated the eomihg- of peace„9
On the other hand, Ribbentrop’’s--*visIt opened the
fo *
way for the Internal German Opposition- ;to make inroads
through the Vatican.

The Holy -See,temporarily unworried

about -advancing communism-and the persecution of Catholics,
became receptive to overtures de^i^ned to reduce German
military success.
^Hassell, 123.
i°The German opposition was made up of diverse
groups not in close touch with one another. Most -members
were military men. All were-against the regime1because
they thought Hitler-would lead the German-nation to ruin.
Three groups -stand out. The J'Goerdeler circle," built
around Dr. Karl Goerdeler, General Ludwig Beck -and Hassell.
The "Kreisau circle,’’ led by Cpunt Helmuth von Moltke, -and
one that' freq-uently ©perated in connection with the-Vatican,
the "Canarls circle." The latter group included Admiral
Wilhelm Canarls, head of the Abwehr (counter-intelligence
department of the OKW). Other members were Dr. Joseph
Mueller and General Hans Oster.
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On May 1, 19^0, members of the opposition used the
Vatican,as-an intermediary to -warn Holland and Belgium
of the impending invasion of the West.

Dr. Joseph Mueller.

working in conjunction with Admiral Wilhelm Gandris and
General Hans Os ter, told the Belgian Ambassador to "the
11
Holy See theexact date of the planned 4hvasion.
The
Belgian Ambassador told the governments of Belgium and
Holland.

They informed the Briti-sh-and French.

A week later, the German Security Service had
intercepted and deciphered the message.

Hitler -and the

German High Command did not know the actual extent of
the damage because the Security Service could not trace
the persons responsible for the leak.

Plans for the

Western invasion were already being executed„ and Hitler
decided to go ahead.

French-and British passivity during

the Polish Crisis, the easy elimination of Poland, and the
German—Russian Agreement that secured the eastern frontier
were indicative pf good military results regardless of
the warning to Holland and Belgium.
On May 10, 19^0, the German Army carried out, with
some modification, General Fritz Erich von Manstein’s
adaptation of the Schlieffen Plan.
11

The ..Army?assaulted the

Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence (London, 1951),
112-13. Hereafter cited as Colvin. Also sees Walter
Schellenberg, The Labyrinth; Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg
(New York, 195^)8 350-51» Hfreafter cited as SchelienbergI
Canarls had dispatched a brahch of his intelligence network
to operate directly thirough tihe Vatican.
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Low Countries and France,

The German Opposition’s

warning turned out to be a benefit rather than a burden.
The Meuse defense system had not been linked with the
Maginot Line because Belgium insisted that its neutrality
must be violated before it would, ally with France and
Britain,

Now, the Low Countries called for help.

The Anglo-French Army responded by racing into the
area around the Dyle and Meuse Elvers,

This action added

to the effectiveness of the German plan.

The Low Country

offensive was a diversionary movement, and the main German
force prepared1for a thrust through the Ardennes Mountains
into France,

Even though Holland and Belgium had received

the Vatican sponsored warning, and Anglo-French troops
mobilized in the Low Countries, Germany overran the Dutch
and. Belgian defense systems in five days.
Pope Plus XII took a strong stand and officially
pledged the Vatican’s spiritual support to the Low
Countries,

Three messages came from the Holy See simul

taneously.

One went to"King Leopold of Belgium, one to

Queen Wllhelmnll^.of Holland, and the last to Grand Duchess
Charlotte of Luxemburg,

Although the form of the three

telegrams differed, the political implications of their
12
content, was the saqie.
The Pope was quite--angry about
^ Principles-. 668-69. PiuaKMI called for the re
establishment of Belgium independence and extended his
sympathy to the countries that had been invaded ’’against
their will and their rights,”
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the violation of Dutch and. Belgian neutrality and expressed
his sympathy to all three countries,,

He clearly expressed

Vatican opposition to German aggress ion*
Vatican concern for the Low Countries did not
affect the. German bishops who continued to stand behind
Germany in the war effort0

The German press Ignored the

messages* and some National Socialist Catholic newspapers
■.
13
denounced Plus because of his anti-German posture*
The German Foreign Ministry feared that the Pope
had sent the telegrams in reply to King Leopold's appeal
to the Vatican*

If this were trpe, Germany would have

to withstand the full onslaught of Vatican opposition
because Leopold had made specific chargfs against the
Reich*

Thus* the Vatican’s statement woiild be a'uni■j |i

lateral condemnation of Germany* ■

The next day* May 11*.

1940 *...Bergen?informed the Foreign Office that Pius did
not intend the messages to be regarded as political
intervention*

A week later* Bergen was* informed that

the Vatican statement was. not a reply to King Leopold’s
appeal but had crossed it in transmission*'11^
Hitler* bolstered by the great military victories-*
remained calm throughout*
13Lewy* 228*
4h
Friedlaender* 49*
May 11* 1940*

It was Mussolini who became

Telegram from Bergen to Berlin*

^ i b l d *,52* Telegram from Bergen to Berlin* May 18,
1940*
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incensed-at the Vatican's early anti-German position.
The Duce sent his Ambassador to the Holy See, Dino Alfieri,
to demand an explanation of the VatlcanVs one-sided stand.
On May.-13* Alfietri had stressed that'the Vatiednls attitude
16
was. Irrevocably against the Axis.
However, when he
'

encountered the Pope six days later, Pius told him-that he
had personally edited the words "Germany" and "invasion"
in order to keep the Vatican aloof.

17

The German Foreign

Ministry received this information from Italy.

In nine

days, May,-f®-19, the Vatican's strong stand against
Germany withered away in the face of military victory,
and. Axis demands that the Pope refrain from condemning
1 ft

Germany. The Vatican also tried to keep Italy from joining
Germany.

Pope Pius XII and his Secretary of State,

Magilone, asked President Roosevelt numerous times to
appeal to Mussolini.

The United States sent a special

representative, Myron C, Taylor, to the Vatican.

Taylor’s

■^Clano, Diaries. 249.
1?DGFP, IX, 378-79.
■^Therb Is no doubt that Plus XII changed his
attitude in the days following the telegrams to!the Low
Countries. Friedlaender, on page 52, attributes this to
growing caution at the vitlcan as a result of German
military victories, Cianfarra, 227-29, gives two'other
plausible reasons. One is that the Vatican is In the
heart of Italy and Mussolini could easily have isolated
it. The other, that the Holy See gave up initiative in
the West because it lenew that military conditions would
change in the-long,run. In either case, the Vatican’s
submission in the West preserved its ability to Intervene
under more favorable circumstances later.
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mission was to aid the Vatican in bringing about peace
and to collect intelligence information from: Vatican
19
sources,
Roosevelt finally agreed and asked Mussolini
to remain a non-belligerent.

The effort failed.

By June 10, 19^0, Germany had overrun Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium,-and Luxemburg-,

The-well-

planned thrust through the Ardennes caused France to
rapidly crumble,
England,
France,

Italy declared war on France and

Six days later, the Axis ••;tK:
OTbughly, defeated
The patriotic German bishops applauded by

ringing church bells throughout Germany,

20

Germany met no resistance from the Vatican during
the conquest of France,

The Vatican’s weak support of

that country parallels, and may well be a result of, the
inability of the French Catholics to counter Germany in
any effective way.

21

Indeed, reports received by the

Foreign Office encouraged the government more than did
^ C o r d e l l Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New
York, 19^8)^713, 7?7-?9o The United States did not have
an Ambassador to the Holy See, Correspondence between
President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII was largely ambigu
ous and accomplished nothing. Sets Eugenio Pacelll (Pope
Plus XII) -and Franklin ,D, Roosevelt, -Wartime Correspondence
Between President RooSevelt and' Pope Pius XII (New York,

tw fft

-

.. .*"'■

- ^ —

—

20Lewyy 228,.
2^*Cf,, Cianfarr-a, 2 k j 0 Relations between France -and
the Holy See had been good since World War I, so the Vatican’s
labk of support cannot be said to come from -an ideological
disagreement between the two. See; DGFP„ I, 1040, The
French national Catholics readily backed Marshal Henri
Philippe Petain’s (the Nazi sponsored leader pf Vichy France)

io6

Plus XII*s retreat on his. stand in the Low Countries„

In

late May, Bergen reported that confidential sources had
Informed him that the Vatican believed that Prance should
conclude a separate peace and leave Britain to carry on
the battle alone,22

On May 29, he told the Foreign

Ministry that the Vatican’.s Secretary of State thought
that Belgium should have capitulated in' fcjaas beginning
and that France should do so now.

23

It soon became evident that Pope Pius XII had
concluded that the war in the West would continue re
gardless of Vatican attempts to keep the peace.

Early

in June. Pius turned to pleas for ■humanization of the
war.

He asked the belligerents on both sides to abide

by the rules of international law when dealing- with
non-combatants and occupied countries.

After Italy’s

entry into the war, the Vatican’s appeals became more
specific.

While still urging Germany to show generosity
>

to France, Papal messages indicated that the gruesome
reality of a European-War had found its way to the Vatican,
\ ft
Pius began calling for -abstention from indiscriminate
’’national reconstruction1’
1 policy. The weakness of thq
French Catholics to put up a serious fight against the Nazis
is a result of the factionalized French political atmosphere,
The Catholics had no p'dritical education-and never formed a
political party for any effective resistance. For a good
review of this subject see: Jacques Maritain, "Religion and
Politics in France,’’ Foreign Affairs (January 19^2), 266-81.
22DGFP,

■

2-^Friedlaender, 53°
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bombing., the use of gases, and persecution of peoples in
occupied areas.
On June 28, 1940, Pius XII made one last try for
peace.

The countless dead and great devastation prodded,

the Pope to make plans to address himself to the governments^qx Germany, England, and Italy.

-Before undertaking

this initiative, he sounded Out the individual govern
ments first.

Magiione asked Bergen to determine German

feeling in regard to a mutual conciliation and an end
\
to hostilities. At the same time, Nuncio Orsenigo
oh.
approached the Foreign Ministry in Berlin.
Germany
refused the Pope’s effort.

The peace feeler failed,

because the., Reich learned that London had not accepted

the overture.

The Foreign Ministry and the Nuncio placed

the blame for this failure squarely on Britain.2-*
Although Germany faced many problems with the
p^
Catholic population in Belgium and Holland,
it had no
24
Pius' peace proposal had exactly the opposite
effect he had expected. It encouraged Hitler to'open the
Battle of Britain because he interpreted it as an admission
that Germany could not be stopped in the West.
25DGFP, X, -49-50; DGFP, X, 318-19. It is extremely
doubtful that Hitler would have accepted the proposal under
any circumstances, but the German government was absolved
of the biame in this instance.’
2.6
The Belgian Catholics -made up the core of patriotic
resistance to Nazism in that country and actively opposed.
Germany until their liberation In--1-944. Political Catholi
cism was at its best there. See; DGFP. VII, 499; DGFP. XI,
343;--Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Hitler's Europe; Survey of Inter
national Affairs. 1939-1946 (London.' 1 9 W . 484-65, 493°

great, problem with the Vatican in the West#
arose elsewhere*

Graver conflicts

Germany and the Vatican continued to have

ma^or disputes concerning Reich measures in: Poland.

Hereafter cited as Toynbee, HitlerIs; Europe. High Com
missioner Seyess-Inquart was Constantly plagued by Catholic
resistance in Holland. See: DGFP„ XI, 1216; Toynbee,
Hitler’ s Europe,-50'3-04j. Werner 'Warmbrtmn, The Dutch Under
German. Occupation. 1940-1945 (Stanford, California, 1963)V
137s 156-60, 189. French Catholics only, did not greatly
resist the Nazis.
i

CHAPTER V

GERMANY TERMINATES NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VATICAN
IN THE OUTSIDE TERRITORIES
I
After the invasion of Poland in 1939* and par
ticularly after the German advance in Russia on June 22,
19^1s the Reich attempted to mold its new territories
into manageable divisions,,
on three separate entities.

The Reich ultimately settled
The first included the

annexed lands adjacent t(o the Reich.

They were called

the Incorporated Territories and consisted of Austria,
most of Czechoslovakia, the Polish area around Poznan,
Lodz, and the Reich district of Danzig-West Prussia.
The second took in occupied Poland and was referred to
as the Government General.
included Warsaw and Cracow.

The Government General
The third area covered

portions of old Poland lying even further east and
parts of Russia,

Germany called this the Occupied
1
Eastern Territories.
The formation of such a plan took time.

During

the Interval, a great deal of confusion arose.

It was

not clear whether the Incorporated Territories should
include Western Poland to the same degree as Austria,
the Sudetenland, and other areas which were traditionally

.... ^United States, Civil Affairs Department, Trials
of.Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg. 19^?°^9). IV. 510-11. Hereafter
cited as TMWC.
10 9
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Germane

If Poland were included on an equal basis, did

this, mean the annexed area, the occupied area, or all
of that nation?

On the other hand, should the adminis

tration of the annexed portion of Poland be similar to
that of the Government General?

Should decrees made in

Poland and the Government General extend to Austria?
When the-Reich informed the Vatican of the government's
position in regions not Included in the Reich, it was
ambiguous as to which lands were or were not involved.
The. resulting diiemma is clearly seen in Austria,
Poland, and Russian lands occupied by Germany.
Since-May 13, 1938i the date of the annexation
of Austria, the Reich had followed a very strict antiCatholic policy in that country.

It closed most churches

and schools while divesting many priests of State subsi
dies and the right to teach religion to children.

Many

priests were arrested and some sent to concentration
camps.

2

Germany instituted many of these suppressive

actions to prepare Austria for a significant role in the
war effort.

On March 20, 19^1, Deputy of the Fuehrer

Martin- Bormann decreed that the Reich must continue to
seize- the property of clergymen who violated laws set
i'
'
up to regulate the war economy in Austria. The offenses
encompassed hoarding, malicious attacks against the

^Cianfarra, 220.

Ill

State-,-..and-..illegal. possession of firearms..,.

Bormann
3
re.fnsad_.to-. .pay...any .compensation for the property..
-...property included convents, monasteries
and. schools as well as churches 0

The Vatican, regarded

these, incidents as incompatible with the Reich Concordat.
A continuous battle between the Reich and the Holy
See as to whether or not the Concordat extended to
Austria had begun some time before,,

In August 19^1,

State Secretary Weizsaecker relayed his government’s
opinion, about this question
to the Vatican.
t

He pointed

out that, the Concordat extended only to the Reich as it
existed.in. 1933 when they ratified the document,

Weiz-

aae.cker_-emphasA.z.ed that this did not include Austria,
the. Sudeienland., the Government General, or any other
areas-not. in the Reich at that time.

The Vatican., never

accepted., this decision and continued to try to gain
concessions in the Incorporated Territories on the
grounds of the Concordat.
Germany’s attack on Russia in June 19^1 caused
new problems for the Reich.

One problem was the ne

cessity of sustaining’the morale of the troops and
civilian population of Germany and the outlying- dis
tricts.

Of course, this demand meant that the.Reich

kus.t include, the Catholics in its plans.

From September

19^1 to February 19^2, Hitler followed a course, of re
straint toward the Vatican.
3NCA, V I I I ,

250.

Germany's definitive decree
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of the exclusion of Concordat provisions in. areas. ad
jacent to the Reich was tempered by the Fuehrer.
i

His

support of this exclusion was moderated by his belief
that, "the main thing is to be clever in this -matter and
not to look for a struggle where it can be avoided.
Hitler openly blamed the persecution of the
Church on staunch Party members.

In September 19^1* he

orders d. Mart in Bormann to stop his campaign against the
Church, in order to boost the morale of Catholics in the
German-domain.$

The Fuehrer's table talks with.-such men

as.- Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, and Goebbels indicated that
he had not given up his idea to eliminate the Catholic
religion--in the German areas completely.

However, the

Fuehrer stated that he could not cope with the Church
at this time.

He also noted that he would not "be able

to go on evading the religious problem-much longer.
Hitler's determination to postpone a final so
lution of the religious problem was weakened by Bormann.
On May 10, 4941, Rudolf Hess, head of the Party. Chancel
lery.,- flew, to Scotland for unknown reasons.

Bormann

replaced-.Hess and began to draw the lines of internal
administration tightly around him.

His unrelenting

anti-Vatican beliefs and ability to gain a position to
^Hitler, Conversations, ^9.
^Papen, ^81-82.
^Hitler, Conversations, 117, 2*1-7.
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Influence. Hitler's. actions, was. determinant. of future- .
Reich-pel icy toward -the Holy See.

Before the. end of the

year, Bormann became second only to Hitler in leader
ship of the.. Nazi. Party,
.On...February 2 1 9 19^2 , Bergen began a drive, to
ease tensions, -beween the Reich and the Vatican„

His

analytlcal-report of Reich-Vat lean, rel-ations asked., for
a "radical, all-embracing solution" to all questions. .
outstanding-with the Vatican,,

To achieve this end*

Bergen stated that, he wanted the. National So c-ialis.tleaders to withdraw measures that hindered such a .so
lution*,?. .Goebbels entertained thoughts along, the ..same.
line, .He believed that the Party enforced too strong.
a policy-against the Church.

This made it too easy for

the Catholic, hierarchy to attack the State
Influenced by Bormann, Hitler took no notice of
these, observations„

The Fuehrer's conversations of this

period-...reflected the policy of the highest Party leaders.
In April,...he..reiterated, statements reminiscent of the.
early. years.of co-ordination of the Catholic Church,
spoke of. the priest*s attempts to undermine the policy
of the..Nazi-Party,

He thought it scandalous, that the

Reich should subsidize the Church with 900 million

^Elledlaender, 158-59.
^Goebbels, I b l „

He
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marks.annually..when- -the money could, -be. spent for -farms.
to be givan-tu-aoldiers-. who.. wanted to retire into agri
cultural service..-

The Fuehrer even .wanted~t©..reduce the

I

subsidy- to. fif ty -millions-.annually to-be paid directlyto the_Jiprlncas-.of the. Church„"

In this way, he thought

they- could.-be bought off and would wholeheartedly support
the.Relejn.^

Hitler had adopted the hard-line Party

stand.
Hitler's order of June 22, 1942, severed Reich
relations .-W-lth the Vatican in all areas except the
Germany, of 1933-*

The severance was handled in a tact

ful but complicated manner.

The Vatican had already

refused, to recognize any political change in territory
after.September of 1939o^0

From the Reich's point of

view,.the.Holy See had-therefore automatically excluded
itself-..fr©m-.any official connection with these terri
tories.,

Since, the Reich controlled these areas, it

meant ,that-there could be no relations concerning-them
between, the-Reich and the Vatican.

The Fuehrer now

wanted to expand this state of affairs to include the
9
Hitler, C o n v e r s a t i o n s 332-33»
lOpriedlaender, 160-61. Telegram from Weizsaecker to Bergen on June 22, 1942. On January 18,
1942, the Vatican had sent a note informing. Berlin
that it. would not recognize any territory taken by
German.aggression after September of 19390 This note
was not found in the Wilhelmstrasse files-. Again,
the Holy See *s refusal to release its documents for
this period pakes it impossible to confirm this
assertion.

t
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regions annexed before September 1939«

T M s mould.—

include Austria, the Sudetenland-0 and Bohemia~Moravia<,
...Since September 1939 was the date of the. Polish
invasion.,-..and.- Hitler wanted to include the territories
annexed, before, that date, relations would., .be. non-existent
in any new land under German control,,

The order further

pointed-out. that the only competent German authorities
in this, area- would be the appropriate local representa
tive of the .Reich„

The only competent Church authority

would be-the local representative of the Church„
.The.-aim was. to by-pass the- Vatican completely„
Thus,. the_.-P.arty Chancellery, which had.- taken over the .
Reich's..-political. alfalrs.-,.rw 0uld.. have no political or
diplomatic-links. with the Vatican,,

The only contact

would, occur, through the- now..moribund- Ministry for
11
Foreign Affairs.,, x

The Fuehrer thought that an., answer

to any. Vatican-note -would be an admission of Vaticanrights .in.. German issues and-an encouragement for. it
to maintain, official. contact -with .G.ermany.o ^

Communis

cations between the two powers rapidly tapered off„
11

Frledlaender, l60~6l„ Hitler, Conversations„
448 „ .,Friedlaender calls. Hitler 's action of June 22 an
”inexplicable---decision.0" It is-apparent that the
decision was influenced by the Party and Germany's
military victories during this period0
TO
Hitler., Converaat1 ons., 450 <, Welz.saee.ker
emphas ized-t hat..-in.-answ.erirg-notes_from. the. Vatican- .
concerning the autal.de- territories, "officials should
not refer to the Fuhrer's decision but should simply
d r a w attention to the note from the Curia of January
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By July, Hitler began, formulating...plans.-.to., negate.the Reich Concordat altogether.

If this happened,, and

the Fuehrer decided-to recall the.present German representatives to the. Holy See, they would never be replaced.

13

He also, found..ptl.eas.nr.a-...In the ..manner-by .which he withdrew.
himself,from, personal.. contact with the Vatican by shunning
tA
the Papal. Nuncio.. in Berlin.
During-this period, German:, conquest on the Eastern
Front reached- its height .

This placed the Reich in a.

position to make demands upon the Holy See and to insist
that they,be.carried out.

But from October to December,

the m 11itary super1ority of Germany decreased.
October , the ..British .assaulted. El Alamein.

In

The next

month,..an.Joagl©-American..invasion force, launched: a- three
pronged attack on North Africa.

In December, the Russian's

18, 1942-,:. stating. that, for the duration of the war, the
Curia. did-.not ..intend to recognize territorial changes
which had~taken place in the ln.ter.im; and. that-.they. .should
represent— the. refusal to negotiate on the. questions raised
as a logical-consequence of that note.. Church representa
tives of the., regions .outside the frontiers of the old
Reich had no authority to negotiate as representatives of
the Vat lean...with the local German authorities/ f* See;
Frledlaender, 162, The author paraphrased the remainder
of Weizsaeeker!s telegram to Bergeri (June 22, 1942) here.
13Ibid.., 447,
ik.I-bld.-, 450o Hitler used various, ruses, to avoid.
Nuncio. Orsenigo-'s. pointed questions. He would amiably.ask
about the.. Pope's-health, quickly turn to .greet, the. rest, of
the diplomatic corps, or "fob him off on Lammers instead,”
This is Hans Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
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broke through-at. Stalingrad,-

The. German- attitude toward

the Vatican.temporarily became-more tolerant,
Vatican ,officials sensed the. .changed- atmosphere
and. retal.iatedl.wiih -.demands.-,,of. their own.' In October „

'

Maglione instructed Bergen to .warn the. German-government.
that if ...the-s.i.tuat.ion.,worsened- the-Holy .S.ee~ ^would.find
itself.-compelled to emerge, from the .attitude of. reserve
1<
which it has so far ..maintained-,, 0 «
The Papal
warning, was .directly related -to Hi11 ers'. June 22.. sever =•=
ance of.relations.-with the Vatican in the Incorporated
Territories.,

The Vatican made it clear that if Germany

made further demands in these areas„ the Holy See would
begin making...public.,protests -against..the. Belch,

A letter

from the-Archbishop of Breslau to the Papal Secretary
of State—placed-.the blame .for. the. Reich’s...policy on the
National...Soclalis..t...P--arty.o

Now., the=-Vatlean., looked, to.

Hitler, and-the. Foreign Ministry to reverse, this,,.-policy,
W.lth..,military...r.e.*ersals.-,plag.ulng.- Germany,.. ..i1.
.
looked.. as.--.tho-Ugh-Hitl.er-.would.re 1ent.-.and...al 1ow the Catho
lic Chur.ch-.mor..e..-fr.eedom of .action.

The. Fuehrer-realized

the he ightene.d. .-prestige of the Church.a t .this, time ,

He

told Weizsae.cker■-..that. the Pope was. .definitely the- strongest
man in Borne,^

Although the official line still ignored

"^Friedlaender, 165=66,
•^Welzsaeeker„ 284, The Fuehrer respected the
power of the Pope much more than that of either Mussolini
or the Italian King,
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the Holy..See r--it..was tampered---by..an_.eas.ing. of .persecution
of Catholics.*..

Bormann. issued, orders, to avoid "petty

annoyance", of- the. Church* ^

Ghabbels .adopted, tactics of

"going, easy on..the church quest-io.n"...and treated...requests.
by the_Po|)e:.:-.acc.ordingly... .Hitler, heartily .approved ..of-hls
action*^®

By. March.. 1943» Hitler wanted, to achieve..a....

covert true e....wlth,. all- churches*... .The truce..,would include
a cess at ion-..of-attacks.. on~ religion. and tolerate ...legal.
procedures.against., the ..c-Iergy.. only, upon express -authori^
zatlon., and. then. only, against, individuals rather than
e11her Church as an-institut ion*1^
Hitler’s_.desire.-to achieve a covert, truce., never.
went.into.
.ef.fe.ct*

The...moat..outstanding.~r.eason—for..the,. .

failure., was— the .appointments, in April., of— Mar tin...Bormann.
as Secretary.-., to. the ...Fuehrer

Bormann,...now. decided to. whom
!

the Fuehrer-.-Sho.uld-talk-9..-.what-..he....shoul.d...rea(i,..-.and...what .
20
ins true tions..-„ha_.shonld ..send. out.*.,. Ernst Kal.tenbrunner *
who had. just...succeeded He.ydrich...as_..C.hial...of the.. Reich
Security Main. Office.,,attempted to implement.-Hit! er,.’s
policy of-restraint...toward, the. churches*

In.-fact,.he

wished to make it especially moderate in regard to the

1 '7Lew.y.., 254,
18
Goebbels,. .285*
19TMWC. XI,

28?*

20Ernst Kaltenbrunner (1903-1946): Austrian Nazi;
Commander of S*S* in Austria, 1933”3^; S »S. and Police
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Vatican0

Bormann, ..acting, in concert with.Heinrich. Himmler ,

not only blocked Kaltenbrunner's efforts but opposed
Hitler's, policy and urged a continued fight with the
Church,2^- Wilhelm. Hottl, an advisor to the Reich on Vati
can affairs, experienced the same set-back asdid.Kaltenbrunner. -He wanted to make the government's policy, toward
the Holy. See more lenient so that it could -be .-us.ed as a
peace, negotiator, should the occasion arise.,

His., idea

came. to.nothing and Bormann placed him under sur22
veillarce-0-.
In April, another appointment rivalled Bormann's
In importance,

Ernst von Weizsaecker was sent to the

Holy See to replace Bergen as Ambassador,

The Pope and

the Papal Secretary of State were surprised and upset, .
Bergen .liad done a good job for both powers in this ca
pacity,

His reports were reliable, fair, and not often

influenced by the emotions of either side. Originally,
23
Hitler had opposed this change, v However, Weizsaecker

Leader, of Austria and Chief of Security in Seyss-inquart
government, 1939; Chief of the Security Police and S.D,,
Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, 19^3-May 19*15,
21TMWC, XI, 288,
22Ibid,, XI, 238,
2-^Weizsaecker, 276-77» Weizsaecker thought that
the Party leaders regarded him as a nuetral. Hitler, at
first, surely thought that Weizsaecker was prone to en
courage Vatican interests. At any rate, in April of
19*1-3s the new Ambassador pointed out that the Reich
leaders "did not by any means trust our old diplomatic
personnel,"
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had... been asking, for., this, post for over a. year-and. his
closeness to Ribbentrop resulted-in his., appointment*
When taking, leave of -the Fuehrer,, Weizsaecker outlined
his plan as..r.-"'Mutual non-intervention, no. discussions
7k.
on fu n d a m entalsno quarrels* *"
Hi ti er...,agreed .*.
.Germany .had won ..another political victory over.
the-Vatican-*

Bormann., with, or -without.-the consent, of

;

Hitler , ,now-directed-a- Hational Socialist, campaign -to
keep, the --Church., from, regaining- -anything.-it had .1ost in
the previous years.,.. More, importantly, Hitler's, in
sistence... of June -22.,.19^2 that the Vatican have no
authority in the Incorporated Territories now^-beeame...a.
25
reality* ^ The Reich had gained every point, proposed-.
by. Hitler at-that time*

Diplomatic relations -between

the. Reich.and the Holy See were limited to the "old
Reich", only*

-Austria,, the. Sudetenland-, Bohemia-loravia., .

and all. the—Western areas-were., included with...the-:-regions
taken -by— Germany...-since-September 1939«

Germany ..recog

nized no-Vatican-author.it,y in any of them*
.The.warning- that the- Vat.ican.-had-glven ..the. Reich,
about the Incorporated Territories in October 19^2, was

^ W e i.zsaecker., 2.8.^.*..
2% o l f Hoehhuth theorizes, that Hitler refused, to
give. the.. Church, authority in the Incorporated, territories
because he hoped to blackmail the Vatican into recog.nition of the new borders* Rolf Hoehhuth, The Deputy
(New York, 196*0, 295» Hereafter cited as Hoehhuth*
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now regarded as a hollow threat,

The Holy See had failed

to make any public protest concerning this area,

A

directive sent to Bergen by Ribbentrop earlier in the
year..dearly outlined Germany's present feeling toward
the-Vatican about negotiations in these territories: <
, , It seems that the Vatican, too, had not
deemed it appropriate to translate into deeds
the statements It made then because no indi- •
cation has come to my knowledge of any attempt
on the part of the Vatican to stir up feelingagainst us by claiming that there has been any
deliberate sharpening qf our attitude towards •
the Catholic Church, , „ , If the Vatican
wishes to see a sharpening of tension in the
fact of our having limited diplomatic dis
cussions with the Vatican to questions relating
to the old Reieh, then the Vatican itself has brought about this state of affairs by refusing
; o o to recognize territorial changes that
have occurred in recent years, The Government
of the Reich has done nothing more than to drawthe appropriate conclusions from this attitude
on the part of the Vatican,, 0 , „ However,
should the Vatican, for its part , threaten to
undertake, dr perhaps carry out, a. political
or propaganda .gampaign against Germany, the
Government of the Reich would naturally be
compelled to react a c c o r d i n g l y , 2 6
J
II
Further problems arose in the Incorporated Terri
tories, -because of Poland,

Reich decrees often included

all of Poland rather than either the annexed area or the
Government General alone.

Again, the Indus ion of annexed

Poland in the same category as Austria, the Sudetenland,
26
Frledlaender, l6?-68.
to Bergen, January 13, 19%,,

Telegram from Ribbentrop
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and. Bohemia^ Moravia caused confuslono -Poland Itself..
created, a situation unique to the Incorporated Terri
tories ,
Germany, intended to establish. Poland, as an. integral
part of its. New. Order,

The New Order, as relative-to

Eastern Europe-, was conceived of as early as November 5»
1937p when- Hitler, outlined his plans for "living space"
to Goering and other military leaders in what is- -called.
P f\
the Hossbach Document-,
The Reich planned to exploit
Poland.1s...natural resources.. and resettle the inhabitants. .
in an. effort to "..Germanize" this area*

The western., area

annexed to Germany underwent the process...first.

The

Government-General- was. to. be used as. a refuge for-dis-placed-persons^. that is,, persons who could not quickly
be absorbed into the Reich or placed under controls
sufficient- enough to "Germanize" them in their original
location,.
In the second phase„ the Reich subjected the
Government General to the same measures,

Germany at

tempted to eliminate the intellectual elite, including
the clergy, to assure lowered resistance to Reich poli
cies,

Further measures provided for the pillage of

public and private property in Poland to increase assets
2&
-Poland.,,--Ministry of. Foreign Affairs, German
Occupation of Poland (New York, n.d,), 4-, Hereafter
cited as German Occupation,
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necessary- for the -war effort, .Various, laws....psr-tainlng- to
rates and taxes.:, exploitation of labor , and property
emitted from the Reich over the years following the in27
vasion of Poland,,
Polish inhabitants not capable of
making a -personal contribution to the war effort were
exploited for their labor ability,,

The Reich considered

this area as. a "territory accessory to the Reich?:' with a
2g
status similar to a colonial possession.
The Vatican found Hitler's concept off a-New Order
repugnant,

Pope Plus XII worried about Axis domination

of Europe because of It and believed that no-new;world
order could be established without "superhuman wisdom to
light up the way, . , ,

With Germany inmind^ he

thought that those who try to set up a new order prepare
the way for destruction of the people they allegedly
serve and do so by the exploitation of human life.

By

December 23* 19391 Pius XII had violently crltlzed German
persecution of the Church and accepted President Roosevelt's
appointment of Myron C 6 Taylor as his personal representa
tive; to the Holy See„-^G

German Occupation,, 8-9« The numerous laws insti
tuted in Poland are well outlined in this work,
28Ibld,. 5.
2^Principles» 7^9 ; Cianfarra, 256,
^Germany never believed that Roosevelt wanted to
establish close co-operation with the Vatican, The Reich
thought it a tactical move for the upcoming elections.
See; DGFP„ VII, 579-80,

12**
One of the Pope8s Christmas addresses had enumerated
the factors necessary for a reconciliations "but Germany was
not ready, and Goebbels concealed the speech from the
public.3-*- The Pope placed the responsibility for the
German-Pollsh war on Germany and observed that the un
compromising attitude of the Reich made it impossible to
32
improve relations with Germany.^
During the winter of 1939^0, when little fighting
took place in Europe, the Vatican took the leadership in
seeking peace.

At this time, the German Opposition again

negotiated with the Vatican in an effort to achieve peace
for Germany,33

in November 1939, Admiral Canards had

transferred:his political intelligence network to the
Vatican.

’The Abwehr„ a counter-intelligence branch of

the 0KW„ did not have the authority to delve into politi
cal intelligence, and the Vatican provided a safer refuge
for this operation..

Canards then sent Joseph Mueller,

the liaison for the Opposition’s warning to the Low

^Weizsaecker, 219; Friedlaender, 39“^1,
32Ciano, Diaries. 184,.
-^^It.must be remembered that the 0ppos.it.ion did
not want to promote peace for the sake of making Germany,
lose the wax but to save the nation from destruction and
the suppressiVe policies of Hitler. They negotiated
through the Vatican in an effort to get a guarantee from
Britain that it would not mete out a harsh peace if the
Army revolted against Hitler. A .revolt would cause con
fusion and make Germany vulnerable to occupation.
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Countries, to make contact with the Pope.-'

Negotiations

went on from November 1939 to the beginning of February
19^0„

Mueller not only kept the Vatican Informed of

atrocities committed In Poland but collaborated with his
old friend Father Robert Leiber,

Leiber was the Secretary

to the Pope, and the two began work on a peace, proposal,
the "X-report," to be presented to the Allies,
The Vatican drafted the document and set forth
the basis, for-negotiations„

Various accounts of the

contents of the "X-report" do not agree, but the■under
lying theme"is clear.

The Nazis were to be eliminated

from the government, and Britain promised not'to:take
advantage of an internal political crisis should one
arise,

There-would be a solution of the Eastern terri

torial problems favorable to Germany,

This meant that

Austria and the Sudetenland would remain annexed to
Germany while Poland, and this point is vague, would
simply remain in the German sphere.
Finally, there would have to be a German-avowal
of Christian, morality, and the preliminaries ■,to. a peace
and armistice agreement could not be negotiated directly,

Colvin, 98, Joseph Mueller is just as enigmatic
of a charactei as is Canaris, He was a Munibh"lawyer
brought into the Opposition for the express purpose of
making eontact with the Vatican, This attempt for peace
was called "Operation X," and Mueller was the confi
dential agent known only as "X", His name is mentioned
in none of the reports. See: Hassell, 125 fn,; Ritter,

1^7 o
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but only through the Holy See.-'-'

Inclusion of the Vatican

placed the entire plan on an official diplomatic basis.
Thus , the' British Secretary of State for Foreign■
■Affairs ,
Lord Halifax,'and the British Ambassador to the Holy See
negotiated with the Opposition,
Generals Hans Oster and Ludwig Beck offered the
document to Ulrich von Hassell, the ex-Ambassador to
Italy, and asked that he give it to General Franz. Haider,
the Chief of*the Army General Staff,

Haider reftised to

see Hassell .and the job of explaining such a treasonous
overture ;fell to General Georg Thomas,

Haider studied

the "X-report1
," conferred with Beck, and then gave it to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Walter
von Brauchitsch,3^

Here the proposal failed,

•Brauchitsch

was mentally and spiritually unable to break from his
Prussian heritage and give the full support of the Army
to such a plan,

Brauchitsch said that the younger offi

cers and troops could not be relied iipoh to'take., action
against the.Fuehrer because they rejoiced in his Polish
v i c t o r i e s , W i t h o u t the Army no plot to overthrow the

-33Hassell, 125; Ritter, 162; Jacques de Launay,
Secret Diplomacy of World War II (New York, 1963), 19-20,
Hereafter cited'as De Launay, The full account of the
course of these negotiations fell Into the hands of the
Gestapo in September 19^1. It has not been seen since,
^Ritter, 162,
-^Hassell, 125-26, 136; Colvin, 100; De Launay,
1 9 -2 0 ,

38Colvin, 100; Ritter, 163-6^,
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regime could be successful.

The German Opposition’s feeling

that the Vatican could help them to return Germany to peace
with a minimum of retribution from the Allies again met
defeat.
Meanwhile, the S,S„ had begun to solve., the Polish
problem by.executing the intelligentsia.
the first to go.

The. clergy was

As early as September 219~1939^ Cardinal

Hlond, the Primate of Poland, personally informed Pope
Pius XII of the atrocities.

He told of the murder of

priests, the sacking of churches, the sending of the
clergy to concentration camps, and the use of the Church
of the Lazar1st Fathers for Gestapo organized orgies with
Polish girls.- Hlond also referred to the plight of the
civilian population which consisted of the breaking up
of families..,, brutal beatings, and indecent gynecological
examinations of women who might be hiding valuables.
Those who could not be processed in annexed 1Poland were
sent to the Government General where conditions-were
worse.

Hitler sent a sharp protest to the Vatican when

it released excerpts of the report. 39

-

In January 19^0, Cardinal Hlond added a supplement
to bring his report up to date.

The new report offered

detailed information concerning the murder, deportation,
and ill-treatment of priests in Poland.**®

■^Cianfarra, 193-97.
^HCA, V, 1078,

The Vatican
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radio also released excerpts of this report,, - By January
29, Ambassador Bergen had dellvered_another, sharp protest
from the German government.

The Papal Secretary of State
in
ordered an Immediate suspension of the broadcasts.
Earlier in January , the Reich had begun, to take

action to relieve the Vatican's abhorrence of communism.
Pressure for this decision came from the Vatican, Italy,
and Russia...as~a result of Germany's close relationship
with the-Soviets,

Political reports to the Reich in-

dicated that., the Italians had an aversion to National
Socialism because it disregarded the Catholic apprehension
about communism.

The Italian Foreign Minister was quite
hO
explicit on this point,
Italy also conducted diplomatic activity to pro

tect the Balkans from communist infiltration because it
feared the fall of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,
This would-place Russia next to Italian held Albania and
the Adriatic. Sea,

The result was an Italo-Vatican front

based on the common bond of dread of communism* (Still,
Italy remained in the Axis with Germany.

This caused
•i

Russian worries about Italo-German relations because of
ki

Lewy, 246, Incidents such as this, when the
Vatican, far ho Apparent reason, yielded to!lGer&An demands
soon'gave way to beliefs that the Vatican was "fencesitting...". .The Holy See did not seem to take a firm stand
on the many inhumane circumstances that arose. Many ob
servers began to think that Pius XII was biding his time
so that he could join the victors, regardless of who they
might be.
^2D G F P VII, 612; Ciano, Diaries, 151.
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the Vat.I-can..'s stand on communism and its influence in
Italy.

Russia s.o Informed the Reich
Hans Georg von Mackens'en, Ambassador to Italy,

brought the problem to the attention of the State Secre
tary. for. Foreign Affairs.

The situation was so grave

that Weizsaecker passed the information on to Ribbentrop.^
The Foreign Minister watched the Vatican's effojrts to
degrade the German partnership with Russia very attentive
ly. and pleaded his case for an understanding with the
Holy See to Hitler.

The Fuehrer refused to listen because

of problems with the Church in Austria and lingering dis
approval of the Vatican peace proposals at the time of,
the Polish invasion.
Ribbentrop concluded that the dilemma stemmed
from the. Reich's propaganda policy in Italy which boasted
about German agreements with Russia.
"special, solution" for Italy.

He worked out a

A more forceful propa

ganda program to play down Germany's friendship with
Russia was introduced to placate Italy and the Vatican.^
Germany's new propaganda policy failed to impress
46
the Vatican.
However, the campaign helped bring Italy
^ DGFP, VII, 712. Russia did not want its Allies
quarreling among themselves.
^ I b l d .. 652-55.
Ibid. , 742-4?.
LiA
^°The decision to introduce a propaganda policy
in Italy that strongly played down Germany's closeness
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fully back Into the German fold.

Hitler met with Mussolini

on the Brenner Pass in March, and Italy joined Germany in
the war In the West a few months later.

In ..May 19^0,

Germany invaded the Low Countries, and the attention of
Vatican officials turned to that arena.
Regardless of the propaganda campaign, the Reich
did not relax its efforts to make Poland a purely German
territory in the months preceding May 19^0,

0n March 1,

Germany extended its military system to the:annexed
portion of Poland.

A week later, Reich Minister’for

Church Affairs Kerri approved Himmler's request; that
Polish nationals attend special segregated church
services.

Kerri warned that the segregation-of Poles

from Germans would be opposed by the Vatican,.

To deter

this probability, he "made appropriate state police
measures to deal with any conduct of the clergy which
is contrary to these principles."^7

This meant forceful

suppression of any objections.
In the' first months of 19^1. the Reich decreed
that no religious associations in the Incorporated Terri
tories would.be recognized as corporations by public
law.

The decree further established that no collections

to Russia occurred in January 19^-0. Later that year,
in March, Ribbentrop did indeed placate the Vatican by
making a trip to Rome to see the Pope and Mussolini..
h.’y

NCA, VIII, 259, 26?-68.
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could, be made In favor of the Church without Reich perhO
mission,,
By mid-summer, the Reich had accepted Governor
General Hans Frank’s request that the Vatican,be stopped
from making appointments to high Church offices,

Germany

thought the Vatican was taking advantage of the deficien
cies of the Reich Concordat in these instances and warned
the Holy See that such actions must be stopped,^
Further developments revolved around Himmler’s
need for •land.:" in Poland so that he could resettle the
German oriented Poles in certain areas while using other
land to -support the less promising Poles acting in a
labor capacity,

In May 19^13 the Foreign Ministry In

formed Nuncio Orsenigo that Catholic lands would be
taken over by the State under directions issued for the
confiscation of property "whose administration whs pre
dominantly influenced by members of the former Polish
state, »

Since there had always been such close

connections:between the Catholic Church and the Polish
people, Germany considered that the Church qualified
under this, rule.
The.next month, Germany invaded Russia,

Just

as Hitler had ordered Bormann to stop his Austrian

^NCA, V, 102*1-,
^ D G F P „ XIII, 211-12,
5°Ibid,, XII, 915~16o
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antl-Chur.ch campaign to prepare that country for the war
effort, he.now directed the head of the Party Chancellery
to quit taking Church property in the East without the
Fuehrer 'S personal permission.-^1

This, too,, was a measure

to help boost the morale of the Catholic population in
an attempt to-aid the war effort.

Now, an uneasy truce

existed between Germany and the Vatican.^2

?

On June 6, 19^1, Martin Bormann caused a-predica
ment that hindered this policy and cost the.Reich a
great loss of prestige with the Catholics of-;.foreign
countries; - Bormann wrote a circular to be sent to all
Reich district leaders.

He clearly stated that. National

Socialist and Christian concepts were absolutely' irrecon
cilable.. -He-also attributed "business shamelessness"
or "naivete" to the belief that prayers could ...influence
a world force-’that was concerned with the fate, of every
single being on earth.^3
Bormann said that the Church's influence limited
the Fuehrer and the NSDAP in their leadership of; the
people and must be e l i m i n a t e d A l t h o u g h he intended
that the circular be secret, Catholic sources reproduced

51DGFP, XIII, 536.
52Lewy, 253-5^.
53NCA, VI, 1035-36.
-^Toynbee, Hitler's Europe, 36.
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It in great-...quantities, and distributed the message- through
out the w o r l d o-5-5

Only Bormann*s esteemed position as head

of the Party Chancellery saved him from, the damning criti
cism of other Reich leaders,

Bormann managed to shroud

the Reieh. in silence whenever the subject came -up*

Vatican

protests, never received answers.0
After publication of the circular, Clemens. von
Galen, Bishop of Muenster, made numerous speeches, that
came, close: to causing- a breech between Germany and. the
Vatican,

Although-the. Vatican gave, no open support, to

his actions..,, the Bishop proceeded with the. blessing of
the Fulda. Bishops' Conference which proposed to sponsor
a line of increasingly sharp opposition to the Reich,
In July and early August 19^19 Galen harshly attacked
the Gestapo for closing several Jesuit houses and many
convents.

He called Gestapo officials "thieves and

robbers,"

Then, amid sermons against German, persecution

of the Church, he denounced the Reich government for its
use of euthanasia to rid the country of feeblemindedness,
Bishop. Galen also claimed that the Reich killed its wounded
soldiers^ because they were no longer productive to the
State, ^
German.officials reacted in varying-ways,.but the
concensus was that drastic measures must be taken against
5%CA, VI, 1035-^6; Goebbels, 98 ,
56NCA, VI, ^06-?; Hassell, 210,

13M
the Bishop,

Hlmmler viewed the attack as a-violation of

State security and asked thdt Galen be shot or disposed
of by some other suitable meteins,-57

A JQivlslon .Director

fpr Propaganda suggested that B o f t M t asfjfi- the Fuehrer
’’whether., the camouflage of Euthanasia thus far in practice
ought to he modified” So a. defehse against GalenAs claims
could be...pfeepared,

Walter TiesSler, Leader for National

Socialist■Propaganda, did not think that such-an enlightment Campaign'would be sufficient and demanded..that Galen
be hanged,-5®. Bormann agreed with. Tiessler and-.wanted an
open breach with the Vatican,

The matter rested' on what

Hitler would instruct Bormann to dd„
Goebbels and Hitler acted more rationally? than
anyone else in this instance.

Both realized -the'necessity

of Catholic, -.co-operation in furthering the wareffort„
Goebbels .feared that drastic measures against...Galen would
alienate.-the. population of Muenster, if not; .all.-of West
phalia,.

The. Propaganda Minister wanted, to .’-'preserve

appearances".and try to steer the Church according to
the interests-.of the State,

The Church, he.fe.lt, could

be dealt with after the war, -59

in this belief, the Party

Chancellery violently opposed Goebbels,

Nevertheless,

Hitler supported' Goebbels rather than Bormann,
57Hassell, 210,
58NCA, VI, *1-05-6,
59Ibld,. 408,
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The Fuehrer settled the matter by calling-Bormann
in and "quite in line with trled-and-tested.procedures,
held it to be. tactically correct to retreat ...a...tew steps
for the present, , »

Hitler, believed that, the

attitude of Galen presented just one more reaaon why the
i

Concordat should be terminated, but he thought.It best
to act "shrewdly" and bide his time.

On orders, from

Hitler, the Reich did not counter Bishop Galen is--speeches,
but the Fuehrer-reiterated his belief that all problems
with the Catholic Church could be solved with impunity
after the war, and said that- he would extract retribution
from Galen "to., the last farthing o'”

L

Reich-;officials now increased the machinery to
deal with political Catholicism,

Most executive 'and

intelligence, offices concerned with the Vatican, and the
Catholic Church, in its. international role originally
fell under the-jurisdiction of the Supreme Office for
the Security of the Reich,

In late 1939, this, agency

set up Section IV B I to deal with political Catholi»
cism,

--In October 19^1, a new intelligence service

emerged to deal with the political Church,

Reinhard

Heydrich, Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, under
took the formation of a group of "Church Specialists"

60Haas.ell, 210,
^Hitler,. Conversations „ 7^, 451,
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to be organized.
..
wit hin the State Police s y s t e m - They were
to keep the ’'opposition" under constant, observation and to
undertake the study and treatment of the Catholic Chureh
in its struggle. ..with the S t a t e d 2

___

The specialists sought to learn the identities of
all Catholic ecclesiastics in Releh territories.,...in order
to find which were employed as "agents" of .the.,..'Vatican,
Heydrich also-demanded the names of ecclesiastics of
German origin.:.who worked in important posts .atrthe Vati
can.,^

Presumably, he intended to recruit them for

counter-intelligence work against the Holy .See, -Having
stemmed the. opposite ends of communications -between the
Vatican and.its. ioeal hierarchy, Heydrich intended to
eliminate the: middlemen.

The specialists were- to dis

cover who the.papal couriers between the bishops and
the Vatican were- and stop this method of reporting,^
Throughout 1941, the outlawing of religious
associations and-the confiscation of Church property
in Poland continued,

Weizsaecker told Nuncio.Orsenlgo

that he "would.hardly have the hope of prevailing"
against Germany in the incorporated eastern territories
because he, believed in canon law as a legal theory.

62NCA.„ IV, 422,
^3Ibid,, 424,
6**Tbid,, 423,

The
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State Secretary pointed out that canon law. was void where
no contractual agreement with the State exl'sted,8^
The Catholic Church lost all of Its corporative
legal rights with the result that most of Its property in
annexed Poland reverted to the Reich controlled "Roman
Catholic Church of German Nationality in the Relchsgau
Warthelando»

Germany informed the Vatican .that it

had transferred the Chureh’s property to "*a juridical
person of a private character*" so that it could:be
recognized as non-Polish property,.

If it were non-

Polish „ the Reich could not confiscate under the present
laws„

However, by November, Secretary of State Maglione

regarded the Polish property as lost.87
Germany continued to impose new measures- in
Poland to win back the racial Germans and their children
who had been "Polandized" by the Catholic Churchy

The

adults had to .join associations sponsored by .the NSDAP,
ZQ
and the children had to enroll in the Hitler■youth.
Secretary Maglione and Nuncio Grsenlgo repeatedly pre
sented their grievances to the Foreign Ministry,

The

65DGFP„ XIII, 415o
66NCA, V, 1024-25o
annexed Poland only,

The Relchsgau Wartheland is
1
;

67Ibid,, 1025,
68Ibido. VII, 110-12.

138

Vatican also still ins.isted-upon the-return of the confis
cated. land, hut- now— added, restoration of freedom of
religion to its pleas,

All complaints by the Vatican met

with .de-laying- tactics, from the -Reich,
Finally , on January 18, 1942, the Vatican took ‘
advantage of an opportunity to enforce, its rights,,
Germany had. .earlier -wanted the Holy See. to place only German., priests-.,.or at least priests, of German origin, in
the. Sees.- in Bohemia,.. Moravia, and Poland,.

Now the govern-'

ment. stated' that because of the importance, of conferring
t

the high offices, of the Roman-Catholic. Church', it must
demand, its rights.under Article 14 of the Reich Con
cordat,^

This article allowed Germany to ascertain

that "no objections-of a general political nature exist"
before, the Vat lean.-appointed Archbishops, Coadjutors, or
Praelates... Nulllus,
The Reich also wanted, to extend, this, right to
include. Apostolic. Administrators, and Vicar. Capitulars

’

who administered these, offices .beyond a. reasonable time,
Germanyrequested -that an "approprlate communi cat ion"
be sent to the government before.any of these offices
were filled "anywhere in the entire new territory of
69

This is.before Hitler severed relations with
the Vatican concerning the outside territories,' See:
Chapter V, ll4c,
?°See Appendix A, 188 o
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the R e i c h . B e r g e n ’s .note. made it clear that this would
Include, the. Government .General., and It was later determined
that.. Austria fell into this class ifi cat Ion,.
Although.. Germany did not ask. for. any great con
cession from, the Vatican, the Holy See responded with a
caustic, denial of the request.

It. gave numerous reasons - •

why the Church could not...grant..Germany's. wishes,

First,

the. Reich had Initiated -measures,and acts In Germany,
the occupied territories, and the annexed countries
which, violated the rights of the Church and the existing
Concordats., 72
Secondly, the Roman. Catholic Church was founded
by Christ which makes the Church., supreme, in-its juris-,
diction by virtue- of. divine right.

It then follows, .the

denial explained., that a.state’s right to influence
episcopal, appointments is a. privilege, granted by. the
Vatican and does not establish a specific right for the
civil authority.

Therefore, the right of the govern- -

ment to make objections of a political nature is a "pure
concession" founded on the Reich Concordat, and Article
■
i

It expressly limited this concession to Archbishops,

71N.CA, V, 1037-38,
?2The Reich held firm to the opinion that the
Reich Concordat did not extend to the. outside terri
tories, The Vatican continued to insist, that it did,
and that the Concordats with Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria
still existed as contractual obligations.
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Coadjutnrs-,.-and..-P.rael-ates-.--Nnllids ,73
Finally , the- argument-as expressed in the German
request, that the, .choice of a candidate for. these offices
contributes to the .good of the State and thus has an
interest for the-government is not a sufficient reason
for the-State, to intervene,'

Certainly, the Vatican

,

got.-gr-eafc-.-S-p±.isfac..tl.o-n from^-issuing-thls: long and sharply
worded..refusal..,, hut- it..als.o—strengt-hahed-the Reich’s decision to. sever, relafldns.--with- the.-..Vatican-In the
7^
outside., territories..
In June. 1942-, ...Orsenigo reported,
that-, the-government had-not. responded-to the denial, but
that Vatican communications relating-to-the new terri
tories were, ’’submitted- to.-unusual- delays”'or lost in the
"bur.eaucratic. procedure” of the Reich,
In October 19^2, the religious-situation in
Poland reached its lowest.point,

Maglione sent a spe

cific, list of. tragic- conditions faced-.by. Polish Catholics
to. the. German-.-Emhass.y.,.

He. noted that. the. episcopate had

been..almost, entirely eliminated, the secular and regular
clergy, had been deported and exiled-to the. point that
they were absolutely inadequate, education of clerics

73NCA, V, 1011-13,
^ I b l d o , 1011,
*^3This occurred ©n June .22, 1942 , in communi”
cations relevant to Austria, See Chapter V, 114, *

76NCA, V , 1016- 17,

Ihl
was...forbidden^.. and-r- among-numerous.other, complaints ,

r-

Catholic.- intellectual-.and..-.charltable. institutions had- been destroyed, 77

But., the.. Vatican could no longer

communicate through the German Embassy to the Holy See because its..chain of command, came... directly, through theForeign...Ministry,

The. Foreign,. Office....had lost whatever-

authority It-may...have had-to the. Party .Chancellery and
now had.-no- control of German policy „
German .circumvention of the Vatican, to negotiate
only with the localhierarchy proved successful in
Austria,,

The- same- condition now prevailed in Poland,

Having-received no response from the vReich government,
Maglione resorted to the use of local Vatican repre
sentatives.. to carry out the policy, of -the Holy See,
Nuncio Orsenigo--had-..earlier requested- that interned
Polish priests be.-allowed to emigrate to. America and
neutral, countries- in. Europe ,

Germany .refused this

request.but collected them all in the. one camp of Dachau
and. promised that, they would be. treated better in the
n Q

future.

The Reich feared that emigrating: priests

would spread news of the conditions- In Poland, which
would be detrimehtal to the government and the Party,??
Maglione now wrote to the Archbishop of Breslau,

7 7 NCA„

V, 1017-18,

?8 Ibld,„

1030,

7 9 Ibid,„

1036,
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i.

•

Adolf Cardinal- Bertram*

He...requested...that Bertram Inter

vene In favor of the priests at Dachau- and work toward
securing- the right for Polish Catholics to profess their
faith without hindrance,,

Bertram-replied that he had

been working-toward this goal- -allalong. and„ in his
capacity .".as- spokesman for all the. h i e r a r c h y h a d even
sent a. formal document, to the: Fuehrer.0

All such attempts

had been -met with silence*^0
■ On December- 7 „ 1941p Car-dinal-Bertram, gave his
views.- -as-.to why this...-was., so.

He ..stat.ed-.that all communi

cations.- from, the- Vatican.,,. the bishops,,.-and., himself were
intercepted by. the Party.. Chancellery-and—the. S 0S 0

These ;

two-agencies now-executed, the -supreme. power in directing
the Reich’s Church policy„

Even attempts, to correspond

with the Fuehrer and the Supreme Office for the Security
of the Reich met frith negative replies because of thisRl
interference-,,
s.
On March- 2 , 1943e the Reich’s refusal to reply to
f-‘ "
Vatican complaints- about-conditions..-. in-Boland culminated
in a harshly worded letter from the Vatican to Ribbentrop0

8^NCA„ V, IO3I „ It is interesting to note Hassell’s
diary entry for. November 1, 1941„ He thought of Bertram
as. a pacifist who led the majority of the German episco
pate. Hassell stated that: "People such as Bertram will
get nowhere at all with people such as Hitler and Himmler."
Thus.„ Hassell believed that the Church should conduct a
"political" struggle with the Reich rather than a "re
ligious" one.
81Ibid..-1032-33.
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The Holy See took this opportunity to unleash all of its
hostility at one...time.

Maglione sent the.-letter and

stated that during the occupation of Poland...members of
the secular...clergy were shot while hundreds..more were
imprisoned,..:. He. observed that while priests...from annexed
Poland, were, detained in Dachau , intensified.police
measures c.aus.ecL..the imprisonment and depor.fcat.ion of '
hundreds more., and Of the six bishops residing., there■,,
O p

only one remained.

He was Interned in his. .own home.

Furthermore, the rights of the Catholic Church
to education.and.religious Instruction of youth was
usurped by Germany, and Catholic schools were

closed,8 ^

The Vatican’also‘denounced the segregation of Catholics
of Polish nationality from those of German nationality
because the-demand that they attend separate .services
deprived many.-.of'"the faithful of religious, consolation.
Finally, the:.letter noted that the "temporary" measure
of placing nuns.in a special concentration camp at
Bo janowo was..'.never rescinded.
Even though the Reich had severed.relations with
the Vatican concerning the outside territories on June
22., 19h2, Nuncio Orsenigo was instructed to deliver the
letter,

Weizsaecker, not knowing that the letter con

tained demands about Poland, accepted it.

82NCA, V, 1018-20,
83Ibid,. 1021,

Hitler thought

Iil4
the Foreign Ministry had. violated his order of severance
"because of "its greed for fields of fresh authority" and
Qi.
left the Ministry to handle the problem....in .its own way.
Having.reviewed the content of the...letter, the
Foreign Ministry adhered to the established policy for
such occasions.. -Weizsaecker w^s ins true ted. ...to. give the
letter back to Orsenigo with the instructions, that it
be returned -to the Vatican.

The reason being, that he

could not present it to the Reich government, as it dealt
with matters-in. which the Holy See did not -have territorial competence.

8 *5

Such an action would surely cause

a termination of"relations between Germany and the
Vatican.
The Holy See demanded that Orsenigo deliver the
letter, and- .German policy just as steadfastly.
.demanded
that it- not he accepted.

Weizsaecker and .Orsenigo wanted

to prevent a. .rupture of relations and somehow, clear
themselves of the blame for this precarious situation.
Orsenigo wanted an official statement that Weizsaecker
had returned the letter to him.

Weizsaecker refused

SilHitler, Conversations, *j48„

®^Weizsaecker, 282-83. It is still uncertain
who made the. decision to return the letter .to Orsenigo.
Weizsaecker indicates that It was Ribbentrop. . At
Nuremberg, Ribbentrop claimed that he could not recall
the..-document, but-under further interrogation, remembered
"a whole desk full of protests from the Vatican." Ulti- :
mately, he decided that Hitler had told him what to do.
Seet NCA, Supplement B, 1235, 1238-39.
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and told Orsenigo that the best thing to. do. would be to
treat the letter as. If it had never come.into his hands.
Orsenigo did as the Foreign Secretary suggested but
doubted that he would officially survive this, affair.

86

Weizsaecker believed that he had warded off ’’.the evil
which the breaking-off of relations would have brought
on the thirty-five million German Catholics... . . ."87
The Vatican had no intention of letting, the matter
rest.

Magl.lo.ne instructed Nuncio Orsenigo to inform the

Reich, in writing, that the Vatican considered. Weizsaecker’s act. as.’"not a friendly one" and that it con
sidered the document as having reached its destination.
Orsenigo wrote to the Foreign Minister on May 5 ancl
explained that..because of the "way in which the trans
missal of the message was carried out and the time
during which said message was retained, . , ."the
Vatican considered it as accepted by the Reich.®®
Ribbentrop answered the letter of May 5 person
ally,

He denied that he had read the letter of March

2, and stated that Weizsaecker had acted in accord with
established Reich policy toward the Vatican. , The Foreign
8

fi

'

Weizsaecker, 283* Orsenigo feared.that he would
be recalled to the Vatican. Rolf Hochhuth says that the
Nuncio was .p.ersona non grata at the Vatican after 1945
so his fears may have been borne out. See; Hochhuth, 296.
87Ibld.
88NCA, V, 1042-43.
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Minister approved, his action and confirmed, the Reich’s
stand that it would, engage in no negotiations with the
Roly See over the Incorporated Territories.*

Ribbentrop

was careful, to. point; out that such territories, included
annexed Poland as well as Austria*
He also referred to the Government. General as
8Q
being in this, category* 7 This was the firs-t instance
in which the Government General was specifically named
as an area where the Vatican did not have authority to
deal with the government*

Ribbentrop also adopted the

same solution to-the quandary as did Weizsaecker*

He

told Orsenigo that it would be best for all concerned
90
to regard- the-letter as non-existent.
Here the matter
ended.
By the. end of May 1943. Germany made it-absolutely
clear to the: Vatican that it would harbor no-Interference
from that lns.tltutlon in regard to the Incorporated Terri
tories.

This confirmed the position taken by the Reich

in communications relevant to Austria.

There.could be

no doubt that Austria and annexed Poland were considered
equally outside the Vatican’s sphere of influence and
that negotiations could be carried on only between the
old Reich and the Vatican.

In slddition, the Government

General was now included in the Incorporated Territories„

8 9 NCA, V ,

1045.

at least for purposes of eliminating diplomatic activity
with the Holy See.

The .Reich had...once, .more....won a victory

over the Vatican by implementing its policies, while not
losing the support of Catholics within its borders because
of a final termination of relations between ...it and the
Holy See.

1A8
III
Hitler’s plan t© build a new world order included
the domination of Russia,

Poland and Russia were to be

the "great experimental field", in the East.^1

By 19^1»

Hungary and Rumania had accepted the status of German
satellites.

German forces crossed these countries and

forced. :Bulgaria to conform*

On April 6, 19^1® Germany

invaded Yugoslavia and Greece*

On April 17, Yugoslavia

capitulated and Greece, after a heroic resistance .to the
Italians..,.:.followed suit a week later.

-

--

In April, Joseph Mueller made another of his now
customary, trips to the Vatican to pass the word to
Britain that Germany intended to attack Russia on June
92
22, 19^1.
Such a warning should not have been neces
sary.

Although no one believed the outlandish passages

of Mein Kampf„ Hitler clearly expressed his belief that
it was militarily Impossible for Germany to be allied
with Russia in a long war with the West.

The Fuehrer,

believed-that the Reich could obtain no effective support
from Russia: because the war would be fought on German
soil.93
.On June...22, 19^1* Hitler turned his attention

^Hitler quoted In Bullock, 319«
92Colvin, 138.
^Hitler, Mein Kampf.

6 5 9.
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from the Battle of Britain to the invasion of Russia,,
Territory occupied in Russia was generally to be treated
the same as the Government General»

Germany wanted to

use part.of the native population for slave labor in
iridustry and agriculture and keep all of the inhabitants
completely at. the disposal of their overlords.

Those

of education or position who might form an effective
i

Q k

center: of opposition were to be exterminated.
'On July I?, Hitle:|* noted that as soon as military
operations were terminated the Army would yield its
administrative capacity to the civil authorities.
Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer S.S., inherited the duty to
lay the racial foundations of the New Order in this area.
Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan,
claimed :.the right to organize the economic exploitation
of the territories.

To oversee this administrative

network, Hitler appointed Alfred Rosenberg "Reich •
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.".
Too many departments had competency, and administratlve functions overlapped until petty jealousV
among the leaders made the operation completely chaotic.
In August, the Fuehrer ordered the Army to keep abso
lutely out of the religious activity of the popuoc;
lation,
but the authorities never established to whom

^Bullock, 696.
95DGFP, XIII, 536.
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the direction of Church policy belonged,,
The German episcopate, again Influenced by patri
otism, supported the invasion of Russia,^
followed a more ambiguous course,

The Vatican

Weizsaeeker repotted

that the Holy See reacted favorably because a German
victory would weaken communism,^

The Vatican radio,

wishing not to harm the German effort, eliminated all
unfavorable- references to the Reich and asked if there
were any further complaints from Germany on this point,
Further reports informed Berlin that Pius XII had earlier
decided that he could no longer remain silent about the
severeness of Reich Church policy, but that he refrained
from taking appropriate steps because he did not want to
hurt Germany's chances of defeating Soviet

R u s s i a ,

99-.

Axis propagandists called the assault on Russia
a benefit to the Church and tried to get the Pope to
approve the Russian campaign and "even to declare it a
holy war or c r u s a d e , T h e Vatican would go no
further than stopping its anti-German pronouncements.
The papal, refusal disappointed Germany and Italy,

9^Lewy, 230,
9?Friedlaender, 76.
08
Ibid,, 77o Minute by Weizsaeeker, June 26,

19^1o
" PGFP, XIII, **89 o
100Graham, 372,
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Although Germany reduced its anti-Catholic campaign in
both Austria and Poland at this time, the Holy See adopted
no clear position in favor of Germany's invasion of Russia.
In the following months, Germany adopted a more
tolerant attitude toward the Catholics in the Reich,
Dino Alfierl, ex-Italian Ambassador to the Holy See,

‘

told Goebbels that Reich policy against the Catholics;
caused ..a definite strain between Germany and Italy and
had an "intensely demoralizing effect" on the large
number of German Catholic soldiers.

101

Goebbels en

couraged Hitler to declare a general truce with the
Church.

The Reich had been arbitrarily talcing the re

maining Church property in Germany and, after the invasion
of Russia, Hitler wanted to eliminate internal dissension
anyway . : On July ?, Bormann followed the Fuehrer’s orders
and told all district leaders to stop confiscating Church
property.102
Germany entered into only one area of conflict"
with the Vatican as a direct result of the Russian cami
paign. .On November 11, 19^1» Rosenberg denied access to
101

'

Dino Alfierl, Dlctatbrs Face to Face (New York,
1955) * l2?-\28. This is one of the few sources that
detects an increase In persecution of Catholics In the
Reich Immediately after Germany's invasion of Russia.1 ~
See page 126.
102Frledlaender, 1^9« Hitler's order to stop the
confiscation of Church property in the Reich is one part
of the larger order to stop this practice all together.
The repercussions are seen in both Austria and Poland.
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the. recently occupied Russian lands to all Catholic
priests with the exception of Army Bishops

The Vati

can had hoped that it would be permitted to function in
these territories.

It wanted to combat communism, and,

more importantly, hoped to gain a foothold from which the
Orthodox Eastern Church could be united with Rome.
The Vatican attempted to negate Rosenberg's order
by securing the aid1of Bernardo Attolico, the Italian-Ambassador to Germany.

Attolico explained to Berlin

that the interests of the Church and the Reich were
identical in the fight against communism, and that a
proper settlement of this question '"was the ground on
which" a "‘rapprochement between the Reich and the Catholic
10&
Church could take place."'
Although Germany had
allowed:‘Some priests to emigrate to the Russian terri
tories,, it now refused to enlarge on this concession.-- • -In December 19^1, the Foreign Ministry issued a
memorandum to establish Reich policy on this question.
The Ministry warned that because of the importance to
the Vatican of the uniflcat'lqni of the Eastern Orthodox
Church with Rome, Nuncio Orsenigo would probably give
the matter his special attention.

The memorandum stated

that the Nuncio should be told that Catholic priests had
103
T 0&

Friedlaender, 151..
Quoted in Friedlaender, 151~52.
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formerly been allowed to enter occupied Eussia by the
Army authorities.

But, since the Army no longer had

competence in this matter, the practice would ’.cease.
The Ministry also pointed out that there were
enough Catholic priests in the formerly Russian area to
serve the Catholic population adequately.'*'^

However,

Orsenigo should not be told the real reason why Catho
lic priests would not be admitted.

The actual reason

was that the Reich did not want the Vatican to have
re.as.on to. consider the Russian land as a "new terri
tory. »106
" By March 19^2, some high-ranking Germans had
become convinced that Hitler had no hope of defeating
thecombined forces of Britain, America, and Russia.

•

Papen sent a representative to inquire through the
Vatican about a possible peace with the Allies.

Papal

Secretary of State Maglione retorted that this was
impossible because there was already fear that Joesph
Stalin, who demanded a second front, might ally with
Hitler again.
During the winter of 19^2-43, Hitler lost the

105DGFP. XIII, 952-53.
106Ibid. It is not clear whether "new territory"
means, a new territory for the Church or a new territory
for Germany. In either case, the Reich did not want the
Vatican to gain any more Influence in German held lands.
10?Papen, *4-89.

-military initiative as' the British Eighth Army and the
Allied combined forces made advances in North Africa.
Three Russian Army Groups also launched a huge frontal
attack north and south of Stalingrad, and the German war
economy faltered.

Some observers believed the end to be

near.
When Germany lost the Initiative the fear of
«

*v

communist penetration of Central and Western Europe
began:plaguing the Vatican again.

-

Rather than side with

the'Allied democracies, combined with Russia, the Holy
See continued to refrain from any action that would
■j'nQ

weaken Germany’s war effort.
Weizsaeeker, now Ambassador to the Holy See, began
flooding the Foreign Ministry with reports of the Vati
can’s desire for Germany to ward off Russian communism.
The-Ambassador stated that Pius XII thought that na
powerful German Reich is quite indispensible for the
future of the Catholic Church,?’10^ and wanted ”a strong
and united Germany as a barrier against Soviet Russia,”11^
while believing that ’’the fate of Europe depends on the
victorious resistance by Germany on the Russian front.1’111

108Lewy, 2^9.
109priedlaender, 191. Telegram from Weizsaeeker
to Berlin, September 3» 19^3.
110Ibid., 195. October ?, 19^3.
in
Ibid., 190. September 2 3, 19^3. One cannot
assume that the Vatican’s approval of a strong Germany
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Although the Immediate Iconsequence of the military
defeat at Stalingrad was not as great as expected, and
the German line remained deep in Russian territory,
Germany could take no advantage of the Vatican's willing
ness to establish a rapprochement with the Reich,

Hitler's

"stand fast" order for all fronts resulted in a large
loss, of men and deprived his generals of using their
military skill.

By the end of 19^3» the British blockade

of Germany and the Allied,air strikes helped to dis
organize and strain the Reich's war economy.
"

The Fuehrer, having taken over the Supreme Command

of the-’.Army, remained wholly preoccupied with the tacti
cal and strategic demands of the war.

Bormann, Goebbels,

Goering; and the other Reich leaders attempted to keep
the German war effort operative.
their time and effort.

This demanded all of

All waited for the fulfillment

of Hitler's belief that tension among the Allies would
cause them to break apart.
now.total and ^esperate.
became.a minor point.

The German war effort w a s ,
Relations with the Vatican -

The questions of the Concordat

and Vatican competency in the annexed and occupied

necessarily meant that it wanted Germany to win a
complete military victory over the Allies. The Holy
See's.. fear of communism was not so great that it would
sacrifice the Catholics within Germany's border. More
probably, the Vatican was trying to retain its neu
trality so that it could protect the most Catholics
regardless of how the war ended.
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territories had no validity in a changing situation for
which the outcome was in doubt*

CHAPTER VI
GERMANY ISOLATES THE VATICAN
Throughout 19^3» the war continued to turn against
Germany despite some successful offensives„

Germany had

moved into Unoccupied France as the Allied forces made
gains in North Afria, and the Eastern Front threatened
to collapse.

The more pre-occupled. the Reich "became with

the military aspects of total war, the less concern it
had for diplomatic relations with the Vatican,

Under

these circumstances,, Reich-Vat lean relations were confined
almost exclusively to Italy,
Pope Pius XII worried about the possibility of
the Allies bombing Rome and requested a statement that
this, would not happen,

Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo

Ciano recorded D ’Arcy Osborne’s reply that; ’’Rome is not
only the city of the Catholics, but also the headquarters
of the High Command, a large German command, many airports,
1
.
and a railway center.
The Anglo-American staff
intended to retain the prerogative to bomb Rome if it
became necessary.

But, by January 2, 19^3o Pius XII,

having received Mussolini’s confirmation that the German
commands had been removed from Rome, believed that bomb
ing of the Eternal City had been averted.^

^Ciano’s Diary, 552.
2Ibid.. 556, 565.
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-The Fuehrer made plans to place Italy fully under
German control,.This would necessitate occupation of Rome
and imprisonment of its leading figures.

All Vatican

officials would have to be taken into custody too,
Goebbels spoke against this possibility and noted that
the Pope had stated that he had nothing to do with the
military goals of the Allies,

Goebbels did not want to

provoke the Pope unnecessarily because he might be useful
at a later time.

The Propaganda Minister and Ribbentrop

opposed Hitler's plan to seize the Vatican because they
did not -want the "whole of world, opinion" to turn against
Germany, ^

They convinced the Fuehrer to exempt the Holy
Ll
See from occupation if the Reich moved into Italy,
On July 5» Weizsaeeker reported to Berlin about;
his private audience with the Pope,

Pius XII told Weiz-

saecker, in confidence, that he had always felt close
to Germany and that this feeling was Strengthened by the
Reich’s'fight against the Communists,
extremely active in Northern Italy,

who were now
Two weeks later,

any possible basis for agreement that this audience may
have had was negated by an Allied bombardment of Rome,

•^Goebbels, 303s 409,
/’ibid, , 416,
^Friedlaender, 1?9“80, This Is one of the few
cases when Pius XII definitely condoned German Invasion
of Russia,
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The Allies bombed because of Rome’s strategic value and
the fact that German outposts had been left In tke suburbs.
The Vatican now. worked for the removal of the outposts
and, particularly, Field Marshal Albert Kes'selrlng’s
headquarters.^
On July 25, the Fascist Grand Council, spurred on
by Italian discontent with the German Alliance, met and
persuaded the King to dismiss and imprison the Duce.

The

news, shocked the Fuehrer and put the Reich’s prestige
at stake.

Hitler quickly realized that Marshal Pietro

Radogllo’s new non-Fascist government would proclaim its
loyalty to the Axis only until it could make a deal with
the'Allies.

The Fuehrer rushed all available men to

Northern Italy in preparation to occupy the peninsula.
The Vatican strove to secure the defeat of
Mussolini and the establishment of the Badogllo govern
ment.

Reports of the Holy See’s activity reached Berlin'’

which, of course, wanted to re-establish Fascism to save
face.

On July 26, Germany moved troops toward Rome and

completed plans for the occupation.

At a two day confer

ence on the matter a German advisor suggested that troops

^Friedlaender, 182-83. Albert Kesselring (1885~
i960): Commander-in-Chief of German forces in Italy and
Military Commander of Italy, 19^3-^5; -Commander-in-Chief
West,. Match 19^5; tried for war crimes, death sentence
commuted to life imprisonment.
^Goebbels, ij-09-10.
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occupy all the exits to the Vatican,

Hitler replied that:

That doesn’t matter; I ’ll get into the Vatican
any time I Do you think I worry about the Vati
can? We can seize that straight away. . . .
Then w e ’ll say w e ’re sorry afterwards; we can
easily do that. W e ’ve got a war on.°
Hitler...continued to think about a final reckoning, but
Goebbels and Ribbentrop persuaded him to spare the Vati**
9
can. ^
On September 8, 19^3» the Badogllo government signed
an armistice with the Allies.

Hitler ordered Field Marshal

Kesselring, the Commander-in-Chlef of German forees in...
Italy, to prepare for action.

Kesselring was relieved ~

when the Allied Fifth and Eighth Armies landed at Salerno*
much: further south than Germany dared to hope for.

Every

one in Rome thought the Allies would arrive on September
10 and~.were surprised when German soldiers disarmed the
Italians..and occupied Italy, including Rome,
German troops did not enter the Vatican, but they
immediately isolated it.

Isolation of the Holy See re

flected a politico-military decision for purposes of
stopping the Vatican’s flow o f .Important intelligence
,
\
information to the Allies, rather than an a n t i - C a t h o l i c „

8

Walter Warllmont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters,
1939-19^5 (New York, 1965)7 356<> Hereafter cited as
Warlimont.
^Bullock, 708.
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gesture.^10

Despite the Vatican's support of the revolt

against Mussolini, and its gathering of information for
the Allies, the Fuehrer agreed to safeguard all rights
of the Holy See during the occupation of Rome

General

Stahel, the commandant of Rome, posted guards around the
Vatican to prevent any violation of the Holy See's extra
territorial rights,1^
.The day before the occupation, Himmler had appointed
S,S0 General Karl Wolff-*-3 to keep civil order in the area
from, north of Naples to the Brenner Pass,

Himmler made-

Wolff, his personal representative in Italy and even creatfi.cL.--.fche new rank of "Highest S0S„ and Police Leader"
for:*him;-

:

This title gave Wolff more importance in the :

eyes of Mussolini and Kesselring and placed him on an
equal basis with Kaltenbrunner.

Wolff co-ordinated the

disposition of S,S. forces with the Army, acted as policy.;
advisor to Mussolini, and consultant to Kesselring,

:Tales

circulated in Berlin that if the Allies attempted to force
10

Cianfarra, 290,

^Goebbels,
12Hochhuth, 32*4-.
13Karl Wolff (1900); General of Waffen S,S,
at Fuehrer Headquarters; Chief of Personal Staff of
Reichsfuehrer S,S„ (under Himmler); Himmler's liaison,
officer with Hitler's headquarters until 19*44; personal
adjutant to Himmler, 19*4-1; Chief of S,S, and Police
Commander in Italy, 19^3; founder and commander of
Italian S.S. legion, 19^5.

162
their way ..into Rome, the S. S. would take Vatican officials
as hostages„

Wolff established contact with the Vatican
14
a n d .assured the Pope that this would not happen.
The foreign press picked up the story, and the

Vatican'became extremely worried that Hitler would removethe Papal Court to Liechtenstein and hold the Pope in
1<
captivity.
The Holy See told Ambassador Weizsaeeker
of its apprehension, and he drew, up a plan to counter
any such "rash action."
In mid-October, as the Badoglio government de
clared war on Germany and American troops crossed the
Volturno, Joseph Goebbels discontinued his policy of
defending the Vatican and seconded Hitler's plan to
i.

exile, the P o p e . ^

Walter S c h e l l e n b e r g C h i e f of the

•^Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender (New York,
1966), 6l. Hereafter cited as Dulles.
^Weizsaeeker, 290. Rolf Hochhuth notes that the
foreign press sensationalized this story, but claims that
his interviews with Vatican officials proved that they
never expected Hitler to occupy the Vatican and exile the
Pope. See: Hochhuth, 324, 329o On the other hand,
Hassell had received information that "if Rome falls,
the Pope will be taken along ’for his own protection.’"
See: Hassell, 32?. Walter Schellenberg believed that
"Hitler was seriously considering the deportation of the
Pope into a kind of exile at Avignon." See: Schellenberg, 370.
^-^Weizsaeeker, 290. The Ambassador did not
elaborate on the details of this plan.
^Schellenberg, 370®
^Walter Schellenberg (1910-1952): Chief of Amt
VI of the Foreign Political Intelligence Service, 194145; Chief of the unified Intelligence Service (which took
over military Intelligence functions from the Abwehr),
1944-45; General of Police and of Waffen S.S.
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Foreign Political Intelligence Service (Amt VI)„ opposed
Goebbels on this point*

He took up Goebbels' old line

that the exile of the Pope "would discredit Germany in the
eyes of the entire w o r l d * S c h e l l e n b e r g approached his
superior* Heinrich Himmler* and urged him to avoid the
anti-Church policy of Goebbels and Bormann because it
would.:.cause him to lose the confidence of foreign nationsshould.;.he become hier to Hitler's Germany*

Himmler' took

Schellenberg*s advice and pointed out to Hitler the degree
to. which-Catholics contributed to the German war effort.
Hitler:heeded HlmniX(er !s warning ahd gave up his plans to
20
deport the Pope*
:

The Vatican still worried that Rome would be bombed

by the Allies because of German facilities in that city*
It conveyed this anxiety to Weizsaeeker who Informed
Kesselring.

The Field Marshal* although reluctant to do

so from a military standpoint* reduced the Rome garrison ;
to about one battalion*

Furthermore* he instructed German

troops- to detour around Rome rather than marching through
21
it* x

■^Schellenberg, 370.
20Ibid*
^Weizsaeeker, 291* Kesselring was most cooperative .during the occupation of Rome. In conjunction
with the Vatican and the Italian Ministry of Education,
he signed many orders to. protect cultural centers and
art treasures * See: Albert Kesselring* Kesselring: A
Soldier's Record (New York* 195^)8 36?« Hereafter cited
as Kesselring*

\6h

When Germany occupied Rome, it withdrew its Italian
. Embassy,,

The Embassy at the Vatican was the only remain

ing diplomatic authority.

Ambassador Weizsaeeker honored

Fapal Interests and reported that; "Our military authori
ties.. respected as a matter of principle all these proper
ties:, monasteries, etc,, for which our Vatican Embassy
had issued letters of protection."

22

From May 12 to June 1 9 ^ , the Allies fought their
way toward Rome.

Kesselring and his troops, short of .

rations and munitions, retreated.

On June

the Allies

marched quietly into Rome as the Germans departed from
the other side.

As Kesselring fell back to set up

defensive positions, he designated many towns as. "open,"
"neutralized," or "hospital" cities to protect their
23
cultural and ecclesiastical traditions, ^
■

'

-

.German occupation of Rome caused, the Vatican much
diS-C-omfbrt, but caused no invasion of its neutralityor
epctru^ territoriality,

The S.S., knowing that Jews and

political opponents of the German regime hid in some
religious buildings while others served as broadcasting
stations for Italian and American intelligence, did not

22Weizsaecker, 289-90, It Is doubtful that Hitler
condoned these liberties. Speaking of the Vatican, he
said: "The whole diplomatic corps will be in there. I
d onft care a damn but if the whole crew’s there, we'll
get the whole lot of swine out." See: Warlimoht, 356.
^Kesselring, 368-69.

165
24
Invade the Vatican grounds,

Long after the war, Father

Robert Leiber, the Pope’s personal secretary stated: I cannot remember the neutrality of the
Vatican ever being violated,, German troops
kept the line closed off so that no one
could cross it who didn’t have a pass, The
Pope, had, therefore , no reason to complain,,
Everything proceeded in an orderly fashion,
almost as a matter of course, Nothing ever
happenedi25
Ifter the Allies occupied Rome, the German Embassy
moved— into the Vatican,,

The diplomats had achieved

nothing in general political matters between the Reich
and the Holy See since June 19^3<>

The Allied occupation

severed the Embassy from German Supreme Headquartersi:
The Embassy received absolutely no information of a
political nature from Germany,

It was left to operate

on its own because the attention of.officials in Berlin
turned exclusively to the ” ’uncompromising determination
to continue the struggle’” against the Allies,
The German Opposition had been rendered in-

ir

effective as a result of numerous" ill-fated security
leakages..

In December 19^2, customs officials had

picked up an Abwehr agent on charges of smuggling curren
cy into Switzerland,

The agent confessed that he carried

^Hochhuth, 328,
25"plus XII and the Third Reich,” Look, (May 17,
1966), 50,
2^Weizsaecker, 293-9^, 299,
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the money for a group of generals who used the Vatican to
27
sound out the Allies on peace proposals0 '

The resulting

investigation, carried out by Himmler's S.S. , led back
to Admiral. Canaris. and General Hans Oster.

In February

19^3» Himmler closed down the Abwehr and took charge•of
a unified. Intelligence Service,,

r

On July 20, 1 9 ^ » the Oppositions* plot to killHitler failed, and the S.S, began to round up all persons
suspected of conspiring against the Reich,

The investi

gation led to discovery of the Oppositions' correspondence
with the Vatican and the "X-report," the Holy See's propO
posed peace conditions of 19^0.
Ultimately, Canaris,
Beck, Oster, Haider, Hassell, Joseph Mueller, and many
others were arrestedo2^

Since the German Embassy to the

Vatican had' been severed from the Reich and the Oppo
sition folded, there seemed to be no influential German
officials, to carry on contact with the Holy See,
Between December 1 9 ^ and January 19^5. a German

^Colvin, 188. Also see: William Shirer, The
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Connecticut, 1962), 1329.
2®Colvin, 20^-05» For Information relating to
the "X-report," see: Chapter V, 125-26.
2^Colvin 202-12; Bullock, 738-79. Canaris and
Oster were among those convicted of high treason and
executed at Flossenburg. Although Mueller was at the
camp at the same time, the Reich never executed him.
It appears that either Himmler had another use for
him. or an order went astray.

16?
offensive on the Western Front failed to reach Its goal,
and Hitler reluctantly withdrew his forces from the :
Ardennes *

On January 12 , 19^5» the Bed Army opened an

offensive on the. Eastern Front from the Baltic to the
Carpathians*

By the end of the month, Russia was less

than one hundred, miles, from Berlin*

On. April 12, the

United States Ninth Army crossed the Elbe river and four
days later the Russians opened the way to Berlin*

Und.er

these conditions, many Nazi leaders searched for themeans to make peace with the Allies to save Germany >
from total destruction*

The most likely place to origi

nate such proposals was the Vatican, where Pius XII was
30
receiving Allied diplomats and soldiers*-'
S*S* General Karl Wolff made the final German
contact with the Vatican*.

Wolff held the only important

S*S* command outside. German territory and had been made
military, plenipotentiary for Italy*

He had proved his

good faith by. releasing- many, prominent. Italians and
ecclesiastics, from the Gestapo’s hands, at the Vatican’s
request*

In May 1 9 ^ , Weizsaeeker. had arranged an

appointment with the Pope for him.

The details of the

conversation are not known, but it is clear that this
was Wolff’s first, attempt to be the prime mover for the
/

30

Dulles, ^9*

I
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surrender of German forces In Northern Italy.^
Wolff's direct access to the Vatican was inter
rupted by the Allied occupation of Rome in June, so he
negotiated with Ildefonso Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop
of Milan,

This channel led to the. Allies, through the

Vatican and the Papal Nuncio in Berne, Switzerland
where the United States had a large intelligence organ
ization,

It also led to the partisan authorities in
\

Northern Italy who worked for peace and the exclusion
of the Germans from Italy.32
Wolff and Schuster conceived, of a. plan to bring
peace on the Italian Front.

The Northern Italian Com

mittee for Liberation, a partisan group, was to sign-a
proposed peace document for Italy, while Kesselring
signed for Germany,33

Schuster used the Papal Nuncio

in Berne and the Vatican to get the proposal to Allied
headquarters in Rome.

The terms of the proposal were'

that the Germans would not destroy Italian Industrial

Dulles, 6l, 79 o Wolff’s motive for negotiating
through the Vatican will probably never be known, but it
was not from any sense of humaneness. He had been ex
tremely active in the persecution of Jews in Europe, At
Nuremberg he received a four year suspended sentence for
his S.S. activities. Finally, in 1964, a Munich court
sentenced him to fifteen years at hard labor. See;
"Bureaucrat of Death," Newsweek (October 12, 1964), 5758.
32F. w. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Mussolini,
Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism (New York, 1962),
761-62. Hereafter cited as Deakin.
33Ibld.. 763c
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and public utility services not of Immediate military
value, if the partisan forces agreed not to hinder the
German withdrawal from Italy.3^

General Wolff later

promised Schuster that the Germans would surrender un
conditionally in Northern Italy,^5

Ecclesiastical

authorities would act as middlemen,

;'
~

The success of these negotiations depended on'
the co-operation between Kesselring’s army forces and
Wolff's S„S,

Schuster and Wolff repeatedly contacted

Kesselring, who seemed eager to negotiate a peace In
Italy, but also continued to follow orders from Berlin,
Just as the Field Marshal appeared ready to make the-’Army a part of Wolff’s plans he was made Commander-ImChief West,

Moreover, the Central Committee of the

National Committee for Liberation balked at making a
deal with any German official hot an authority of Berlin
at the supreme level.
On April 25

19^5 #• after much undercover (and

unrecorded) negotiations, Cardinal Schuster arranged a
meeting of the. National Committee for Liberation.
Mussolinihaving been reseued from the Badoglio govern
ment by Germany, was to attend the meeting.;

General

Wolff secured the support of Kesselring's replacement,
3^Dulles, if-6.
-^Benito Mussolini, Memoirs . 19^-2-19^3; .With
Documents Relating to the Period (London. 19^9). 259.
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Army General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, and planned to
o /I

attend the meeting to sign the peace treaty.

At this

moment,, It appeared that a Reich official had finally
used the Vatican to make a peace with the Allies that
did not include the Hitler regime.

Such was not the

case.
Wolff had also been negotiating with Allen Dulles,
the head of the United States Office of Strategic
Services, in Switzerland,

Dulles entered into negotl-

ations with Wolff on the Pope’s recommendation.

37

Rather than attend the meeting sponsored by Cardinal'
Schuster, Wolff traveled to Switzerland and met with
Dulles’ representatives.

On April 28, they made final

plans for the surrender of all German troops in Northern
Italy,

The next day, representatives of Vietinghoff',

Wolff, and Dulles, signed the document.

Kesselring

relieved Vietinghoff of his command and, on Hay 2, the
day the surrender went into effect, gave his personal
, 38
approval.

1

On the same day, Germany announced Hitler’s

36Dulles, 193; Deakin, 810.
^Dulles, 92-3. The subject of Wolff’s negoti
ations with -Cardinal Schuster and Allen Dulles has been
elaborately traced by many authorities. Most sources,
and even the statements of witnesses, are contradictory.
Allen Dulles’ The Secret Surrender, F. W. Deakin’s' The
Brutal Friendship, and Jacques de Launay’s Secret
Diplomacy of World War II are the best sources on this
topic.
38Deakln, 77^.
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deatho

The Fuehrer had committed suicide in his bunker

as Russian forces arrived in Berlin,

Five days later,

May 7, 19^5» Admiral Donitz signed an unconditional
surrender for Germany,

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Germany's attitude toward the Vatican between 1933
and 19^5 did not reflect a pre-concelved policy formulated
by the National Socialist German Workers' Party or. any
one individual.

Different factions within the Party held

divergent views, and each individual had his own opinion.
The preface to the Documents on German Foreign Policy
aptly expresses this point;
Readers of these documents will soon become
aware of one peculiarity of German diplomacy
under Hitlers the fact that for a long period
of time there might be not one, but several,
German policies, and that the adherents of
one policy might be in partial or complete,
ignorance of what the adherents of other
policies were doing.1
From the complex inter-action of the?e different positions,
came a constantly changing policy toward the: Holy See that
may be called the "German attitude."
Ambassador George S. Messersmith (Consul General
in Berlin, 1930= 3*1% and Minister to Austria, 193^-3?) of
the United States filed an affidavit to be used at Nurem
berg.

The statement accused all officials responsible to

Ribbentrop of being ardent Nazis and "criminally responsi
ble for the acts of the.German Ministry of Foreign Affairs
during this period."

2

One must know what beliefs these

1DGFP, I, XVI.
2NCA, V, k 6 a
172

173
Individuals held in order to understand the complexity of
the German attitude,,
Messersmlth specifically implicated Ernst von Weizsaeeker as one of those criminally responsible for actions
of the Foreign Ministry.

Weizsaecker devotes his memoirs

to the contradiction of this claim.
somewhere in between.

The truth lies

In the years before April 19^3>

when Weizsaecker was appointed Ambassador to the Holy
See, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs definitely lacked personal initiative.

He tried to take a position

midway between Nazi demands that he persecute the CathO”
lie Church and actions that would not make’ him appear
as an opponent of Christian morality.
extent, he was successful.

To a certain :

Vatican officials never ■
>

chided him personally, nor did he get into any grave1
trouble with his Nazi superiors.
Weizsaecker, as did all other Reich leaders,
acted in. the best interests of Germany as dictated by
his; own conscience.

While, writing letters and sending

telegrams, usually, drafted by. Rlbbentrop, to various
agencies of the. Reich, the. State Secretary also kept
the German Opposition informed of events, and political
decisions in the Reich Chancellery. ^

In this way, he

fulfilled his duty to the Party while satisfying his
own desire to maintain a personal peace with the

^Weizsaecker, 182; Colvin, 51o
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Vatican,,
Nevertheless-, Weizsaecker did not make, any decisions
that represented his personal opinions,.

He wanted to keep

Germany

free of the stigma of anti»Church- persecution but

took no

active measures to do so until he arrived safely

at the Vatican,

Only when Weizsaecker convinced Hitler

and Ribbentrop that
See did

he should be Ambassador to the Holy

he take the intiative in protecting the Church's

rights and instigating peace p r o p o s a l s W e i z s a e c k e r ' s
primary consideration was not the defeat of Catholicism
in. German territory but the desire to escape. the war
years without subjecting himself to adverse criticism
from any quarter,
Diego von Bergen, another representative of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs-, attained the highest degree
of professionalism of any Reich official assigned to
Vatican affairs,

Bergen adopted the National Socialist

belief that the Church be absolutely excluded from Reich
politics but promoted this idea in a highly diplomatic
manner.

The Aabas-s-ador to the Holy See took a realistic

point of view, unaffected by the emotional squabbles of
either side.

The furtherance of Reich policy was foremost

In his mind, but he clearly saw the necessity for compro
mise with the Holy See in order to carry out German

^Weizsaecker, 2?7, 258-59? Hassell, 332,

■wishes to limit Vatican influence in Germany and the
world
Bergen never hesitated-to. give his personal opinion
regardless of whether or not it conformed to Reich policy„
He wanted an exchange of explicit details concerning
points of conflict between Germany and the Vatican at all
times *.^

By clarifying all issues, he thought there would

be no misunderstanding', and each power would know exactly
what was expected by the other0

Bergen’s prestige in

Germany and the Vatican allowed him to remain as Ambassa
dor until he was considerably past retirement age, despite
attempts by his enemies to have Ribbentrop recall him,,'7
Ribbentrop had some vague idea that National
Socialism would somehow be substituted for Catholicism
in German territory*®

But he probably did not understand

the basic tenets of National Socialism, let alone the
intense ideological conflict between it and Catholicism*
The Foreign Minister was incapable of making any decision
in relation to the Vatican that was not dictated by Hitler*
Ribbentrop was- not a leader, nor even an effective follow
er, in the Reich’s struggle to eliminate Vatican influence

5DGFP, I, 1039*
6Ibid** 936*
^Ibld** Appendix III,
®Weizsaecker, 281*
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In Germany,,

He was a blind, adherent to orders whose stock

answer a.t. Nuremberg...was..: "We all believed, in. the. Fuehrer. "9
Not all agencies of the Reich were led by such weak
and. irresponsible men.

Some were dominated, by. strong,

demanding leaders like Joseph Goebbels, the Minister for
Propaganda and Public Enlightenment„

History has desig

nated Goebbels as one of the infamous leaders of the Third
Reich„ but this is not true in relation to his Church
policy,.
He thought it was nonsense for a spiritual power
to interfere with political and military questions and
flew into a rage when the Vatican voiced its. complaints
to the foreign...press rather than to Germany.

lety exc.Cpt

in a few. isolated cases, he did not take direct action
against the Church for these "treasonable" offenses.
Goebbels. believed in National Socialist doctrine com
pletely but did not think that Catholicism should be
eliminated during the war.

The Propaganda Minister

thought that the Vatican should be dealt with after the
war.10
This position placed him in direct opposition
to the extremist group of the Nazi Party which tried to
uproot the Church during the war.

9NCA o -Supplement B, 1237.
10Goebbels , 166, 3,82.

When the Gestapo,
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at the insistence of the Party;,, requisitioned Church
buildings, in Berlin against his orders, Goebbels repri11
manded. .them, alio
When, against his warnings, Party
members attempted to take over certain functions of the
Church that later proved unpleasant, he accused them
12
of "driving:, out the devil with Beelzebub,"
His stand
was that :.
The church question is as far as possible
not to be discussed at all during, the entire
war, no matter how recalcitrant the 'skypilots» may prove to be'in this or. that
matter. After the war we shall certainly
have other possibilities of making them see
the light,13
Although the political leaders of Germany did not
participate as a unit in the elimination of Vatican
influence in Germany, the extremist group centering
around Martin Bormann did.

Of all the documents entered

in evidence by the Prosecution at Nuremberg, the largest
single author was Bormann,

Most other contributions

I•

were made by:men and organizations that executed directions-nnmlng- from his Party Chancellery: Alfred
Rosenberg-, Heinrich Himmler, the S ,S ,,, and the Gestapo,
Baldur. von Shirach blamed him for preventing any agree
ments between the youth leaders of the Reich and the
11Goebbels, 121,
12Ibid,. 2^2,
1 -3J b i d , ,

121,

^ T M W C , X X I,

k6ka

1^
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Churcho

Hermann Goering--blamed Bormann, along with

Himmler, for all persecution of the Church,
Bormann’s authorship of the June 6, 19^1 circular
which rejected any possible reconciliation of National
Socialism. .and religion made him exceptionally vulnerable
to such, claimso

Yet, Bormann truly could not find any

place, fox. Catholicism in his concept of life.

H. <R.

Trevor-Roper, editor of Bormann's letters to his wife,
believes that religion is the only area in which this
man made a personal contribution,

Botmann's hatred of

religion spilled over into his personal life.

His.

letters to his wife demand that she "make sure that none
of our children gets depraved and diseased by the poison
of Christianity, in-whatever dosage.
He wrote'voluminously to Rosenberg, the author
of The Myth of the, 20th Century, and increased the origi
nal distaste that Rosenberg had for Christianity,
Bormann. wanted Rosenberg- to work toward substituting
National Socialist principles for Catholic instruction
in schools., increasing Catholic monetary contributions
to. the State, and to reject all compromises between
Christian teachings and National Socialist ideology.1^
The leadership for anti-Church policy and refusal to

^Martin Bormann, The Bormann Letters (London,
195*0. 36.
l6NCA, III, 154-55. 153-59. 171-72.
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compromise wi th the- Vatican cannot lie ..more heavily on
any..single person than Martin Bormann.
Nevertheless, final responsibility for Germany's
attitude toward the Vatican must rest with Adolf Hitler
simply because he was- the Fuehrer.

Actually, Hitler

hated all of the routine^work of government.

Once he

had. established National Socialism as the only accepta
ble- German ideology and himself as the Reich's Fuehrer,
Hitler only laid down general lines of policy toward
the Church.

The details of implementation of this, policy

were.left up to the departmental Ministers while. Hitler
pre-occupied himself with broad ideas in foreign, affairs
and. preparation for war.

Except in times of .arises., the

Fuehrer...seldom voiced his opinion about Germany's policy
toward the Vatican.
The Fuehrer respected the Catholic Church, because
it was. an international society directed by the Vatican,
an authority outside of Germany which was not subject to
the Reich's will.

He also admired its hierarchical

structure that allowed the Vatican to control its vast
17
membership with ease. ' The Church's ability to survive
so long with so little change reminded him of his dream
of a thousand year Reich,

Hitler thought that National

Socialism could learn from the Catholic Church by study
ing, its capacity to maintain a changeless doctrine.

1^Bullock, 312-lfc.

He
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thought an unchangeable, eternal doctrine should be the
1O

aim of National Socialism,,
Even during the early years of co-ordination of
the German Catholic Church, Hitler did not want..a break
with the Vatican0

He foresaw that it would be useful
in the-event of war. 19 The Fuehrer knew that theChurch

could.be strengthened by persecution and restrained any
open.:.anti-clerical outbursts that might impair.:-.his. po
litical power.

Unlike Rosenberg and Bormann, he did
20
not attack the Church publicly,
- -'After the invasion of Poland in September-1939,
he: continued to follow this policy.

Hitler made a

point of not openly attacking the Church and camouflaged
his distaste for Vatican interference in German affairs
unless it obstructed German politics.
was to maintain peace with the Vatican,

His.constant goal
21

Along with

Goering and Goebbels, he believed that the Church .problem
should not be acute during wartime.

22

It was not that the Fuehrer felt sympathy, fpr
Catholicism,

On the contrary, he thought it was a,

l8Hitler, Mein Kampf, ^59,
■^Heinrich

1955), 129,

Hoffmann, Hitler was my Friend (London,
'

20Bullock,: 389 o
21Hochhuth, 310, 333,
22Goebbels, 1&L-42-.
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"filthy reptile" that struck at any sign of weakness in
the. State..and that it had but one desire.,....to destroy the
Reicho

21

Yet, he thought Catholicism so important to

the German nation that whenever he was held personally
responsible for persecution of the Church, he blamed it
24
on'"irresponsible elements in the p r o v i n c e s ~

When

he did give a direct order to punish members of the
Church hierarchy, it was because he truly believed that
they were guilty of political Catholicism,

Hitler

believed that the Church should be eliminated-after the
war. 25

- ":

,... ...

final analysis, these men and..their..:follow

ers combined to use the Catholic Church in its.: .national
form to wage political warfare against the Vatican.,
German policy toward the Vatican can be seen in two
stages.

Germany strove to gain complete control over

the German Catholic Church and, later, the national
Catholic Churches in the areas annexed by the Reich.
This control was used as a lever to persuade the Vati
can to react in a manner favorable to German policy.
In the first stage, Germany made the first in
roads against the Vatican by concluding the Reich
Concordat.

By manipulating this treaty, promising;to

^Hitler, Conversations, 50 8o
^Papen, 282,
^Hitler, Conversations. 117.
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uphold its guarantees when necessary and. narrowly in
terpreting-them when advantageous, Germany kept, the
Vatican constantly on the defensive*

Meanwhile, the

German Catholics were co-ordinated with the State.
*
S'*
They became a-part of thefjtoinalitarian concept of
statehood..

No longer could they act independently.

If the clergy attempted to act without the authority
of the Reich they were immediately suppressed.
In 1939* the beginning of warfare brought the
Vatican into direct diplomatic contact with Germany
because the Holy See was an international power avowed
ly dedicated, to keeping peace.

In this, the second

stage, it was too late for the Vatican to make many
demands against Germany, because the Reich had control
of. the Catholics in Germany, the Sudetenland, Czecho
slovakia., Poland, and other areas.

The German empire

had authority over more Catholics than.any Other nation
26
in the world.
If the Vatican wanted to oppose German
policy on the international level, it would have to be
willing, to accept the consequences of the Nazi reaction
at the national level.

This it would not do.

When it looked as if the Holy See had reached
the point where it might appeal to its world-wide Catho
lic membership, the German government took steps to
26

L. H. Lehmann, Vatican Policy in the Second
World War (New York, 19 ^ 6 ) , ^3o
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paoify the Vatican.

The most obvious example is the

sending of Ribbentrop to the Vatican in March 19^0.
At this...time, the Reich convinced the Holy See that it
did_not want to foster communism and, furthermore,
want.ed....to promote a truce with the Church.

After

Ribbentrop's meeting with Pius XII, the Vatican again
reacted favorably to German policy.
From 19^0 to 19^3» the Reich severed relations
with the Vatican in the outside t e r r i t o r i e s T h e
German government, which now consisted mostly of the
Reich...Chancellery as the Foreign Ministry was nearly
defunct, would accept negotiations over problems in the
old..:Reich only.

At this time, there were no outstanding

problems in the Reich.

The German Catholic Church had

bean-almost fully co-ordinated, before 1939 c and any re
maining disagreements that might arise with the Vatican
were- far. overshadowed by the ill-treatment of the clergy
in Austria and Poland.

The result was that the Holy See

could negotiate only in an area where it could, accomplish
very little.
Germany would allow negotiations in the outside
areas only through the local authorities.

Reich repre

sentatives in these areas could have diplomatic contact
27
‘Relations were severed in Austria by Hitler’s
order of June 22, 19^2. Germany stopped relations with
the Vatican in all outside territories, including the
Government General, in March 19^3. See: Chapter V,
sections I and II.
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only with the local Vatican representatives of these
areas.-„

Thus, the Reich had come full circle*

It had

started, in 1933» "by securing the support of the national
clergy and keeping the Vatican out of Internal political
affairs.

In 19^3» Germany by-passed the Holy See to deal

only with its local authorities.

Again, the Vatican was

kept out of German political affairs.

During the inter

vening, ten years, Germany had increased its capacity to
keep-the Vatican on the defensive by extending its control
over_mo.re, and more Catholic countries.
;.Relch leaders generally followed the policy toward
the*Vatican that Hitler and Goebbels established.

They

didi_not provoke the Vatican to the extent that it would
completely sever relations with Germany,

They bided

their..-time with the thought in mind that the Reich could
entirely eradicate the Church and eliminate the Vatican's
influence in German territories after the war.

Since

the Holy See did not break off relations with Germany, no
impetus was given to the lower Catholic hierarchy to
condemn German policy against the Catholics or in aggressive
warfare.

The Reich's political victory over the Vatican

was.-t.otal.
On the other hand, Germany lost a spiritual war
with the Vatican.

National Socialism became the predomi

nant...ideology in Germany and the outside territories, but
it was only a superstructure.

Underneath, in the hearts
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of the individuals of the totalitarian State., Catholicism
never died*,

It was never., "replaced" by National Socialism

as most Nazi leaders had hoped,
Vatican officials used the Concordat as "a juridical
basis.for their defense, a stronghold behind which to
pO
shield themselves, in their opposition, , , ,"
Despite Germany's-constant breeches of the Concordat, the Holy See
continued., to use. it as an instrument for negotiation in
Germany and. the outside territories.

The. Vatican did not

want to break off diplomatic negotiations with Germany
because it wished to continue protecting all Catholics by-whatever methods remained.
The Catholic Church takes a long range view of
historical, events and knows that situations ehangd with
time.

Although the Vatican may experience setbacks and

its membership may suffer persecution, centuries of
experience... have proved that more favorable conditions
will, eventually present themselves.

As one prominent

Cat hoi ic...stated:
v
The Vatican places no limit of time, on the
achievement of its ends. It thinks of itself
in terms.;of eternity, and. its dealings, with
foreign powers are, therefore, based, on the
assumption that
the Holy See can afford to
wait since men are mortal and the Church is
eternal,29
28.T_. TT
_
NCA, V, 1039oThese are the
XII,
2^Cianfarra, 68,

words

of Pope Pius
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The Vatican could afford to wait patiently and- watch the
rise—and fall of the Third Reich from a dis tance„. It did,
and. the Eternal Church survived Adolf Hitler’s National
Socialist dream.
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APPENDIX A

SELECTED ARTICLES
CONCORDAT BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND THE
GERMAN REICH1
His Holiness Pope Pitas XI and the President of the German
Reich, moved by a common desire to consolidate and enhance
the friendly relations existing between the Holy See and the
German Reich, wish to regulate the relations between the
Catholic Church and the State for the whole territory of the
German Reich in a permanent manner and on a basis acceptable
to both parties, They have decided to conclude a solemn
agreement, which will supplement the Concordats already con
cluded with certain individual German states, and will ensure
for the remaining states fundamentally uniform treatment of
their respective problems, , , «
Article 1,— The German Reich guarantees freedom of pro
fession and public practice of the Catholic religion.
It acknowledges the right of the catholic Church, within
the limit of those laws which are applicable to all, to
manage and regulate her own affairs independently, and,
within the framework of her own competence, to publish laws
and ordinances binding on her members.
ArticleJ2,-— The Concordats concluded with Bavaria (192if),
Prussia (1^29) and Baden (1932) remain in force, and the
rights and privileges of the Catholic Church recognized
therein are secured unchanged within the territories of the
states concerned. For the remaining states the agreements
entered into in the present Concordat come into force in
their entirety. These last are aliso binding for those
states named above in so far as they affect matters not
regulated by the regional Concordats or are complementary
to the settlement already made.
In future, regional Concordats with states of the German
Reich will be concluded only with the agreement of the
Reich Government, , , ,
Article ij-»— In its relations and correspondence with the
bisfiops j clergy and other members of the Catholic Church in
Germany, the Holy See enjoys full freedom. The same applies
to the bishops and other diocesan officials in their dealings
with the faithful in all matters belonging to their pastoral

1NCA, V, 1080-90,
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office,
Instructions, ordinances, Pastoral Letters, official
diocesan gazettes, and other enactments regarding the
spiritual direction of the faithful issued by the ecclesi
astical authorities within the framework of their compe
tence (Art, 1, Sec, 2) may be published without hindrance
and brought to the notice of the faithful in the form
hitherto usual, , , ,
Article 11,— The present organization and demarcation
of dioceses of the Catholic Church in the German Reich
remains in force. Such rearrangements of a bishopric or
of an ecclesiastical province or of other diocesan demar
cations as shall seem advisable in the future, so far as
they involve changes within the boundaries of a German
state, remain subject to the agreement of the government
of the state concerned.
Rearrangements and alterations which extend beyond the
boundaries of a German state require the agreement of the
Reich government, to whom it shall be left to secure the
consent of the regional government in question. The same
applies to rearrangements or alterations of ecclesiastical
provinces involving several German states. The foregoing
conditions do not apply to such ecclesiastical boundaries
as are laid down merely in the interests of local pastoral
care.
In the case of any territorial reorganization within
the German Reich, the Reich government will communicate
with the Holy See with a view to rearrangement of the
organization and demarcation of dioceses, , , •
Article lit.,— , , , , 2, The Bull nominating
Archbishops, Coadjutors cum jure successionis, or appoint
ing a Praelatus nullius, will not be issued until the name
of the appointee has been submitted to the representative
of the National Government in the territory concerned, and
until it has been ascertained that no objections of a
general political nature exist, , , ,
Article 16,— Before bishops take possession of their
dioceses they are to take an oath of fealty either to the
Reich representative of the state concerned, or to the
President of the Reich, according to the following formula;
"Before God and'on the Holy Gospels I swear and promise,
as becomes a bishop, loyalty to the German Reich and to
the State of, ,
, I swear and promise to honor the
legally constituted government and to cause the clergy of
ray diocese to honor it. In the performance of my spiritual
office and in my solicitude for the welfare and the inter
ests of the German Reich, I will endeavor to avoid all
detrimental acts which might endanger it,"
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Article 17 #— The property and other rights of public
corporationsj, institutionsp foundations and associations
of the Catholic Church regarding their vested interests*,
are guaranteed according to the common law of the land#
Ho building dedicated to public worship may be destroyed for any reason whatsoever without the previous
consent of the ecclesiastical authorities concerned® * # »
Article 200— Where other agreements do not exist*, the
Church has the right to establish theological and philosophical colleges for the training of its clergy*, which
institutions are to be wholly dependent on the ecclesi
astical authorities if no State subsidies are sought® « # *
Article 21#— Catholic religious instruction in ele
mentary*, senior*, secondary and vocational schools consti
tutes a regular portion of the curriculum*, and is to be
taught in accordance with the principles of the Catholic
Church® In religious instruction*, special care will be
taken to inculcate patriotic*, civic and social conscious
ness and sense of duty in the spirit of the Christian
Faith and the moral code*, precisely as in the case of
other subjects® The syllabus and the selection of
textbooks for religious instruction will be arranged by
consultative agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities*,
and these latter have the right to investigate whether
pupils are receiving religious instruction in accordance
with the teachings and requirements of the Church#
Opportunities for such investigation will be agreed upon
with the school authorities# # # •
Article -23#— The retention of Catholic denominational
schools and the establishment of new ones*, is guaranteed#
In all parishes in which parents or guardians request it*,
Catholic elementary schools will be established,, provided
that the number of pupils available appears to be suf
ficient for a school managed and administered in accordance
with the standards prescribed by the State*, due regard
being had to the local conditions of school organi
zations# » # «
Article 27#°=°The Church will accord
provisiontothe
German army for the spiritual guidance of its Catholic
officers, personnel and other
officials*, as wellasfor
the families of the same#
The administration of such pastoral care for the army is to be vested in the army bishop# The latter*s ecclesi
astical appointment is to be made by the Holy See after
contact has been made with the Reich government in order
to select a suitable candidate who is agreeable to both
parties# # 0 «
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Article 31 q-»Those Gatholic organizations and societies
which pursue exclusively eharitable*, cultural or religious
ends* and* as such* are placed under the ecclesiastical
authorities* will be protected in their institutions and
activities»
Those Catholic organizations which to their religious*
cultural and charitable pursuits add others* such as social
or professional interests* even though they may be brought
into national organizations* are to enjoy the protection of
Article 31* Section 1* provided they guarantee t© develop
their activities outside all political parties®
It is reserved to the central government and the German
episcopate* in joint agreement* to determine which organi
zations and associations come within the scope of this
article®
In so far as the Reich and its constituent states take
charge of sport and other youth organizations* care will
be taken that it shall be possible for the members of the
same regularly to practice their religious duties on
Sundays and feast days* and that they shall not be required
to do anything not in harmony with their religious and
moral convictions and obligations®
^ t i b l e _ 32®-*-In view of the special situation existing
in Germany, and in view of the guarantee provided through
this Concordat of legislation directed to safeguard the
rights and privileges of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Reich and its component states* the Holy See will prescribe
regulations for the exclusion of clergy and members of
religious orders from membership of political parties* and
from-engaging in work on their behalf®
Article 33®°°a’All matters relating to clerical persons
or ecclesiastical affairs* which have not been treated of
in the foregoing articles* will be regulated for the
ecclesiastical sphere according to current Ganon Law®
Should differences of opinion arise regarding the in
terpretation or execution of any of the articles of this
Concordat* the Holy See and the German Reich will reach
a friendly solution by mutual agreement® ® * ®

The Supplementary Protocol®
At the signing of the Concordat concluded'today■between
the Holy See and the German-Reich* the undersigned* being
regularly thereto empowered* have adjoined the following
explanations which form an integral part of the Concordat
itself®'
In res ® « ®
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A r t i c l e F a P i g o ^ I t is understood that when ©b~
jections of a general political nature exist, they shall
he presented within the shortest possible time® If after
twenty days such representations have not been made, the
Holy See may be justified in assuming that no objections
exist to the candidate in question® The names ©f the
persons' concerned'will be hept confidential until the
announcement of the appointment. Ho right- of the State'
t© assert a vet© is t© be derived from this article. . . .
"Article' 32«l— It is understood "that similar provisions
regarding activity in party polities will be introdmced
by the Reich -government f or'members ©f non=Gath©lic
denominations, fhe conduct, which has been mad© obliga
tory for "the clergy and "members ■©f religions- orders" in
Germany in virtue "of Artiel©"32, does hot involve .any
sort of limitation -of official and prescribed preaching
and Interpretation of the dogmatic and moral teachings
and principles of the Church.
Signed? Eugenio, Cardinal Paeelli.
Signed? Franz v©n Papen.
At the’Vatican City, July 20th, 1933®

191

APPENDIX B

THE GERMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPATE
IN SEPTEMBER 1933

A0

Church Province Breslau
1,
2,
3o
4,

B,

Church Province Munich and Freising
5o
6,
7.
8,

C,

14,.
15o
16 .
17,
18„

Karl Joseph Cardinal Schulte, Archbishop of
Cologne
Joseph Vogt, Bishop of Aachen
Antonius Hilfrich, Bishop of Limburg
Clemens; August von Galen,Bishop, of Munster
Wilhelm .Bernlng. Bishop of Osnabruck
Franz. Rudolf Bormewas-s er, Bishop of Trier

Church Province Paderborn
19o
20o
21,

F,

Jakobus von Hauck, Archbishop of Bamberg
Konrad von Preysing, Bishop of Eichstatt
Ludwig Sebastian,, Bishop of Speyer
Matthias Ehrenfried, Bishop of Wurzburg

Church Province Cologne
13o

E,

Michael Cardinal Faulhaber, Archbishop of
Munich and. Freising
Joseph Kumpfmuller, Bishop of Augsburg
Sigismund Felix von Ow-Felldorf, Bishop of
Passau
Michael Buchberger, Bishop of Regensburg,

Church Province Bamberg
9.
10,
11 ,
12,

D,

Adolf Cardinal Bertram ,. Archbis~@id%of Breslau
Maximilian Kaller, Bishop of Ermland
Christian Schreiber, Bishop of Berlin
Franz Hartz, Prelate Nullius of Schneidemuhl

Kaspar. Klein, Archbishop of Paderborn
Joseph Damian Schmitt, Bishop of Fulda
Nikolaus Bares, Bishop of Hildesheim

Upper Rhenish Church Province
22, Konrad Grober, Archbishop of Freiburg i, Br„
23, Ludwig Maria Hugo, Bishop of Mainz
24, Johannes Baptista Sproll, Bishop of Rottenburg
25o Petrus Legge, Bishop of Meissen (exempt diocese)
19 2
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCUMENTS

Ciano, Count Galeazzo0 Cianofs Diplomatic Papers. . Edited
by Malcolm Muggeridge. Long Acre , L o n d o n .Odhams
Press, 19^80
The Papers, examine the Italian attitude, .toward
Germany which is often inseparably linked with the
degree of relations between Germany and the Vati
can. However little mention is made of the Vati
can, and the Papers add nothing new to the study
of the German attitude. Ciano was anti^German.
Documentary Background of World War II., 1931-19*H<,
Edited by James W. Gentenbein. New York;
Columbia University Press, 19^8.
An excellent collection of pre-World> War II
documents. It should be used to understand the
internal and external German political activities
during this period. -Nothing on the Vatican, but
there is much useful material on German relations
'With all the major,powers. Includes speeches,
treaties, agreements, etc.
Documents on German History. •
. Edited by Louis L* Synder.
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, .
1
9
5
8
^ _
1
A very representative selection of-“documents
from 9 A.D. to 1955s "but nothing in detail. A
broad and general coverage of the period Judder
study which includes material on the Reichstag
fire, propaganda, the Nuremberg Laws, etc. '
Nothing on the German attitude, but useful for
finding major documents quickly.

19^

Friedlander, Saul, Plus .XII and the Third Reich; A
Dooumentat1on. Translated by Charles Pullman.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
Here Is a presentation of the most Important
documents found In the DGFP with a narrative text
that ties, them together in a comprehensive fashion.
It is. bound, to become a standard work in the study
of the German attitude toward the. Vatican if only
because., it introduces hithertofore unpublished
materials-.which are found in the Foreign Ministry
archives, at Bonn. The work is indispensible
although -Friedlander seems to strain to fit the
documents, into his-preconceived idea of historical
pattern. He also over-emphasizes the Vatican's
fear of communism.
Germany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Documents and
Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World
War, 1938-1939o Vol. II. New York: Internati onal Publis hers, 1948.
Also called the "Dirksen Papers." These were
captured and published by the Russians. Nothing
on the German attitude toward the Vatican. Very
useful in understanding the development of events
prior to World War II.
Great Britain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Documents. Concerning- Gebman-Pollsh Relations and
the Outbreak-.of Hostilities Between Great Britain
and Germany on September 3, 1939° New York:
Farrar &. Rhinehart, 1939.
These documents are of no use to examine the
German point of view. They are indispensible in
the study of the invasion of Poland, however, as
the. British, were, inextricably involved..
Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 19191939. Third Series. 9 vols. London: His Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1949-1950.
This series covers the period of 1938-1939.
Volumes VI and VII show that Britain knew more about
Reich relations with the Vatican than did the German
Foreign Ministry. These volumes,contain much infor
mation pertaining to British-Vatican diplomatic
relations. They also disclose what Britain thought
of Germany’s negotiations with the Holy See,
Hitler, Adolf., Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944.
Translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens.
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New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953»
This is the stenographic record of. Hitler's
" t a b l e - t a l k s M u c h of his religious philosophy
can be gleaned. His observations are mainly
sweeping generalizations concerning an alleged
Jewlsh-Christianity-Bolshevik connection and
science as superior to religion. His attitude
toward, a- few specific incidents is apparent.
Hitler's philosophy concerning the church changes
disturbingly, depending upon to whom he is talk
ing.
.' The Testament, of Adolf Hitler: The HitlerBormann Documents. February-Apr11 19^5« Trans
lated by R. H, Stevens. London: Cassell & Company,

.

1961

These are the last passages ever written by
Hitler (19^5)» He now knew that the war was ending
so he compiled a sort of supplement to his Conver
sations,. Hitler attempts to examine- where he went
wrong,-and-some of his conclusions, and reflections
are interesting... There are few statements, about
Christianity, but they are in final form in his
mind., not rambling, like Conversations. His thoughts
seem to have jelled in many areas. Not necessary
for the topic under study.
Pacelli, Eugenio (Pope Pius XII) and Roosevelt, Franklin
D. Wartime. Correspondence. Between President
Roosevelt and Pone Plus XII. Explanatory^notes
by Myron C. Taylor. New York: Macmillan 'Company,

19*7 .

The letters are of little value exclusive of
illuminating the scanty diplomatic relations between
the United States and the Vatican. Myron Taylor’s
textual additions are very interesting, although not
always correct. They show that the United States
was the only major power with a large Catholic popu
lation that did not take full advantage of the
Vatican's power to further its policies.
Polish Information Center. Documents- Relating to the Ad
ministration of Occupied Countries in Eastern
Europe.. Issue No. V. New York: Polish Information
Center, 19^1 <>
Here is a reiteration of Cardinal Hlond’s memo
randum. of 1939 and other documents commonly availa
ble . Nothing, new is added. It is a compilation of
documents,, issued by the Reich which were restrictive
to Poland. Thus an anti-German approach is pre
sented.
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Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Occupation
of Poland, New York: The Greystone Press, n,d.
Also called the Polish White Book, A docu
mentary compilation, with text, of all German laws
and degrees enacted to deal with Poland during and
after the invasion,. Laws which caused suppression
of the Polish, clergy and their property are in
cluded and commented on in the text. It is meant
to be anti-German and is. The documents presented
can be found in any of the standard works in this
field such as NCA and DGFP,
Principles for Peace Selections, from- Papal Documents ,
Leo XIII to Plus XII, Edited by Reverend Harry
C, Koenig-, Washington: National Catholic Welfare
Conference., 19*4-3»,
This is a very good compilation of the published
speeches, and. decrees of both Pius XI and Pius XII,
It. must be read in order to understand the corre
sponding reactions the Popes * words caused in the
Reich,
United Nations, The United Nations Review; a Bi-monthly
Selection of Official Statements, and Documents,
(January 19*4-l=December 31, 19*4-5), 5 vols, New
York: United Nations Information Office, 19*4-1“
19*4-5«
In 19*4-3, the name of this set was changed to
the United Nations Review from the Inter-Allied
Review, Herein is presented the text of documents,
radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, declarations
by diplomats, excerpts from diplomatic speeches,
and statements of Allied leaders. At the end of
most articles "Press References" are given—
synopses of numerous press articles on the subject
covered.. The general view and "feeling" of indi
vidual countries, can be grasped through this set,
and there are articles dealing with Church problems
on the state level.
United States,- Civil Affairs Department, Trial of Major
War-. Criminals, before the. International Military
Tribunal^ *4-2 vols, Nuremberg: International
Military Tribunal, 19*4-7=19*4-9*
Includes some testimony of witnesses and the
accused which is valuable. Much material is
entered in evidence: documents, excerpts from
decrees, orders, letters, etc, • Presents a sche
matic Interpretation of these documents. From
these the general picture of many phases of Nazi

religious activity can be determined.,, A necessity
in any study of Germany durihg this period,. The
documents, found here are all- in NCA-and. DGFP 0
United States, Civil Affairs, Trials of War Criminals
before the Nuremberg- Military Tribunals. Under
Control Gounel1 Law No, 10, 15 vols, Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 194?49,
The trial of the lesser Reich functionaries .
who .were not tried under the Trials of the. Ma.ior
War Criminals., Volumes XII-XIV are appropos to
this field of study as they concern the "Minis
tries Case" which includes Weizsaecker, However,
they are mainly concerned- with, the breech of
International Law and the Jewish Question,
together with membership in Nazi organizations.
Some general conclusions are drawn by the Prose
cution,
United States, Department of State, Documents on German
Fore1fen Policy, 1918-1945, Series C (1933-1937).
5 vols, Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1957o
Series C is the best source for Germany's
attitude toward the Vatican in the years between
1933 and 1937o The series includes abundant
material on the Reich's "co-ordination" of the
German. Catholic- Church and- the repercussions
caused at. the Holy See, The documents concern
the German. Foreign Ministry and were captured
by the. Allies.- after the war,- Although the
published-material is selected, from a very large
amount of captured material, it is thoroughly
.representative of German policy in these years.
United States, Department of State, Documents, on German
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945).
42 vols, Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1950-1964,
Series D continues where Series C left off in
1937
continues through December 1941, Many
Nuremberg- documents are repeated, but the trans
lations are better and the source given where
possible. Both series present correspondence
between the Foreign Ministry and the German Am
bassador at the Vatican as well as pertinent
political reports and Reich degrees, This
collection is the basic source for studies in
this area until 1941 and is extremely valuable
198

because most German negotiations with the Holy See
Were conducted through the Ministry at this time.
United States, War Department,, Nazi Conspiracy and Ag
gression, 10 vols, Washington: Office of United
States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, United States Government Printing
Office, 1946,
This collection contains- the full text of the
majority -of documents entered in evidence at the
first- Nuremberg-, trial „ It also-includes in
dictments.-,- oral.arguments-, .and- useful appendices ,
Supplements-A-and B contain statements-by the
defendants, arguments, by the defence, counsel, and
interrogations, There is a great deal of material
relating-to the. Vatican, and muc.h circumvention by
the defendants while determing where to place the
blame for German policy toward the Catholic Church,
United States, War Department, Nazi Conspiracy and Ag
gression:- Opinion and-Judgment., Washington: Office
of United.States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution
of Axis Criminality, United.States Government
Printing Office, 194?,
This volume sums up the reasoning, judgments,
and sentencing of the defendants tried at Nurem
berg, It helps the reader define the categories
of religious persecution for which the German
leaders were tried.

DIARIES, MEMOIRS,
AND OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES

Alf ieri,-Dino-„ -Dictators -Face to Pace, Translated by
David Moote ,. New York: New York University Press,
1955.
,
Alfieri was the Italian Ambassador, to the Vati
can in 1939 and transferred to Berlin in May 1940, ■
It is amazing that he does not say more about the
German attitude toward the Vatican, His few refer
ences to this attitude are in general terms and not
at all indispensible. The work is important, In
this respect, only in its examination of the person
alities of various high ranking Germans such as
199

Hitler, Weizsaecker, Mackensen, Ribbentrop, Goebbels,
etc,
Badoglio, Pietro.. Italy In the Second World War. Trans
lated by Muriel. Currey. London: Oxford. University
Press, 1948.
A poorly written, dull chronological presen
tation of Italy's role in World War II, and statisti
cally encumbered documents that might prove of some <
value. No psychological background at all. The
documents, are bolstered by Badoglio's personal re
collections which are of value as a primary source
and might be used in a future comprehensive study.
Bormann, Martin. The Bormann Letters: The Private Corre
spondence Between Martin Bormann and His Wife from
January 1943 to Apr11 1945» Edited by H. R. TrevorRoper. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954,
The Letters offer a profound examination of
Bormann's personality in connection with_his family
life but have little value in this field," -There
are a few. indications of his extreme anti-Christi
anity. and. his-.desire to bring up his. children in
the same tradition. Of greater value to the student
of Bormknn than the student of history in any other .
area. .
Churchill, Winston S. Memoirs of the Second World War.
Boston:.Houghton. Mifflin Company, 1959«
No information on the German attitude, but it
adds, many details external to the situation and
gives the. Allied.thoughts In m a n y cases. Of
course, Churchill is his usual self and the only
thing portrayed as more correct and valiant than
England is Churchill himself.
Cianfarra, Camille M. The Vatican and- the War. New York:
E. P. Dutton, 19^4.
Himself a Catholic, Cianfarra has written an
earnest, sympathetic account treating Popes Pius
XI and XII during the 1933-1943 period. This
journalistic-view disregards, polemic and. records
first-hand, observations concerning the Vatican's
attitude, toward- the war- and Germany,. Many of the
authorTs.-remarks... are not substantiated by available
German- documents., and must be used with- care.
Cianf arra-also has the reporter *s..malady of not
naming his source. All things considered, it is
a good source.
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Ciano, Galeazzo, The Ciano.. Diaries, 1939^-1-9^3-? The -Complete
Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo-Ciano,. Italian
Minister for. Foreign- Affairs., 1936-19^3» Edited and
translated by Hugh Gibson, Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Company, 19^6,
Ciano was anti-German and well thought of by the
Vatican-, His daily entries throw little light on
the German attitude toward the Church, He could
have contributed, very much to this problem, but
actually recorded very little, The Foreign Minis
ter does record some of the Pope’s conversations
with the Duce concerning the Helch,
Dietrich, Otto, Hitler, Translated by Richard and Clara
Winston, Chicago-: Regnery Company.,. 1955»
Another personal-.account- by a..~close associate
of Hitler.’.s, Not much. on. Hitler’s attitude toward ■
the. Vat lean,-and-what, there is is not new, but a
reiteration of statements' found throughout Mein
Kampf and- Conversations,
Dodd, William. E., Ambassador.- Dodd’s. Diary, 1933-38,
Edited, by W, E, Dodd, Jr, and. Martha Dodd, New
York: -Harcourt, Brace, 19^1,
This. is., a-good, work for the 1933=37 period as
Dodd records his conversations with many high rank
ing German and Catholic leaders. Much insight can
be gained as his observation of the church question
is acute. It is too bad that he is antl-Catholic
as well as anti-German and concentrates more heavi
ly on the Protestant Church, Dodd is a Baptist,
Dulles, A^len, The Secret Surrender, New York: Harper
and Row, 19^6,
” ~~
Herein is presented some insight into the
attitude, of the German authorities in Italy at the
time, the Vatican, was- instrumental-in peace negoti
ations which ties together the memoirs of Walter
Schellenberg- and. Albert Kesselring.,
Goebbels,. Joseph^ .The...Goe.b.b&ls--Djapies : 19k2 -19^-3»
Translated....by; Louis P, Lochner,- New York:
Doubleday &. Company, 19^8,
....The...Diaries --give much insight-, into the beliefs,
actions..,, and policies of members, of the Nazi Party,
Goebbels. was. among- the leaders of the. opposition to
the Church and second only to Martin Bormann in
closeness to Hitler, His attitude toward propa
ganda aimed at the Vatican is apparent and he is
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somewhat of a weather-gauge of the upper echelon
Reich officials who desired to rid Germany of the
'•politically active" church0 The Diaries is one
of the best personal narratives available for the
study of the German attitude, He was a Catholic
and quite aware of the problems Germany had with
the Church„
Has.sell9 Ulrich vonc The Von Hassell DiarieS: 1938-19^4,
New York: Doubleday & Company,, 19^-7»
Hassell touchs on the attitude of both the
Nazi Party and the internal German opposition to
the Vatican, He was in a position to observe the
situation, and his Diaries indicate that he did
just that, Hassell traces, in detail, the German
oppositions negotiation for peace through the
Vatican,
Information he has gleaned from various
contacts, as well as from Hitler and Bormann, are
recorded as is his contact with generals who sought
peace for Germany, A necessary source which far
over-shadows that of Papen and Weizsaecker,
Heiden, Konrad, Per Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power,
Translated fey Ralph Manheim, Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 19^<>
A view of the' rise of the Fuehrer within the
framework of National Socialism, Little infor
mation on the German attitude toward the Church
but should be read to help garner the feeling of
the period. He does not omit the part played by
the Vatican and the Catholic hierarchy In bring
ing Hitler to power however, Heiden is recognized
as knowing more about the rise of Hitler and
Nazism than any other objective historian, but it
must be remembered that he was anti-Hitler,
Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, Translated by Ralph Manheim,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^3°
Mein Kampf is, of course, a basic work to be
examined in the pursuit of an understanding of the
German attitude. His religious beliefs are
scattered throughout the work and blended with
principles of National Socialism,
It is compara
ble to Conversations in that Hitler's attitude is
exposed in generalized, often quixotic terms. It
can generally be said that he is consistent in his
belief that the Church must give way to National
Socialism, but he varys in his thoughts as to when,
how far, and in what manner.
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Hoffmann, Heinrich,, Hitler was my Friend, Translated by
E„ H, Stevens, London: Burke, 1955®
Hoffmann was Hitler’s official photographerand always present at great occasions as well as
at dinner parties, etc. He often comments on the
religious attitude of Hitler, Bormann, and others
and has a sympathetic view. He was, however, so
deeply influenced by the National Socialist feeling
around him that his judgment was inaccurate, Hoff
mann is self-serving, but the work should be read
to help grasp the attitude of Hitler and Bormann,
Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948,
This work shows that the German attitude
toward the Vatican was correct in its awareness
of the importance of the Vatican in international
affairs. It also throws light on America's nega
tive attitude toward the guarantee of not bombing
Rome, Hull writes extensively and covers a.
tremendous span of years in two volumes. Relations
with the Vatican and Germany make up a very minor
portion of the work. Still, to understand the .
German attitude one must understand the power the
Vatican possessed and part of that power was
concentrated in the United States,
Kesselring, Albert, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record,
Translated by Lynton Hudson, New York: William ■■
Morrow & Company, 1954®
The bulk of the Record is taken up with German
tactical and strategic decisions, and maneuvers of
which Kesselring had knowledge. However, for the
period from 1944-45 he gives a detailed account
of the German and Allied activities in Italy, He
describes the aid that, he and other German soldiers
gave to the Italian population, the Vatican, and
the saving of art treasures. He also sheds light
on the activities engaged In by himself and S,S.
General Wolff in negotiating a peace with the
Americans for the surrender of German troops in
Italy, The Vatican often acted as intermediary
in all of these activities, and it appears that
Kesselring co-operated fully,
Murphy, Robert, Diplomat Among. Warriors, Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964,
Murphy, a Foreign Service Career Officer with
the United States State Department, traveled and
worked throughout Europe during World War II, He
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is a Catholic and many times gives interesting
side-lights on the activities of prominent Catho
lics during this period0 His hook is written with
a good deal of hindsight, hut does offer some fresh
and contemporary conclusions. Very little dis
cussion ahout high ranking personalities who were
concerned with the German. attitude.
Mussolini, Benito. Memoirs. 19^2-19^3: With Documents
Relating to the Period. Translated hy Frances
Lohh. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 19^9,
The Memoirs are apologetic and propagandists;
obviously written to influence world opinion in
favor of Mussolini. Useless for Germany's atti- •
tude toward the Vatican except that significant
material on S.S. General Wolff's negotiations for
unconditional surrender of the German forces in
Italy is presented. The appended documents are
of much more value than the memoir Itself. There
is also useful information on the hombing of Rome
by the Allies. Mussolini consistently grossly
exaggerates his case.
Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. Translated by Brian Connell.
New Yorks E. P. Dutton & Company, 1953o
Papen was always in a position to view the
German feeling toward the Church. His Memoirs.;
is an autobiographical defense of his activities
for the Reich and can generally be criticized for
lack of Intellectual honesty. Nevertheless, the
work must be considered a basic source in this
area because of Papen»s intimate relationship .
with the top Nazis and his more than average con
cern with the Vatican.
Rosenberg, Alfred. Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg. Commen
taries by Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck.
Translated by Eric Posselt. Chicago: Ziff-Davis
Publishing Company, 19^9»
The work is mainly a commentary on Rosenberg's
final testament and fragmentary memoirs which have
been partially rewritten to assure readability.
The commentators have attempted to interpret Rosen
berg's words in the "light of history," but, as it
was written in 19^9 ® have not taken a very objective
view. It Is evident that Rosenberg never felt that
he was guilty of any excesses and that, to the end,
he was the ideological embodiment of National
Socialism. He followed a politically expedient
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policy toward the Church although his words were
often violently directed against it.
Schacht, HJalmar Horace Greeley. Confessions of "The Old
Wizard.’> Translated by Diana Pyke. Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Company. 1956*
The Confessions are predominantly concerned
with the administration of finances within the
Reich, but Schaeht was a devote Christian (Protes
tant) who was against the Reich’s church policy.
He spoke openly against the Reich’s church,policy,
but his activities in this area are completely
overshadowed by his concentration on finance.
The work presents a good' example(of a man who is
German by nationality but anti-Reich in ideology,
and the tribulations this dichotomy eaused him
in regard to loyalty and, to a lesser degree, the
church.
1
Schellenberg, Walter. The Labyrinth; Memoirs of Walter
Schellenberg. Translated by Lopis Hagen. New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1956.
Schellenberg wrote direct and honest, as well
as intriguing, memoirs I His familiarity with the
S.S. and S.D. set-up gave him the background to
evaluate events in minute detail wlqile observing
the' reactions of higher Reich leaders and the .
entire S D/S. entourage. Many details can be added
to the circumstances surrounding the death of
Heydrich and the disclosure of the German Western
invasion plans to the Allies. He often delves
into the attitude of Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler-,
Heydrich, Bormann, Canaris, and himself toward^
the Church. Very good. Vej^y interesting.
-•
Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters,- 19391945. Translated by R. H. Barry. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.
Particularly good for an examination of the
development of Hitler's war plans. The work
includes the dialogue of conversations between
Hitler and other important personages in the
Third Reieh. Very few passages relate to German
regard for the Vatican, but these are quite
important.
CO

CO

Weizsacker, Ernst. Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsacker.
Translated by John Andrews. Chicago: Regnery,
1951o
The former German Ambassador to the Vatican
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presents an apologetic and distorted account of
his activities, He discusses only the periphery
of the great events that surrounded him. There
is much discrepancy between Weizsaecker’s account
of his activities and information found in the
German documents and other memoirs0 Still, he
adds much detail to major events (eog 0 the
Maglione letter in 19^3) that had been obscure
before.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Bullock, Alan, Hitler; A Study in Tyranny, Completely
Revised Edition, New York; Harper & Row, 1962,
The study is a definitive biography of Hitler
and Interweaves most political development In
detail. But, as Bullock points out, the regime’s
attitude toward the churches does not fall within
the scope of the book, A fine source for study
ing the background to the Reich-Vatican conflict,
Cochrane, Arthur C, The Church’s Confession Under Hitler,
Philadelphia; The Westminster Press, 1962,
Cochrane devotes his work to Protestantism but
shows the degree to which it and Catholicism were .
Involved together In the struggle against German
suppression of religion. The most useful material
is concerned with the Catholic opposition within
Germany, One of the author’s conclusions is that
the two Churches worked together effectively, i
This thesis is contradicted by the Dodd Diaries
and Hitler's claims, in Conversations, that it
was a brilliant maneuver to keep the two from
working together,
Colvin, Ian, . Chief of Intelligence, London; Victor
Gollancz, 1951 o
Colvin places his emphasis on Canarls’s oppo
sition to Hitler, Much of his evidence relies on
circumstantial evidence and speculative thought,
Canaris’s encounters with the Vatican are mentioned,
but In such general terms as to be nearly worth
less ,
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Deakin, F, W„ The Brutal Friendship; Mussolini„ Hitler,
and the Fall of Italian Fascism, New York; Harper
and Row, 19^2 ,
"-™" ~—
Deakin?s work is one of the most scholarly
studies available on the relationship between
Hitler and Mussolini0 Many documents not else
where published are included,,
De Launay, Jacques, Secret Diplomacy of World War II,
Translated by Edouard Nadier„ New York; SimmonsBoardman, 1963 <>
Relates briefly to the surrender negotiations
carried on by Dulles and S,S, General Wolff in
19^5 o
Gilbert, Go Mo The Psychology of Dictatorship; Based on
an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany,
New York; The Ronald Press Company, 1950o
Here is found much information concerning the
attitude of German leaders, particularly Papen,
toward Catholicism, The work is most important
to this subject because it helps the reader to
understand the influence the psychological back
ground of the leaders had on their policy making
capacity during World War II, Since many of these
men were Catholic, their religious environment'
as children is part of the explanation of their
ambivalence toward Catholicism as adults. Curi
ously, ambivalence toward Catholicism is quite
characteristic of the leaders of the Reich,
Goris, Jan-Albert, Belgium in Bondage, New York; L, B,
Fischer, 19^3 <>
A pro-Belgium chronicle that examines the
German occupation of Belgium and the Belgian
resistance. Very Interesting reading but short
on specific details. No mention is made of the
Vatican although a great deal of space is given
to the Catholic clergy. Good for getting the
feel of the period and the Catholic resistence in
churches and unions,
Graham, Robert A, Vatican Diplomacy; A Study of Church
and State on the International Plane, Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959*
A well-researched documented tracing of Papal
diplomatic machinery from the fifteenth century
on. There is concern for the legal ideas behind
the Internationality of the Church, particularly
in regard to the United States and the Soviet
207

Union, This dispassionate study suffers from the
lack of available sources in the Vatican and national
archives,
Halecki, Oscar, Eugenio Pacelll: Pope of Peace, New York
Creative Age Press, 1951 <>
A very good work which examines the trials and
tribulations of Pius XII in detail and adds much
interesting, fully developed information to many
of the obscure incidents that occurred between^the
Reich and the Holy See, However, it is, as the
title suggests, quite biased. Many of the opinions
set forth by the author are grossly incorrect if
one is to believe the German documents. All in
all, a very interesting-book but open to a great
deal of debate,
Heiden, Konrad, A History of National Socialism, Trans
lated by Ralph Manheim, New York: Alfred A, Knopf,
1935o
'
■
A detailed examination of National Socialism,
and its aims and actions particularly in 1932-33°
There is useful discussion about the problems posed
by the specific demands of National Socialism in
relation to the German Catholic Church and the
ideological conflict precipitated by the Concordat,
The broader, diplomatic picture which concerns, the
Vatican is not discussed,
Hochhuth, Rolf, The Deputy, Translated by Richard and
Clara Winston, New York: Grove Press, 1964,
Hochhuth presents a morality play which cari
catures the motives of Pope Plus XII during the
Second World War, A compound of fiction and fact
is rendered more valuable by the author's "Side
light on History* which documents much of the work.
Moral issues abound,
Lehmann, L, H, Vatican Policy in the Second World War,
New York: Agora Publishing Co,, 19^6,
Lehmann’s work is of no merit concerning the
German attitude. Although a Catholic, priest, his.v
thesis is that there was a Jesuit conspiracy to
spread Catholic political totalitarianism through^
out national totalitarian governments. His con
clusion that the Church is disregarding its
spiritual mission and becoming dedicated to po
litical ultramontanism deserves consideration.
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Lewy, Guenter0 The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,, 196^0
This is the most comprehensive and well-done
work available on the relationship of the Nazi
hierarchy to the German Catholic Church,, There
is1 also much Information on the German attitude,
both individually and collectively, toward the
Vatican, However, it is mainly concerned with
the internal Church, Lewy makes use of a great
amount of unpublished material and his sources
are generally unimpeachable, It is a wellbalanced, objective work, Lewy not only made use
of unpublished Foreign Ministry material but
gained access to many diocesan archives which con
tained communications to and from the Holy See,
Finally, he held personal Interviews with many of
the important surviving personalities. His con
clusions are, of course, open to discussion,
Manvel1, Roger and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr, Goebbels :His Life and Death, New York: Simon and
Schuster, i960,
A portrait of the career and character of
Hitler's Minister for Propaganda and Public
Enlightenment,
It is a biography based upon
letters, diaries, and the oral testimony of
.those who knew him. Not a definitive biography,
but it helps to understand the man. Nothing on
the Church that cannot be found in better sources,
Namier, L, B, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938^-1939, London:
Macmillan & Co, Ltd,’, 19^8.
Inter-relationship of the Vatican with any
power is mentioned only in regard to Mussolini
and then is very brief. This is a very specific
work which is valuable for its delineation of
events Immediately prior to the invasion of
Poland,
Peers, E„ Allison, The Spanish Dilemma, London: Methuen
& Co., 19^0,
Peers is predisposed to favor Spain and wrote
in 19^0 which was very close to the subject. The
work is couched in generalizations, as was the
intent, which show the extent to which Catholicism
and Russia influenced the possibility of a GermanSpanish alliance. It Is valuable for this study
in that is shows, to a degree, the problem Germany
faced with Spanish Catholicism and therefore with
the Vatican,
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Ritter, Gerhardo The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's
Struggle Against Tyranny, Translated by R c T,
Clark, New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1958, ■
An excellent account of the German Opposition
which includes information on the relationship' of
the Opposition to the Vatican,, It is clearly
pointed out when and how the Vatican was used to
'make contact with the Western Powers' concerning
peace overtures. Of course, much of this is in
the realm of conjecture as there is little documen
tation, but Ritter was in a position to observe
and talk to the individuals involved. Quite
detailed,
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